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progress of East-West détente notwithstanding. It further gave the non-Soviet officers, who became more extensively involved in the alliance's mushrooming agencies, a greater stake in its existence—a critical development that made possible the resolution of the 1980-81 Polish crisis by Poland's own military.54 In the long run, however, the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into an extended arm of the Moscow defense ministry, rather than of the foreign ministry or the central committee, made its eventual fate more dependent on the fate of Soviet security doctrine. This dependence made the alliance's collapse a foregone conclusion as soon as that doctrine was changed in the late nineteen-eighties—by effectively adopting the views of the 1968 Czechoslovak reformers about the non-existence of the Western military threat and consequently allowing the reluctant allies to go their own ways.

Document No. 1 “Statute of the Unified Command of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty," 7 September 1955

Draft

Strictly confidential

GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND

with all who have a direct interest in this.":49 Although the document did not question the country's alliance obligations and did not specifically demand any changes in the Warsaw Pact, it was guaranteed to infuriate Moscow when it was leaked to the Soviet embassy in Prague about the middle of August. Yet although it was forwarded to the top Soviet leaders by Ambassador Stepan V. Chervonenko, with the remark that it had originated with the “infamous Gen. Prchlík,” it came too late to make a difference in influencing their decision to invade.

Moscow may have been right in suspecting that some of the reformers wanted Czechoslovakia to leave the Warsaw Pact. They reportedly considered the following options for their country: staying in the alliance but reconsidering membership in another 10 to 15 years, preparing to defend Central Europe without the Soviet Union through another "Little Entente" concluded without regard to ideological boundaries, and neutralization or neutrality providing for defense by national means along the Yugoslav model.50 However plausible, these suggestions have not been reliably documented; the only source of information about them is the hostile polemics published in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion.si

Because of the lack of support within the conservative Czechoslovak military and even the reformist party establishment, it is hardly surprising that none of the proposals included in the memorandum was acted upon; what is surprising is that its authors continued to pursue them despite the country's occupation by Soviet forces. They organized the first major discussion of their document at the already formally dissolved political academy as late as 18 April 1969 — eight months after the invasion.52 But the first discussion was also the last, ending both the project and soon afterward also the careers of those of its architects who did not quickly repent.

The month before, the Warsaw Pact had at last been reformed, largely in accordance with Soviet wishes, at the Budapest session of its political consultative committee. Following agreements among its member states concluded in the fall of 1968 under the impact of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, even the Romanians went along with the reorganization, although they continued to dissent on a host of issues pertaining to the actual functioning of the alliance. The public communiqué of the Budapest meeting, at which Moscow also stepped up in earnest its campaign for the convocation of an European security conference that would lead six years later to the conclusion of the Helsinki agreements, could only be adopted after a heated discussion and painstaking revision of nearly every item."

The resulting institutionalization of the Warsaw Pact as a true military alliance, soon to be recognized by NATO as its effective counterpart, influenced the course of the Cold War in important ways for its remaining twenty years. The restructuring facilitated a continued arms race and fostered the development of increasingly realistic military plans rehearsed during more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers imitating conventional war in Europe, the

PART I.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Supreme Commander chairs the joint armed forces of the members of the Warsaw Treaty agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid adopted on 14 May 1955. The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander are:

To carry out resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee, which deal directly with the joint armed forces.

To supervise and direct operational and combat preparation of the joint armed forces and to organize the joint exercises of troops, fleets and staff under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

To have a comprehensive knowledge of the state of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces, and to take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Governments and Ministers of Defense of the respective countries in order to ensure permanent combat readiness of the forces.

To work out and present the Political Consultative Committee with constructive proposals on further improvement of the qualitative and quantitative state of the available staff. The rights of the Chief-of-Staff:

To evaluate the fighting trim, strategic and fighting readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and to give orders and recommendations based on the results of the evaluations;

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To address the Political Consultative Committee and the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries with any questions regarding his activities;

To call for meetings with his deputies representing their governments within the Armed Forces, in order to discuss and solve the occurring problems.

The Chief of Staff has a right to:

- discuss his activities with the Deputies of the Supreme Commander and with the Chiefs of the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries;

- determine information about the state and conditions of troops and fleets who are under the command of the Joint Armed Forces.

PART II

PART IV

The Deputies of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The relationships between the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries

The activities of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces must be carried out in cooperation with General Army Staff of the member countries.

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander carry the full responsibility for:

Combat and mobilization readiness, as well as operational, combat, and political preparation of the troops under the command of the Joint Military Forces;

For making of troops and fleets under the supervision of the Joint Military Forces; for the available personnel; for supplying armaments, technical equipment and other military items; as well as for the accommodation arrangements and service of troops;

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander are obliged to report the state of the military and mobilizing readiness as well as the state of the political, strategic and combat instruction of troops and fleets at the disposition of the Joint Command.

The General Army Staff of the member-countries are obliged to:

Inform the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces about the combat and quantitative composition of troops, about their mobilizing and fighting readiness; military and political training of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

Coordinate deployment of troops, fleets and Staff with the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

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The Warsaw Treaty agreement, adopted in May 1955 (especially its military provisions), as well as different bilateral agreements signed by the representatives of the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland prior to the Warsaw Treaty and ratified after the adoption of the Treaty, require a thorough analysis and revision. This mostly concerns Polish obligations regarding organizational, quantitative and technical supplies of the Armed Forces, in the production of military equipment and the strategic positioning of the country.

The need to revise earlier agreements is caused by the political and economic conditions of our country. The earlier agreements and the ensuing obligations do not correspond to the policy of independence and sovereignty of our country pronounced by the Party and the Government of the People's Republic of Poland. Despite the constant changes of obligations acquired by Poland on the basis of the bilateral agreements, their implementation would not be feasible without considerable financial expenditures assigned to the Armed Forces and military industry. Such a policy would be inconsistent with the course of the Party and the Government aimed at the constant improvement of the living standards of the Polish people.

Taking into consideration above-mentioned situation, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has analyzed the obligations and provisions deriving from bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Treaty and our obligations deriving from them. Our proposals are listed below:

The conditions under which the Warsaw Treaty was created are completely different. Our interest is in the European War Theater that involves all the participants of the Treaty, excluding the Soviet Union (the interests of the latter only partly lie in Europe). Therefore we believe that the total composition of our Armed forces should participate in our common defense initiative in Europe.

The above-mentioned facts illustrate the superficiality of the partitioning of the Armed forces by the participants of the Warsaw Treaty; namely, the structure in which one part of the armed forces is under the joint command and other part is under the command of the national armed forces. In the current situation, Poland cannot allot one part of the Armed forces under the joint command due to the unrealistically large number of divisions required (see part II of the memorandum). Despite the recent reduction of 5 divisions in Polish Armed forces, the number of required divisions for the joint command was only reduced by 1.

The organizational structure of the Joint Command of the armed forces is based on a single authority. The collective decision-making process bears only a formal character (it is not mentioned in a treaty). The process of the Supreme Commander's subordination to the international political body is not clear.

The above-mentioned determines the supranational character of the Supreme Commander and his Staff, which does not correspond to the idea of independence and sovereignty of the Warsaw Treaty participating countries. The supranational positioning of the Supreme Commander and of his Staff is illustrated in the “Statute" in the chapters dealing with the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his Staff.

The authority of the Supreme Commander in questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states. This imposes the introduction of common rules and regulations determining the order and conditions of military life (for example, the Garrison Duty Regulations, Drill Regulations, Disciplinary regulations, etc).

The Supreme Commander has widespread rights in the sphere of control. The volume of the report information required from the General Staff is tremendous. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not an international body in a full sense. The rights and responsibilities of the representatives of the corresponding armies are not stated clearly. The existing practice demonstrates the formal character of their functions.

The relations between the Staff of the Joint Command and the General Staff are based on the complete subordination of the latter to the former.

Current events prove continuously the unilateral character of the obligations acquired by the People's Republic of Poland. No international agreement dealt with the judicial state of troops located or passing through the territory of Warsaw Treaty country.

Military obligations originating from the Warsaw Treaty.

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The present balance of power in the world, our strategic position as well as our ideological ties with the socialist camp, prove the importance of the Warsaw Treaty and of the unification of the military efforts of the member countries for the further protection of our common interests.

Nevertheless, we believe that the military protocols originating from the Treaty require radical revision. The organizational concept of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces foresees the allocation of the part of the member countries' Armies under a Joint Command.

The above-mentioned concept is similar to the structural concept of NATO. Some parts of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries are placed under the Joint Command. Nevertheless, the structural position of the NATO countries is somewhat different from the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The only exception to the rule is the Soviet Union.

The strategic interest of the major participants of NATO is applied to the numerous theaters of war operations, therefore the specific theater of war would require only part of the Armed forces of the respective countries, with the remainder of the forces allocated to different pacts, the Bagdad Pact, for instance.

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The above listed questions should be regulated in the spirit of the Declaration of the Soviet Government issued on 30 October 1956.

In order to correct the above-mentioned organizational and structural concepts, we suggest the following changes to the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty agreement. a) the Warsaw Treaty countries are interested in using all their armed forces for defense purposes; the Soviet Union would agree with other member countries on the quantity of Soviet troops to be allotted to the Warsaw Treaty common actions in Europe; b) the involvement of troops of any of the Warsaw Treaty countries in military operations would require the prior approval by the appropriate body in its home country according to the Constitution; c) in peace-time the armed forces of each of the countries are subordinated to their national command. d) we recognize the need for close cooperation of all Warsaw Treaty countries in the following areas:

in strategic plans and tactical issues;
in logistics prior to tactical moves;
in standardization of the major types of weapons;

in regulations of military production and deliveries in times of war and peace;

in joint strategic training on the territory of one of the countries. e) we recognize the need to create a "Military Consultative Committee" for the implementation of the above mentioned proposals. The Military Consultative Committee would consist of the Ministers of National Defense and the Chairmen of the General Staffs of the Warsaw Treaty Countries. The Chairman of the Committee would be one of the members of the Committee elected once a year. f) the working body of the Military Consultative Committee would be the Permanent Staff Committee. It would consist of the officers and generals of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Supreme International Political Body would stipulate the number of the officers allotted to the Permanent Staff Committee by each country. g) the Supreme International Political Body would determine location of the Military Consultative Committee. h) all proposals concerning the issues listed in part b) must be approved by the Supreme Political Body. They become compulsory to all Warsaw Treaty countries if approved. i) the Permanent Staff Committee can present its recommendations regarding the issues in part d) to the General Staff.

The implementation of these recommendations depends on the decisions of the responsible parties of the national governments of Warsaw Treaty countries.

In the situation of war the International Political Body can appoint the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed Forces.

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only on major issues, but often also on current policy matters.

among member countries, despite the fact that they were suggesting such a need.

II. We appraise the USSR's initiative positively. It meets the basic need to define and improve the organization of the Warsaw Pact. So far the Warsaw Pact organization has not been precisely defined, its forms of work were volatile and dependent on extemporaneous initiatives, mostly by the USSR. This situation has created loopholes in the coordination of policies and actions of Pact members with regard to the Pact itself, as well as in relations among its members. It also did not ensure the proper system of consultations, which would enable to take into consideration the positions of all member states. This condition was shaped at a time when the Warsaw Pact Treaty was concluded and when its forms of operation were just emerging. It does not meet its current needs.

III. The Soviet initiative to improve the instruments of the Pact's operation is coming at the right time, when a greater need to strengthen the unity of actions of the member states is emerging. In the present circumstances elaboration of a common political line of the Pact, which would take into account positions of all interested parties calls for systematic and frequent consultations and contacts.

V. To improve and rationalize the operation of the Pact consistent with the existing needs, it would be proper to specify the decision-making organs, as well as consultative and advisory bodies.

1. This objective could be achieved by setting up a Pact's Council, which would take over functions heretofore exercised by the Political Consultative Committee. The Council would hold meetings at a summit level; it would decide on key issues, with the rule of unanimity. It would hear and approve reports of the Unified Command. It would meet whenever needed.

2. The Political Consultative Committee should be restored to its original character provided for in the Pact. It could thus become a flexible forum for consultations of foreign ministers. In some cases, when needed, with the participation of defense ministers. In particular cases the ministers might delegate their deputies. This Committee would become a consultative and advisory body, preparing positions for the governments, or the Council. The Committee should meet at least 2-3 times a year. In this way consultations which are now difficult to hold or which are held only as a result of arduous procedures, would obtain an institutional character.

3. A Permanent Secretariat of the Pact should be set up at a proper level and with a proper composition. It is necessary to prepare properly meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee, to ensure regular liaison among member countries during the intersession periods, for providing continuity of coordination and information on matters related to the decisions adopted, or the ones that should be submitted for discussion. The shortcomings resulting from the lack of such body have been felt frequently. To be sure, according to the Resolution adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1956 (Prague), a United Secretariat of the Committee, composed of a General Secretary and his deputies, one from each country, has been set up. This Secretariat, according to the Resolution, functions only during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. In practice, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR served as Secretary General. His activity as Secretary General was limited to organizational functions and only during the sessions of the Political Consultative Committee. During the intersession periods neither the Secretary General nor the Secretariat in practice perform any functions. The fact that up to now the Secretary General was not disconnected from state functions in his own country was in some situations causing even political difficulties (e.g. in case of inviting Albania to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in January 1964, Poland took over functions which should have normally belonged to the Secretary General). To satisfy the needs mentioned earlier

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IV. The Warsaw Pact Treaty has created a Political Consultative Committee for consultations among member states and for consideration of questions arising from the Pact's operation. According to the Pact’s provisions each state is to be represented in the Consultative Committee by a government's member or another especially appointed representative. The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as are deemed necessary. In practice, however, that Committee has been transformed into summit meetings, called up sporadically, generally not properly prepared, which adopt spectacular resolutions (declarations, communiqués).

In fact, this is inconsistent with either the consultative tasks of the Committee, or with its originally intended composition (Government members), or with its name (to whom a gathering of top party and government leaders is to be advisory?). In such circumstances meetings of the Political Consultative Committee cannot be held with proper frequency, as meetings of the Party and Government leaders by their very nature are held when there are very important matters to be considered or decided upon (reminder: a resolution of the Committee from January 1956 was calling for meetings of the Committee at least twice a year, not counting extraordinary meetings).

Thus, as the Committee has transformed itself into a Council, there is no body which would ensure the opportunity for systematic and frequent consultations

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