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Homann: I support what has been said here by the comrades. The question of ensuring security and peace is also the primary one for us. All other issues are derived from and subordinate to this question. Therefore I think that the proposals made here are correct. Negotiations in an all-German committee which must be carried out before 1961, will give us the opportunity to lay out broadly our position, to show that from our side the national question is decided on a path of peace and peaceful coexistence with other countries, and to show that the development of the GDR guarantees a happy future of Germany. We can also demonstrate that the policy carried out in the GDR under the leadership of the working class is really a national policy.
Loch: Adenauer represents himself as a fighter for democracy and unification, but Adenauer's decision to withdraw his candidacy for president called forth a wave of protest and opened the eyes of many to the real state of affairs in the FRG.
Therefore, Khrushchev's proposals will have great significance. An all-German committee which will decide the fate of Germany, this is of course a step forward. The creation of this committee could activate the opposition forces in West Germany. The strengthening contacts between West German and GDR parties will gain new impetus.
In conclusion, I would like to express my certainty that we will return with good results to the GDR, which will allow us to strengthen our struggle for realizing the tasks which are before us.
Scholz: If we want peace, we can only agree with your proposals.
During Geneva we tried to explain things to the farmers and at every meeting, the question was asked: will there be war after Geneva[?] This testifies to the fact that people are thirsting for peace. However, some have lost heart, they don't see the real possibility to reach agreement. Therefore, the formation of the committee would be an important step in this direction which would inspire many. Thus I entirely agree with the proposals of the Soviet comrades.
Correns: There has already been a lot said here about Khrushchev's proposals. I think that these proposals will be well accepted in West Germany, since they are intelligent
The propaganda in the FRG tries to present everything as if the USSR always says no. The new Soviet proposals cut the ground out from under this propaganda. This will give us great help in our all-German work and will give us the opportunity to start a conversation with the population of the FRG.
Khrushchev: If there aren't more people who want to speak, I would like to elaborate on one issue. The Western Powers are not accepting our proposals for a free city. But psychologically they are already prepared that a treaty with the GDR will be signed. Therefore, they are now especially worried about the situation in West Berlin.
They are asking us, they are defining precisely, what the situation in Berlin will be. From their side, they have put forward the formulation that the GDR exercises control over the communications of the Western Powers with West Berlin “as agents of the Soviet Union. We immediately answered them that this is unacceptable to us. But there is one question of theirs we must answer. They are saying: what will happen if the GDR one day takes the initiative and closes communications between West Berlin and the West?
And so on this issue there must be clear agreement. This has vital significance, even in relations between friends. We can imagine two forms of such guarantees:
1) The GDR together with the Western powers signs an agreement on guarantees. But the West probably won't agree to this. And we don't really need to achieve this.
2) The GDR guarantees it by a unilateral declaration.
However, in this case the Western powers want us to make the guarantee for your guarantee.
Ulbricht: Please. [i.e., okay]
Khrushchev: This would not be right. We can't do this. Therefore, we must sign an agreement with the Western powers which will be registered at the UN, in which it is foreseen that in the event that the GDR violates its obligations regarding guarantees, then the great powers together will seek measures to bring pressures to bear on the GDR.
In our view, this is the only possible path right now.
Ulbricht: Will this point of view be proposed at
Khrushchev: Yes, in Geneva. If we don't do this at the Geneva conference, a vacuum might be created at Geneva and there won't be any sense of a future at the conference.
We don't know whether Eisenhower will agree to this. But it is necessary for world opinion to know about these positive proposals by our side.
Ulbricht: The remarks by Comrade Khrushchev are very important. The time is really ripe for this. We must find a way out. But it is clear that we can't solve all issues in one stroke. Therefore I discussed the peace treaty very carefully, since it's clear that the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would exacerbate the situation, for which we are not now prepared. Economically, we still cannot exert influence on the West; therefore, we must win time. This also concerns our policy with regard to the Social Democrats (SPD) and the opposition circles of the West through which to isolate Adenauer. The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would complicate the situation. In all regards, Khrushchev's proposals correspond to the real situation and our domestic political situation.
But we are interested that the issue of nuclear disarmament remain on the agenda. We must constantly discuss this, since only by this path can we isolate Adenauer. Therefore we will put special stress on all issues which are understood by the majority of the German
people. Our opinions in this regard concur completely. All parties in the GDR support these proposals. Accordingly, we will give corresponding instructions to our delegation in Geneva.
And in the future we will declare our support for a non-aggression pact between the two German states and for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. But from the point of view of the development of the situation in Berlin, we also need to gain time, since Western propaganda is now maintaining that the dependence of West Berlin on the East would mean the lowering of the standard of living in it.
Khrushchev: I would like to quickly sum up the exchange of views on these issues. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the German friends for the fact that you correctly understand us and between us there is a complete unity of views that the German people support us.
This inspires certainty in us, this attests to us that our policy is right. If all the parties in the GDR approve of it, that means that world public opinion will correctly perceive it also. This understanding is a great victory of our peace-loving policy.
Ulbricht: I would like to speak some more about the situation in the GDR. The first months of fulfilling the plan of this year speak to the fact that we are quickly moving forward. We have been thoroughly occupied with certain branches (of the economy], especially chemical [industry and) construction, therefore we have achieved well-known successes. In construction, business has also gotten better now. Currently we are occupied with light industry and trade where we have well-known lags.
The main issue for us now is the increase of work productivity and the reconstruction of industry. In the chemical industry, the corresponding plan has already been worked out. For other branches, we are discussing (the plans). It is also a new development that cooperation between the workers and intelligentsia is developing and growing. Brigades of socialist labor have been formed. There are about 10,000 of these brigades. The stimulus for this was an initiative of the Soviet comrades in creating brigades of communist labor. It is true that we have them at a lower level than you do, but it is occurring without any kind of propaganda or pressure from above. Thus we highly value this development.
In this connection, we have a request—to bureaucratize and broaden the cooperation and ties between large enterprises of our countries. Until now, too many functionaries (and) trade-union workers, but not direct representatives of industry have travelled (to us). We should develop connections between exemplary industrial factory workers.
Until August, we are mainly working on a plan for developing agriculture for the period up to 1965. But we have tasks which we cannot resolve with our own forces by 1961. It is a question of acquiring some foodstuffs and consumer goods, such as wool, coffee, cocoa, and
southern (tropical] fruits.
Khrushchev: We will give you oil instead of cocoa.
Ulbricht: Of course we can survive even without cocoa. But the question here is about comparing the standard of living in the GDR with West Germany and West Berlin. At the current time, the population still goes to West Berlin to buy some of these goods, which has, of course, negative political consequences.
We have a list of goods which we need, and we ask you to familiarize yourself with it and to see how you can help us. We are prepared to pay for everything you want in 1963. This is a proposal of the Politburo and planning commission. We aren't presenting these lists for negotiations. We would only like your specialists to look them over and tell us how they could help us. Concretely, the question is of a credit of 700 million rubles over 2 years, 1961-1962.
Khrushchev: Let [Bruno) Leuschner (Head of the GDR State Planning Committee and Politburo member] and Mikoian study this question.
Ulbricht: I would also like to inform you about the situation in agriculture. The development of our agricultural production is proceeding normally on the whole. At the current time, SKhPK's [Agricultural Production Cooperatives] occupy 49% of land space. We want to strengthen the weak SKPK's now, and give agricultural technology to the strong cooperatives. We are not planning to speed up the tempo of the cooperativization of the farmers.
In the area of cattle-breeding, we have well-known difficulties. But we are studying these problems now so as to overcome the shortcomings we have here. On the whole, I would like to emphasize again that our agricultural situation is not bad.
We have another request. It has to do with broadening the scientific-technical cooperation between our countries. In several areas we have already achieved world standards. In other areas we are strongly lacking. Therefore we would request that you help us in the development of the chemical industry and in several other areas. I have in mind giving us help in the matter of mastering the technology of new machines. We will give you our best machines, the organization of technological processes for producing these machines, the blueprints for these machines, etc., and you will give us yours. In addition, we ask you to familiarize us with the models of those machines which you buy in America and other capitalist countries. For example, we now produce beautiful artificial fibers, but we are very backward in the production of weaving machines. Our research council worked out a concrete plan and proposal on this issue. And we already gave an order to stop the production of old machines. We are in a good position, for example, in heavy machine building and in the chemical industry where you exerted certain pressure on us.
But we can only surpass West Germany by carrying out a quick reconstruction of industry. Without this we
cannot resolve our main economic task. Besides, our intelligentsia compares not only our standard of living with the level of West Germany, but also the level of production. Therefore, it would have great significance also for the resolution of the question about the intelligentsia.
In sum, the issue is to strengthen (our) exchange and cooperation.
Your delegation which was in the GDR already gave us significant help in this regard. We hope that this cooperation will strengthen even more in the future.
We also think that it is time to broaden the cooperation between our countries in the area of schools, including in the preparation of textbooks.
Until recently, this matter was going badly here. But it has improved in the past year. It is true that we have some different forms and methods of work, but the principles are the same. The same basic problems face you and face us. We are now preparing new school laws which will be implemented shortly. The main direction in which we are going is the introduction of polytechnical education in the schools.
But we are particularly behind in the development of new textbooks and in this regard we need more significant help.
Khrushchev: We agree with you. And we will give you help where we can. But these issues are difficult. Therefore let's wrestle (with them together. The question of schools, of course, is easier than the question of reconstructing industry. And what you need, what you find good for you (from us], take it. If something isn't suitable for you, don't take it. Here we must have a free exchange of views.
It's harder with machines. And the issue here isn't with secrecy, but with the fact that we have very many machines, and we ourselves often don't know whether we make them worse or better than other countries.
In this connection I would like to say that I really liked your (trade) fair. It gives an idea of a level of
a achievement of world technology. It even served as a stimulus for the CPSU CC plenum which will meet this month.
On the whole we want to say—let your engineers look at what is suitable for you, and what is suitable, take. We buy a lot of machines abroad. You can also get the blueprints of these machines, and your engineers can assist in their assembling.
Thank you for the information on the situation in your country.
Ulbricht: We need to agree on working out the text of the communique. From our side, comrades Leuschner, Kundermann and Korb could participate in its preparation.
Khrushchev: From our side, comrades [V.V.)
Grotewohl: I have one concern. Ulbricht already
expressed our ideas, our points of view on economic issues. We agreed that Leuschner will discuss this with Comrade [Minster of Foreign Trade N.S.) Patolichev. But we already ran into this problem in the past. If comrades approach this question from the point of view of foreign trade, then the whole matter will be reduced to a pencil.” But in our conditions economic problems turn into political ones.
If we obtain the creation of an all-German committee, but then we have to retreat, our position will be deplorable. Therefore, I really ask you to take this situation into account. We need credits for 1961 and 1962, and I would ask that the Soviet comrades approach this issue from the perspective of what I have said.
Khrushchev: We will look at all of this. We must reckon with our real capabilities.
I would like to remind you that we began the competition with capitalism naked and with bare feet. The people believed us not only due to the promises of sausage and beer, but also due to the teachings of Marx and Lenin.
The Americans are placing great hopes now in the organization of their exhibit in Moscow. They are reckoning that the Soviet people, looking at their (the American achievements, will turn away from their (Soviet) government. But the Americans don't understand our people. We want to turn the exhibit against the Americans. We will tell our people: look, this is what the richest country of capitalism has achieved in one hundred years. Socialism will give us the opportunity to achieve this significantly faster.
Therefore, we won't raise the issue of socialism or coffee. Socialism—first, but coffee must be delivered, today maybe not the whole cup, but tomorrow the
We aren't tradesmen, we are friends. Therefore, we approach all issues politically. But before giving an answer, we must consider, we must look at our capabilities [to help you economically).
Notes taken by: comrades Beletskii, Kotomkin, Myal'dizin
Document No. 2 “Summary of the Talks with the GDR PartyGovernmental Delegation on 18 June 1959. On the
Soviet side, the same people took part as in the previous meeting, and also A.N. Kosygin and N.S
Patolichev,” 4 July 1959
Secret. Notes taken by Beletskii, Kotomkin, Mial’dizin.
Ulbricht: Let me express the gratitude of our delegation for the warm welcome we received in Moscow, Riga, Kiev and Gorki. Our meetings were a significant event in the development of friendship between the Soviet Union and the GDR. We are all very pleased with the trip,
them is our will for peace and (our) readiness to have a partial resolution of issues.
When we speak about the conclusion of a peace treaty, we have in mind the conclusion of a peace treaty with two or with one German state.
I don't know whether we will bring this issue of the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR to realization[:] however, such a prospect acts in a sobering way on the Western powers and West Germany. This, if you will, is pressure on them, Damocles' sword, which we must hold over them.
Why? Because by the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR they will lose all their rights to West Berlin which come from the fact of the military defeat and the unconditional surrender of Germany. The threat of war from their side is nonsense, it is blackmail, since it is clear that (merely, because of the two and a half-million inhabitants of West Berlin, it would be unreasonable to place under threat the lives of a hundred million people. The more the Western powers know that there is a balance in the area of atomic weapons and rockets, the better it is
including the students who were also in our delegation. We are very grateful to you for everything, including also for the well-composed program. Regarding the visit to the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR (VDNKh), it is completely clear that we could only become acquainted with it in general outline. But already after that, it became clear to us that at home we have an entire series of unresolved problems [economically). At home we are discussing things, but sometimes they aren't applied quite right. Thus, we ask you to accept a group of our specialists for a more detailed study of
your achievements which were shown in the Exhibition. This is particularly so with regard to electronics and chemistry. This will have great political significance also, because it will give our intelligentsia the opportunity to be convinced of the superiority of Soviet science and technology over the West, especially over the Americans and West Germans.
Khrushchev: We will welcome everyone who comes to us with the goal of becoming acquainted with our achievements.
Ulbricht: Maybe we should listen to the report on the prepared communiqué.
Khrushchev: They gave us the text of the communiqué late, and we didn't have the opportunity to study it in detail. Thus I propose studying in more detail the draft communiqué we received and giving our views through our representatives.
Khrushchev: Now I would like to say a few words on one important question, namely: on a peace treaty.
Or perhaps (should I) acquaint you with the latest information on Geneva?
We recently received a letter from Eisenhower and yesterday we gave an answer. I would like to emphasize that in accordance with our agreement, the exchange of letters took place confidentially.
From Eisenhower's letter, it is clear that we can't expect any great results from the Geneva conference. The Western powers bring everything back to the question of the period of time. They say that our proposal about a time period of 1 year is an ultimatum, although in principle the issue of a time period was put forward by them themselves in the overall plan.
They want to have a meeting with Adenauer, to wreck the agreement on the committee, proposing the principle of proportional representation on the committee. They know, of course, that if they go for the creation of the committee, this would be recognition of the GDR. However, refusing our recent proposals, they at the same time made a series of concessions and proposed limiting the number of troops in West Berlin (and) stopping subversive activity on its territory. But for this they want us to confirm their rights to maintain their occupation in West Berlin forever and to renounce signing a peace treaty.
They are trying to represent our latest proposal as a threat. But that isn't what is a threat to them, the threat to
Therefore we must directly establish our point of view on a peace treaty in the communiqué. If we didn't do this, it would be a gift to Adenauer; then they would say: the representatives of the USSR and GDR assembled and were afraid to move away from their old positions. Thus I think that we must continue our line on this issue and reflect our position in the communiqué. Furthermore, this must be strengthened by new arguments in our speeches also.
Ulbricht: We are in full agreement with you. I would just like to direct your attention to one issue in connection with the communiqué. Where the recent Soviet proposals are discussed, it says that the Soviet government agrees to the temporary maintenance of the well-known occupation rights of the Western powers in West Berlin. We exchanged opinions on this issue in the delegation. We propose to start not with West Berlin but with the transitional time period (let's say-1 year) during which the commission must agree on a series of questions, that is, to lay special stress on the fact that the Western powers have recommended a limited transition period. This stating of the issue corresponds to the Soviet proposals and at the same time alleviates for the Western powers the transition to this new position. And this facilitates our argumentation.
Khrushchev: Let's not give a time period. A year or a year-and-a-half—this isn't a key issue for us. We are agreed on different time periods, but we aren't agreed on endlessness. Let us act more flexibly on this issue, using a sliding scale of time periods. They are proposing two-anda-half years, we [are proposing] one year. Maybe we will agree on something in between.
Ulbricht: For us, the main thing now is not to drive them into a corner, but to give them the possibility to change their position.
Khrushchev: Maybe I will acquaint you with the contents of Eisenhower's letter and our answer to it. (The
text of the letters is read.)
for example the liquidation of rocket bases and the As you see, in principle there is nothing new, only a prohibition of atomic arms in West Germany. Proceeding repetition and elaboration of what has been said earlier. from this, it is in our interests that the summit conference The new thing is just that we are agreed to make a
will be successful on the issue of atomic disarmament. compromise on the issue of a time period. And this we
Khrushchev: That is correct. But the main thing is to must emphasize in the communiqué.
fulfill the resolutions of the (SED) 5th congress (of July I would like to emphasize again that the Western 1958), to raise the standard of living. Then it will be clear powers aren't interested in a peace treaty, because
to each German where there is freedom and where there otherwise they would weaken the threads which are
isn't freedom. connected with NATO. The present position already
Grotewohl: From a general estimation, I agree with weakens NATO, but signing a peace treaty with Germany, what has been said here. I just have one reservation. It this would mean normalizing the situation in Europe. But seems to me that the comparison with Japan appears a bit then how could the Americans keep Denmark,
formal. Signing a peace treaty with Germany and with Luxembourg (and] Greece in NATO?
Japan are two different things. Japan was a single state at And even the seemingly strong tie of de Gaulle with the moment of the signing of the treaty, but Germany is Adenauer—this is a relative understanding. In France the divided. If we sign a peace treaty, the good conditions will issue of the removal of American bombers from their be complicated. However, in the West, they will try to country was raised.
present the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR as the Now a few more words on the peace treaty. When the deepening of the division of the country. If there is a peace Western powers want to sign any sort of treaty, they don't treaty signed with the GDR, this would mean that there think about anything. This was how it was, for example, would be written into it something about the acceleration with the conclusion of the treaty with Japan (which the of militarism in the GDR, whereas the problem lies in the U.S. signed with Japan in 1951 and didn't include the acceleration of militarism in West Germany. Since at the Soviets). And they weren't blamed by us for the signing of current time we can't count on the conclusion of a peace separate peace treaty. Therefore, in order to unmask them, treaty with Germany or with two German states, then, we must write directly in the communiqué: we will
obviously, this national problem-stopping the arming of achieve the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. West Germany—must be resolved now by other means, by But if the reactionary forces will hinder this, then we agree the fulfillment of the resolutions of the 5th Congress. We to conclude a peace treaty with two German states. And if cannot separate these issues. the Western powers don't want this, then we will conclude What we need to study now, what we need to resolve a peace treaty with the GDR.
is to determine our relations to the occupying powers and In concluding a peace treaty with 2 German states or to the occupying authorities. The Western powers with the GDR, all agreements on the occupation will cease currently are formulating their entire policy on the their operation. There is no point in discussing West Berlin principle that they are allegedly defending freedom and separately from the issue of the peace treaty, since this Western culture. They declare that for the defense of this doesn't have equivalent value. These aren't two questions freedom they must maintain the occupation of West but one question. Berlin is an issue derived from the Berlin. This explains the fact that they are fighting problem of a peace treaty. But we must clearly speak in persistently for their formulation of preserving their rights the communiqué about the status of the free city of West of occupation. Berlin[:] otherwise we will be accused of agreeing to
Thus N.S. Khrushchev's proposal not to give a swallow up West Berlin. Clearly we must also speak
concrete time period in the communiqué is correct. This about guarantees.
will make our position more flexible. Proceeding from Ulbricht: We agree.
this, we must find such a formulation in the communiqué We also heard that (U.S. Secretary of State Christian] which will present the liquidation of the occupation Herter wants to exclude the German question and agree regime as a necessary process of development in order to only on the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. He
make that understandable to everyone. is looking here for a path to a summit conference. As for The most decisive thing in all the negotiations is to us, we think that without any reduction of tensions, we win time, and time can be won only through negotiations. cannot move forward including on the German question. So, I agree with you. Thus, if the Western powers want to talk about
Ebert: I would like to speak about the issue of a disarmament, it wouldn't be bad, because then we would peace treaty and about Berlin. I agree that a peace treaty again come to the question of a peace treaty, but from the and Berlin are one issue. But for our activity in Berlin, it is other side.
important to emphasize that by preserving the current I would also like to note that only a part of the
situation, we can find a way to normalize the situation in German people understand the slogans about a peace Berlin (pushing off from their concessions to bring about treaty. Thus we will put on the main plan those issues of the stopping of subversive activity, propaganda, etc.). the peace treaty which are more understood by all, such as Their proposals on this are already a step towards the