For the Decision of the WTO C-in-C:14 (My suggestions) — 11.12.81 1. To find a position with a site in the Embassy (work, relaxation, eating) (Titov, Fedorov) 2. "Bulava" communications in the Embassy.15 From where to put it. A crew, eating, toilet facilities..., etc. 16 Borisov is to drive the commander along the route on 12.12 3. Guards and defense — Armored pers. carr.... Shilka artil.17 Polish identification marks. Merezhko Must remove their own unit's marks.' 4. Merezhko —> Oliwa, a unit for the guards of the Embassy 5. A kitchen one for meals. Groceries Fedorov -> to get them 6. To Borisov -> Molczyk, Gen. Staff, via Oliwa Scheme of communications District, Representative Zarudin, Rembertow 19 7. Transport for conveyance -> a site in the DefMin 1-2 armored tank regiments Merezhko, Titov 18 Report to Def Min D. F. Ustinov 17:35 (Moscow time) 11.12.81 The report overall is the same. Without any sort of changes. In the volume of ciphered The situation is getting complicated. A session of "S"25 at the factory. Roughly 200 young thugs gathered.26 Per Jaruzelski's instruction, he reported: When everything is prepared for the culmination, he requests that the following questions be answered: (1) The Soviet side would send for consultations on political matters in the plan for the introduction of martial law 27 (2) later - a request to consult on economic matters. The economic situation is dramatic. He thanked Baibakov. We understand the inconvenience in the USSR, but we are counting on the provision we also viewed your arrival favorably. For us this gives support in the matter of introducing martial law and struggling to overcome the crisis. At this stage there can be no consideration at all of sending troops.30 WW28 is very worried that no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale economic and military aid. WW raises this question because even though it was clear earlier, the situation recently has changed. The adversary is supported from outside and is making the situation more tense. 31 It might join forces with "S" and draw young people to its ranks, forcing a confrontation." Cde. Jaruz. met yesterday with Aristov and raised questions of a political and economic nature. What is the reaction now of the USSR to our actions? But we received no answer. We are very worried about what the ambassador's adviser on economic relations (trade) is reporting today to the Min. of Foreign Trade (of 30,000 tons — 12,000 to be sent to Legnica).33 and we cannot embark on any adventurist actions if the Sov. comrades do not support us. 34 WW wanted to travel to the USSR. But the time wasn't suitable for us. I suggested traveling a bit earlier. We transmitted the requests to the ambassador, but have received no answer. With what sort of polit. slogan must we act against the adversary. "The mechanism is operating; the bow is We can defer the schedule for starting by a day: from Sunday to Monday (13./14.12). But no later. VG I am not fully informed about what you transmitted to the ambassador. I know what sort of work you carried out in preparing the introduction of martial law. It is very significant. You do have the forces. That much we know. If the church is stepping up its activity, that's because you did not give a rebuff to the enemy. And the church is continuing to exert pressure on the leadership.37 The leading officers for martial law are in good spirits, and there is no need to speak about any sort of adventurist action. You have real strength. You insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own. The friends spoke to you about this matter, and you remember it. We also spoke a lot about this at the DefMin Comm. mtg.38 It's now time to act. The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement is now impossible. I don't know what Andropov was saying. But friends remain friends. I will report all the questions to my leadership, and you must act decisively. If the Church had caused tension, you obviously would feel your weakness. Evidently, that weakness lies at the center of this deterioration. Yes, the mechanism has been neglected. We understand, and the leadership in Moscow understands. But does this mean that Cde. Jaruz. has not made a final decision?? Is that so? We would like to know this.39 As far as the arrival of Baibakov is concerned, he examined Siwicki About "Adventurism." We link this word with polit. consultations. How does the Soviet leadership assess our polit. our line.11 We are embarking on this action under the slogan "Salvation of the Motherland" and "National Salvation." VG Why has the question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law. Siw. The decision has been made. The premier requests that you look upon these matters with understanding. And again reminds you about his requests. Without help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles. The enemy has said his final word. The sides have clearly staked out their positions. Now what is needed is a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution. A "Military-Revolutionary Council of National Salvation" has been formed and is already beginning to act. "They want to arrest 50 people from the old leadership.” Mutual thanks and greetings. P.S.42 Siwicki left here dissatisfied. He got nothing new and heard nothing new from V.G. The WTO C-in-C has been restrained by Moscow!! 12 12 9:30 The WTO C-in-C held talks with Cde. Gurunov and gave an explanation along the lines of our telegram of yesterday under three signatures: Aristov, Kulikov, and Pavlov The ciphered message is very bad. The introduction of martial law is made dependent on the fulfillment of four points. Jaruzelski is demanding a meeting at the highest level, an answer about the provision of military assistance, etc. |