conclusion of a peace treaty near the end of summer. A commission would be necessary for this. What will come of it, if we go too fast? Crudely put, a bad peace treaty. That is, the questions of the borders and the capital would be regulated, and a number of the war's remnants would be eliminated. [The question of] air traffic would remain open, while the general traffic would remain as it has been. All of this would mean a strengthening of the German Democratic Republic. We are of the opinion that the USA would not have any formal reason to exacerbate the situation. One must consider the possibility of continuing to use the tactic used up to now of exploiting West Berlin as a means of pressure.

Hence, there is the proposal to conclude a peace treaty, including a protocol that expresses the matters in which the Soviet Union and the Western Powers stand in unanimity and that also states what still remains open.

In terms of strengthening the GDR, such a step would be greeted warmly; the conclusion of a peace treaty would be expedient for the elections to the Volkskammer. From Berlin, of course, one cannot perceive the entire situation, but simple propaganda for a peace treaty will not meet with the acceptance of the population.

In recent weeks, the enemy has greatly strengthened its attack. Many of the measures taken by the Soviet Union have been exploited against the GDR because they were carried out without any political justification—e.g., the trip of the Soviet garrison commander to West Berlin, the exercises by Soviet planes in the air corridors.

Comrade Khrushchev: One must see things the way they are. We are disturbing the USA's air traffic.36 It has to defend itself. The imperialist forces will always be against us. One must see that West Berlin is not in Adenauer's hands. On August 13, we achieved the maximum of what was possible. I have the same impression as before that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR need not lead to war. But one must consider the situation realistically. You want to give your signature and we are supposed to give economic [support], because one must see the possibility that after the conclusion of a peace treaty, there will be an economic boycott. Adenauer will carry out an economic boycott, and we will have to give [the GDR] everything that is lacking. I am proceeding on the basis of the interests of my country and from the interests of the entire socialist camp. One should not assume that the West has it easy. Why does it want guarantees for access? Because the West does not trust the people of West Berlin. They believe that West Berlin cannot hold out for more than ten years.

The signing of a peace treaty would lead to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The main question, however, is not the peace treaty, but a consolidation of the economic situation. That is what we have to concentrate on. I say once again with regard to a peace treaty, that I believe there would be no war, but who can guarantee that? What is pushing us to a peace

treaty? Nothing. Until August 13, we were racking our brains over how to move forward. Now, the borders are closed. One must always proceed from the idea that the conclusion of a peace treaty must serve us, that we will conclude it when we need it. The measures worked out by Comrade Ulbricht are correct. Of course the German people are affected by Western propaganda. It affects us less. We support the GDR's measures, but we do not agree that it is absolutely necessary to use the peace treaty as a slogan for the elections to the Volkskammer.

Comrade Ulbricht: The economic questions are naturally the most important. For us, they do not necessarily coincide with our political tasks. In previous years, we campaigned for the conclusion of a peace treaty, but then came the withdrawal of the deadline, and the impressions from that are still present in the population. It is necessary to conduct the propaganda about a peace treaty more carefully. Our population sometimes thinks differently. It links the peace treaty to national illusions. The document before you is, so to speak, the expression of a new phase in our politics. We have thoroughly discussed it with the other parties, and it is correct that with regard to a peace treaty, one must be more careful.

Comrade Khrushchev returned to the peace treaty. What do we see? The Thompson-Gromyko talks are a step backwards in comparison to the earlier talks. The USA wants to raise its price. We have said openly that these are no foundation for negotiations. Previously, Kennedy presented his standpoint on the borders of Poland and the CSSR. Of course he cannot ratify the German border between the GDR and West Germany. One cannot expect that of him. He is trying to reach an agreement— for example, on an international [border] control. In one interview, he posed the question himself of what one can do and to whom one can turn if, for example, Ulbricht infringes upon the [existing] order regarding access routes to Berlin. To whom can one turn in such a situation?37 One has to see that on August 13, we disturbed the stability of West Berlin. The GDR must be made invulnerable in economic terms. One must also discuss this with the Poles and the Czechoslovaks. The Albanians and the Chinese criticize us with regard to the peace treaty and West Berlin. What are they doing themselves? (Portuguese colonies in India, Hong Kong, etc.)38 I think that our policy is correct, nothing disturbs us, and as long as imperialism exists, we will have to operate in this fashion.

Comrade Ulbricht interjected that the EEC [European Economic Community] is also becoming effective. Comrade Khrushchev referred to the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and started to speak in this regard about agricultural matters.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the GDR's economic situation. The preparations for the 1962 plan foresee a 7% increase in investments, and the growth in production will amount to around 6%. Overall, the standard of living

remains the same as it was. Wage increases of around 1% will follow.

We want to try to carry out a mobilization of production for the conclusion of a peace treaty by this fall. One should not forget, however, that often the material incentive is missing. We are currently working with large savings measures, including a reduction in higher wages; the incomes must be cut. That means domestically a certain political risk.

We are having difficulties with investments because the investments in part are in areas with little economic return―e.g., metals [Buntmetalle] and coal. For us, the costs of production in these areas cost many times the world-market price. The plan for 1961 was not achieved. The workforce is lacking. We have a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union, but it cannot be completely fulfilled. It is necessary to develop further the specialization and the deliveries of raw materials. In the trade treaty with the Soviet Union, there are a number of quotas that cannot be met.

In terms of carrying out the plan, there is a greater orientation towards those branches of production that are profitable. A higher worker productivity absolutely has to be achieved by using the best machines, which are now going in part for export. A reorientation of industry in this way is necessary. Then the GDR will be in a situation to repay its credits.

In response to an objection by Comrade Kosygin, Comrade Khrushchev replied that we cannot act like petty traders. It has to do with creating a profitable economy in the GDR.

Comrade Kosygin is in agreement with the plans as they were presented. He pointed out that in the GDR there is, in part, higher consumption than in West Germany. A great deal is paid out in the form of social support, but the German only sees what passes through his fingers. He believes that the reduction in investment in agriculture is incorrect. Unprofitable branches of industry must be cut. The plan for 1962 is not yet ready; it will be necessary to work out the material in 1-2 days in order to reach an acceptable decision.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the necessity of rebuilding several city centers. It is a political, not an economic, question.

In the construction of housing, a reduction in costs absolutely must be achieved, but he is of the opinion that for the time being, construction should not be touched.

Comrade Khrushchev referred to the difficulties in agriculture and asked whether it is true that the GDR bought potatoes from Poland.

Comrade Kosygin interjected that the GDR is importing sugar and before, it was exporting it.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out that the transformation of agriculture is a protracted processe.g., the development of combines.

A long conversation evolved over the development of agricultural machinery.

At the end of the discussions, it was decided to carry out the next discussion on the afternoon of the 27th around 1600 hours. In the meantime, talks were to be held between [Chairman of the State Planning Commission] Comrade [Bruno] Leuschner and Comrade Kosygin.

[Source: Dölling, Ambassador, "Note of the Discussion on 26.2.1962," 7 March 1962. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Außenstelle Berlin, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (MfAA), 39 Ministerbüro (Winzer), G-A476.]

Document No. 4

Note on the Discussion between Khrushchev and Ulbricht in Moscow on 27 February 1962 (Excerpts)

Comrade Kosygin reported on the discussion that had taken place between him and Comrade Leuschner; as the first problem, he dealt with the prospective plans for 196365. He touched upon the following questions: control numbers, 1963-1965; investment questions; balancing of industrial branches; coordination and reorganization of individual branches of industry.

He reported that the consultations had concluded in a decision to appoint groups of experts, who will prepare the appropriate materials and come to the negotiations without binding directives. These preparations should provide a basis for the 7-Year-Plan. Deadline for the work of the groups of experts: one month.

Comrade Khrushchev stressed that it is necessary to see the new bases for economic relations between the two states. This has to do with the unification of the economies of both states and the harmonizing of their plans. Whatever is decided upon must be carried out by both sides. The economies of both countries must be treated as a united whole, and all possibilities must be considered. He proposed that relations with the GDR be governed in the same way as, for example, the plan and settlement with the Ukraine are binding. He illustrated this strive-worthy condition by referring to a discussion that [Klement] Gottwald 40 had once led.

Comrade Ulbricht pointed out that until 1954, there had already been closer economic relations than is currently the case.

Comrade Khrushchev countered that the cooperation then was different, it was a mutual agreement. He is of the opinion, for example, that the question of investments in copper and potash must be agreed upon in the mutual plans, which [each side] must be obliged to keep.

Meeting the quantities agreed upon must be an obligation. Comrade Ulbricht voiced his agreement. He then made several supplementary remarks regarding economic-technical cooperation and suggested that a direct cooperation of the [Party] secretaries working in this area should take place. Currently, things are not in order because very many matters regarding the transfer of

patents and experience are being regulated by state security. He is of the opinion that the exchange and transfer of such things should take place through the "Committee for Coordination." He proposed that suitable guarantees be made for such cooperation.

Comrade Kosygin then reported on his conceptions for the plan in 1962, at which point he stressed that deliveries to the GDR have been fully agreed upon, but that the balance is still 215,000,000 rubles short.

He then drew attention to the following particulars:
Activation of trade with Bonn to the maximum extent.
Scrutiny of military expenditures.

The establishment of technically-based norms, esp. the alteration of norms.

The alignment of investments in crucial areas. The standard of living in the GDR in comparison to the Federal Republic.

From the latest numbers he reached the conclusion that there are good possibilities for real propaganda in the GDR. He further stressed that great possibilities still exist to balance the plan in 1962, though with a larger credit from the Soviet Union. He suggested that it is better to discharge an investment with 6% than with 7%, but also to fulfill and surpass the plan. By all means, that is politically better. With regard to the standard of living, he drew attention to the fact that it seems expedient to give more in the form of direct wage increases and less through the social funds, because the latter is barely taken into account by the population.

Comrade Khrushchev interjected that the after the 20th Plenum, the Soviet Union also went over to presenting the plan in such a fashion that a larger surplus [Übererfüllung] was guaranteed. That is of political consequence. Regarding the credit, he proposed that a suitable agreement be made and then signed in Leipzig.

Comrade Ulbricht expressed his agreement to the proposals and drew attention to the situation that had developed in terms of the individual matters in the most recent time period.

With regard to military expenditures, he referred in particular to the fact that it had become necessary to equip the army with new rail and radio equipment.

Comrade Khrushchev interjected that it cannot be that such an increase could arise on these grounds. One must check. It has to do with limiting the non-productive expenditures.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the need to achieve an increase in production through additional material stimuli and reported on the struggle being waged to create technically-grounded work norms.

He pointed out that an acceleration of this struggle [to create technically-based work norms] is impossible. Comrade Kosygin pointed out that the GDR is among those [states] with the highest norms in housing. In discarding ruins and constructing new city centers one cannot proceed from the desirable shape of the city centers; instead, money must be placed first of

all at the disposal of factories. In the GDR there are accommodations, city centers, etc., that are not planned for the Soviet Union until 1970. One must make reasonable use of the funds available. The main thing is to use these means for production.

Comrade Khrushchev said that he is upset that little is being invested in agriculture. We cannot accept special circumstances with regard to the large number of kulaks. If a decision [has to be made], whether city centers are to be built or investments made in agriculture, then the latter. One must promote production with all means and not simply pay more for the work units in the agriculture. In general, agriculture is the sore point of all the people's democracies. He then referred to the reorganization of the administration of agriculture in the Soviet Union that had been discussed at the March plenum.

In response to Comrade Ulbricht's letter, he said that the campaign for a peace treaty is settled. We will pursue the campaign aggressively, for the signing of a peace treaty. We will exploit every possibility for negotiations, but we will decide at what point to conclude it.

He is in agreement with a joint protest against the Western states' discrimination against the GDR. It would be incorrect, however, to strive, for example, for a general boycott in the field of sports. Stalin did that. One must make reasonable policy and not declare a boycott as a principle. That would only be principle. That would only be to the advantage of the reactionary forces....

Comrade Ulbricht then referred to the articles being printed in the press about comrades who perished in the period of the Stalin-cult and stressed that this is of a certain importance to the GDR. Until now, nothing has been done in this direction, and there is no intention to do so. It is nevertheless necessary to agree upon the tactics in these cases.

There are cases in which the Soviet comrades do not understand our tactics-e.g., a delegation of writers who expressed the opinion that there is not enough freedom [in the GDR]. That was expressed at a writers' congress. The GDR is not publishing materials about Stalin's victims, and such books and publications will be refused by use.g., a book about the events in 1953 and the case of [Lavrentii] Beria.11

He voiced a request that in exchanges on the state level a certain order be created, so that--for examplewriters cannot be used against the policies of the GDR. To this end, it is necessary that the party get involved.

Comrade Khrushchev agreed to speak with Comrade [Mikhail] Suslov and Comrade [Leonid] Il'ichev12 about it.

[Source: Dölling, Ambassador in Moscow, "Note of a Discussion on 27 February 1962," 5 March 1962. Marked, "For personal use only." PA/AA, Außenstelle Berlin, MfAA, Ministerbüro (Winzer), G-A476.]

Douglas Selvage submitted his dissertation, "Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question, 1955-1967," at Yale University received his Ph.D. in December 1998.

'The author would like to thank Hope Harrison for her advice and support during his research in the Polish and East German archives. Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the US Department of State, which administers the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).

2 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 149; Vladislav M. Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962), Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 6, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), p. 22; Hope Millard Harrison, “The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-61,” Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1993, pp. 239-40 and fn #625.

3 Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61, CWIHP Working Paper No. 5, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), p. 55.

4 See Douglas Selvage, "Khrushchev's Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives," in this issue of the Bulletin. 5 Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' pp. 28-9.

6 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 190-94, 197.

7 Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' p. 16.

8 Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' pp. 28-30. On the inter-German trade agreement, see Robert W. Dean, West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 56-9; Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945-1989 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997),

pp. 219-20.

9 "Maßnahmen zu den Analysen über den Warenaustausch mit den volksdemokratischen Ländern: Anlage Nr. 1 zum Protokoll Nr. 37 vom 25.7.61," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO BA), Berlin, J IV 2/2-778, pp. 26-7.

10 "Protokoll Nr. 48/61 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees," 12 September 1961, SAPMO BA, J IV 2/2-790, p. 7.

11 Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' pp. 45-6.
12 Ibid.,
p. 47.

13 "Stenogram IX plenarnego posiedzenia Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej," 22 November 1961. Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), KC PZPR, sygn. 1240, p. 408.

measure. See the "Memorandum of Conversation," 15 September 1961, in ibid., p. 412.

16 "Notatka z zapisu spotkania przywódców partii panstw obozu socjalistycznego w Moskwie," in Jan Ptasinski, “Moje rozmowy z Wladyslawem Gomulka w latach 1960-1970," 1992, cz. II. Instytut Dokumentacji Historycznej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej (IDH-PRL), P II / 7b, k. 194, pp. 514; Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, pp. 19-25. I have based my account of the Moscow meeting on notes that the Polish ambassador to Moscow from 1968-70, Jan Ptasinski, allegedly made from a transcript of the meeting that he found in the safe of the Polish embassy in Moscow. Ptasinski's notes compare favorably to the Soviet transcript cited by Vladislav Zubok in his work, and I have found Ptasinski's papers to be reliable in other instances by comparing them with documents in the former Central Committee Archives, now part of Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive for Contemporary Documents) in Warsaw. IDH-PRL was set up as a private foundation by Polish scholars in the early 1990's to collect documentation and interviews from former communist officials who did not want to contribute their papers to the state archives. 17 Ibid.

18 "Protokoll Nr. 48/61 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees," 12 September 1961. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/2790, p. 7.

20

Letter, Ulbricht to Gomulka, 23 September 1961. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 15.

21 Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, p. 346.

22 "Memorandum of Conversation," 30 September 1961 (talks between Gromyko and Rusk), in "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 262, File "CF 1957, 16th United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 1961, Memcons." Record Group [RG] 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD [NA]. Also see: "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France," 28 Septmber 1961, in FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIV, pp. 439-41; and "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France," 2 October 1961, in ibid., pp. 456-460. On Bonn's opposition to discussion of matters relating to "European security" in the context of a Berlin settlement, see the attachment

MASTNY NAMED SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR

CWIHP is pleased to announce the recent appointment of Dr. Vojtech Mastny as a "Senior Research Scholar" at the Cold War International History Project. Following his award-winning book on "The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years," Dr. Mastny is currently working on a parallel history of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Concurrently he is heading a larger documentation project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, jointly sponsored by CWIHP, the National Security Archive at The George Washington University, and the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Zurich).

to the State Department's briefing book for Adenauer's visit to Washington from 20-22 November 1961, entitled, “Position Paper: Arms Control in Relation to Berlin," 17 November 1961, "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 269, File "CF 1993— Adenauer Visit, Washington, 11/20-22/61, RG59, NA.

23 "Memorandum: Four Power Declaration," in the briefing book, "Adenauer Visit: Washington, D.C., November 20-22, 1961," "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 269, Files "CF 1993-Adenauer Visit, Washington, 11/20-22/61," RG59, NA. 24 "Memorandum of Conversation" (Kennedy-Adenauer Meeting), 22 November 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. XIV, 62027. Also see Letter, Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, 22 Novermber 1961, in ibid., pp. 632-634.

25 Ibid., “Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, 1012 December, 1961," File "Berlin Crisis-DOS FOIAS," National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

26 On curtailing Ulbricht's influence, see Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' p. 55. On China's possible role, see Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, pp. 24-5.

27 Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' p. 55. 28 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p. 249.

29 See, e.g., Erwin Weit, Ostblock intern: 13 Jahre Dolmetscher für die polnische Partei- und Staatsführung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1970), pp. 45-6.

30 COMECOM is the acronym for “Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance."-on Khrushchev's Comecon reform proposals and Gomulka's "triangle," see "Relacja Wladyslawa Tykocinskiego: zdradzone tajemnice,” Na antenie 41 (21 August 1966), I; Henryk Rózanski, Spojrzenie na RWPG: Wspomnienia, dokumenty, refleksje 1949-1988 (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990); Jan Ptasinski, Drugi zwrot: Gomulka w szczytu powodzenia (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1988), pp. 169-72; Beate Ihme-Tuchel, Das *nördliche Dreieck': Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR, der Tschechoslowakei und Polen in den Jahren 1954 bis 1962 (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), pp. 305-6, 344-46. For the latest on the New Economic System, see Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

31 See the letter from Walter Ulbricht to Hans Rodenberg, 23 October 1971, reprinted in Peter Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. II (Berlin: Rowohlt Verlag, 1991), pp. 351-52. Ulbricht wrote: "When Khrushchev came to the GDR, he criticized me all the way to Magdeburg because I was not a sufficiently obedient corn boy [Mais-Jünger]."

32 L. Cieslik, Moscow, "Notatka z rozmowy z A. Adzubem," 7 May 1962. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 116, t. 40.

33 Adzhubei claimed in the course of several conversations in Germany that Ulbricht would not live much longer; he had cancer. Adzhubei's statement, Ulbricht later wrote to Hans Rodenberg, "had not improved" his relations with Khrushchev. On Adzhubei's visit to West Germany, see Daniel Kosthorst, "Sowjetische Geheimpolitik in Deutschland? Chruschtschow und die Adschubej-Mission 1964," Vierteljahrshefte zur Zeitgeschichte 44 (1996), pp. 257-293.

34 From this point forth in the document, Rusk's name was rendered as "Rask."

35 Spaak visited Moscow on September 19. Khrushchev apparently suggested that he had never "placed a deadline on Western acceptance of Soviet demands for a German peace treaty and free-city status for West Berlin." Slusser, The Berlin Crisis

of 1961, pp. 229-30.

36 In February 1962, the Soviets "demanded exclusive use of the air corridors, ... buzzed allied aircraft and dropped metallic chaff to interfere with Western radar and air traffic control." Tusa, The Last Division, p. 347.

37 Although it is unclear to which interview Khrushchev was referring, Kennedy did write to Khrushchev through a confidential channel on 16 October 1961: "This area [Berlin] would also be rendered less peaceful if the maintenance of the West's vital interests were to become dependent on the whims of the East German regime. Some of Mr. Ulbricht's statements on this subject have not been consistent with your reassurances or even his own - and I do not believe that either of us wants a constant state of doubt, tension and emergency in this area, which would require an even larger military build-up on both sides." Letter from President Kennedy

to Chairman Khrushchev, Hyannis Port, 16 October 1961, U.S. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 41. 38 On Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's failure to conclude a peace treaty, see Harrison, Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose,' p. 53.

40

Former General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

41 Lavrentii Beria, head of the NKVD/KGB and heir-apparent to Stalin, executed in 1953. After his arrest in late June 1953, Beria was accused of having been willing to give up the socialist GDR in favor of a neutral, reunified, bourgeois, and demilitarized Germany in return for substantial reparations from the FRG. Khrushchev and his other rivals in the Soviet leadership had justified his arrest and execution in part on these grounds. Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 136.

42 Both Suslov and Il'ichev were CPSU CC secretaries with responsibilities in the fields of ideology and propaganda.