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in pt. 3, the institution of the Secretary General and the Permanent Secretariat should be organized and set to be able to:
a) provide a steady organizational link among member countries during the inter-session periods;
b) perform functions connected with the preparation and servicing of meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee;
c) provide current information to the member states on the implementation of adopted resolutions and decisions, as well as on matters calling for consideration. Circulate documents relating to the activities of the Pact;
d) submit to the member governments motions regarding consultations, convening meetings of the Consultative Committee and in exceptional cases also the Council;
e) submit proposals for consultations on working levels regarding matters of lesser importance (e.g. preparations for U.N. sessions, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, etc.);
f) organize an exchange of information among foreign ministries of the member states regarding the assessment of political situation, in the area of analytical and research work carried out by the foreign ministries of member states.
The position of the Secretary General should be situated in such a way that he would be able to stay in touch with member governments at the highest levels (prime ministers, foreign ministers) and obtain the necessary information. He should not be combining this function with any other state function in his own country. He should be nominated by a resolution of the Council for a period of 2-3 years. The headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat should be in Moscow. The Permanent Secretariat should be staffed by representatives from all members states, including the country of the Secretary General. They would be cooperating and fulfilling the role of liaison officers between the Secretariat and member governments (foreign ministries) and the Secretary General. Such representatives could be responsible employees of member countries' embassies. The Permanent Secretariat should also have its own small, but indispensable and qualified staff.
In connection with a letter by Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka regarding the improving and ameliorating of the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact and proposing to call a conference of defense ministers on the reorganization of the command and general staff, it is known to us that the Soviet side—unwilling to impose its proposals upon the leadership of other countries-does not intend to put forward any preliminary proposals on the organization of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, but instead expects such proposals from the countries concerned.
From unofficial talks with Soviet comrades it looks that their position can be outlined as follows:
1. There is no intention either to change or amend the Warsaw Pact provisions, but rather to base (any changes) on its artsicles ] 5 and 6.
2. The intention is to set up a command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the prerogatives and real possibilities of coordinating defense efforts of member states relating to forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces in the operational, training, organization and technical area.
It is intended to position more properly than up to now the status of the Supreme Commander and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, and to define the place of commanders of troops assigned to these forces. A need is also seen for a different, more independent positioning of defense ministers of member countries vis-à-vis the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.
3. It is also expected that a Military Advisory Council is to be established within the Political Consultative Committee—as an advisory body to the Committee. Such a Council would be composed of defense
a ministers and the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, on equal footing. Secretary of the Council would be the chief of staff of the Unified Forces. Chairmanship of the Council meetings will be rotated consecutively among all its members. The Council would consider general questions of development and readiness of the Unified Armed Forces, preparing proposals for the
VI. In our opinion the new measures in the area of organizational improvement of the Pact should be made public (published). It would emphasize the political vitality of the of the Warsaw Pact.
On the other hand, similar measures undertaken in the military area should be published at the proper time and in the proper form, so as not to be exploited by NATO states, interested in counteracting the current process of NATO's disintegration, but quite the contrary, they should evoke a desired effect in the given political situation.
T-/ A. RAPACKI
Political Committee and recommendations for the national military commands. The issues will be dealt with according to the rule of full equality.
4. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would coordinate operational-training preparedness of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as matters relating to the enhancement of their development and military readiness.
The Supreme Commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces would be relieved of their functions in the Soviet Army.
5. Strategic weapons will not be included in the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and operational plans will be developed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army, as well as by general staffs of member countries in the areas of concern to them.
6. It is envisaged that in peacetime the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, employing about 600 people, will be in charge of coordinating preparations of the military to the realization of tasks assigned to them.
However, the position of the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces as a command organ in wartime is still a matter too premature to be considered, as there is, among other things, a need to maintain the current procedure of working out strategic and operational plans, the rules for using strategic weapons, as well as to maneuver forces and equipment from one war theater to another.
7. The general staff of the Unified Armed Forces will be composed of the representatives of all armies in proportion to the number of forces assigned to them. It is assumed that Soviet participation in the staff will be percentage-wise smaller than their actual contribution to the Pact.
8. The following are projections of a new percentage share in the command budget of the Unified Armed Forces:
and artillery, engineering and chemical. Also included in the command as deputies to the supreme commander would be commanders of assigned forces of member countries.
Key positions, such as supreme commander, chief of staff, chief of air defense, deputy chief of air force, quartermaster, deputy for technical questions, would be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.
In view of this purely tentative recognition, one can state the following:
The Soviet side, initiating the question of improvement of the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact, has not presented so far any specific and official preliminary materials in this regard.
Therefore, during the forthcoming conference of ministers of national defense it would be useful to obtain in the first place the Soviet position on the following questions:
a) Defining the role and competence of chief command of the Unified Armed Forces for a threat of war and war period;
b) The scope of participation of member countries' political-military leadership in drawing up strategicoperational plans for particular war theaters;
c) The subordination of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces.
It is now difficult to foresee what kind of position the Soviet side and other interested countries will take on the above questions. Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Defense is presenting the following point of view, which, if accepted, might be the basis for our position at the conference of defense ministers and for further work on proposals for detailed solutions:
1. It is proposed to set up an Advisory Committee for Defense as a body of the Council, which is the top organ of the party and government leadership.
The Advisory Committee should be composed of ministers of national defense of the Pact members, the supreme commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces as its secretary.
The rule of rotation should be introduced in chairing Committee meetings.
In addition, it would also be advisable to set up a Consultative Commission of the Chiefs of Staff, which would deal with operational planning and the resulting tasks for preparing the armed forces.
2. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, his deputies and the chief of staff should be appointed by the Pact's Council, with the Supreme Commander and the chief of staff being relieved of their duties in the armed forces of their country.
The Supreme Commander is to be subordinated to the Council and carries out its decisions. In the intersession periods he personally coordinates with members of the Council basic questions requiring joint decisions, or does this within the Advisory Committee for Defense.
In peacetime, the command and chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces should play the role of a
coordinating body, preparing the designated military forces, while in wartime they should take command of those forces on the European War Theater. The Supreme Commander and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should participate, based on a common defense strategy of Pact members and jointly with their general staffs, in developing plans for the particular strategic directions of the European War Theater. On the basis of such plans the Supreme Commander is coordinating and preparing the staff of the Unified Armed Forces and the designated forces to the execution of tasks faced by them. Thus, he is carrying on proper operational and training activities, as well as coordinating organizational, technicalmanufacturing and scientific-research activities,
The internal structure of the command and general staff should correspond to the needs of directing activities in the particular strategic areas. The position of Polish representatives in the chain of command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces on the Western front should correspond with the place and tasks of the Polish armed forces scheduled to be deployed in that area.
Organizational structure of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should ensure realization of the above tasks in peacetime and constitute a nucleus of proper organs envisioned for a period of war. A preliminary assumption is that these tasks could be tackled by a staff of approximately 200 professional workers. But, it should be assumed that most of the key positions will be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.
Development of the command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces for a war period should be carried out through the inclusion of the proper chains (of command) from the general staff and other institutions of the Soviet Army, provided for in the operational plan for use in the European War Theater. It is also assumed that the backup and support units for the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should be assigned from the Soviet Army within their peacetime activities and consistent with a plan of their deployment in case of war. The command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should continue to be headquartered in Moscow.
3. There is a need in all Warsaw Pact countries, without exception, for a clear-cut definition of commands being in charge of forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces, as well to define both the formations and size of those forces.
The strategic assault forces are still to be at the disposal of the Soviet Army. Their use is being planned by the general staff of the Soviet Army. However, the commander of the Unified Armed Forces should be inducted in planning their use in favor of forces entrusted to his command. It also seems necessary to define an obligatory scope and method for use of the strategic assault forces for the common defense of the Pact members.
Ministers of national defense and the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries are to fully exercise their
superior command and leadership role with regard to formations assigned to the Unified Armed Forces. They are to be held responsible for their moral-political condition, their mobilization and fighting readiness, for their operational and tactical preparedness and completeness in terms of numbers, arms and equipment.
4. Together with establishing broader tasks and new organizational structures of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces there is a need to fix the size and percentage share of contributions borne by the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.
It is suggested that this question should be considered in terms of proportional efforts resulting from the threat that we face in the European War Theater.
The population, economic and military potential of the NATO countries in Europe is, in comparison with the potential of the people's democracies, clearly unfavorable to us. Creation of the indispensable superiority for defense and defeat of the enemy—can be ensured by the engagement in this theater of the proper Soviet forces in the proportion of approximately two-thirds of the total Warsaw Pact potential.
The above indicator of the indispensable USSR's share corresponds with the real place and potential of that country. It reflects both a probable size of its armed forces provided for the European War Theater, as well as its population potential (counted for the European area of the USSR) and its share in the production of basic raw materials and strategic materials. The share of the above factors can roughly be estimated at 65-90% in relation to the total potential of all other Warsaw Pact countries.
Moreover, the relative weight of the USSR is determined by its strategic assault power on behalf of the whole Warsaw Pact.
In view of the above statements it does not seem feasible to accept unofficial suggestions regarding the percentage share of the USSR in the budget of the command of the Unified Armed Forces (merely about 31%).
In the opinion of the Ministry of National Defense the share of member countries in the command of the Unified Armed Forces should:
- correspond percentage-wise to the share of positions held in the command and the general staff the Unified Armed Forces (this indicator with regard to the Soviet Army representatives should be 50 % as a minimum);
- remain basically within the actual percentage share kept in the budget up to now;
- take into consideration national income per capita in the particular countries;
- take into consideration a particular country's effort in the development of its territorial defense and its contribution to securing the redeployment of allied forces and thus bringing a relief to operational forces.
Taking into consideration these premises, Poland's share should not exceed the present 13.5%, and we should be trying to obtain from our point of view more justified
Document No. 5 Informal remarks by Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, at a Confidential Meeting of
General Staff Officials, Prague, 13 March 1968
numbers—e.g., a minimum of 50% for the Soviet Union, and for the remaining Pact members also about 50%. With this assumption our share would amount to 1/5 of the share of all people's democracies, which would be about 10% of the total budget.
However, this proposal may encounter strong opposition, based, among other things, on current membership contributions to the CMEA56, which for the USSR amounts to only 32.25%.
Independently of the ultimate settlement of percentage shares, one should assume that that budget of the Unified Armed Forces should cover exclusively the costs of the staff and accommodation facilities, administrative expenses of the staff, participation of employees in joint exercises and partial defraying of their remuneration, etc. This budget, however, should not be designed to cover expenses related to preparations for military operations, building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc.
5. Besides the above-mentioned problems there is also a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming talks on the following questions:
Finally, there is our foreign policy. It has been said that while staying loyal to our friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism we must show greater independence. This also concerns our armed forces, and quite considerably so. I am going to spend some time on this, because it is at the root of the problem that you, too, have touched upon in your presentations.
What is it about, comrades? The thing is, to tell you the truth, we are in a bind today, we have no room, no material means, no people. We've got into a situation when our task, as it has been set, is beyond the means of our state—both human and economic. What's the reason, comrades? The reason is, I think, at the heart of the Warsaw Treaty. We've been talking for ten years and can't agree about creating an organ, a military organ of the Warsaw Treaty, the staff and the military council that is, which would work out the military concept of the Warsaw Treaty as its top priority.
We can't do without a concept. But the concept must not only come out of the General Staff of the Soviet army. Since it is a coalition concept it must come out of the coalition. This means that the members of the Warsaw Treaty must take part. It's a fundamental question, comrades. I'm sorry I can't talk much about it in any great detail, it would lead me too far; it would get me into the area of strategic operational plans, and this I can't do no matter how much I am trying, and believe me I am sincerely trying, to make the complexity of this problem clearer to you.
This is the thing, comrades. If there were an organ we could agree on this matter. Through that organ, we would be able to make our voice heard, so that we would be listened to. Today our voice comes through as our views or opinions but certainly not as pressure. That's because we have no legal grounds for being effective. And so we are getting the assignment for our army in case of war from the joint command, which does not really exist except as some transmission office. I have no doubt, of course, that, as far as the Soviet army is concerned, this assignment is backed by the economic and human potential of the Soviet Union. But it does not reflect our economic and human possibilities. And this applies not only to us but to our neighbors as well.
This is a situation we can't tolerate any longer; we have to act on it. We have called it to the attention of both our leaders and the Soviet leaders, but so far we've had no solution. Just take the following question, comrades. Look, once there used to be a doctrine-maybe for some of you, comrades, this will sound a bit complicated, but allow me to say it. Under Khrushchev, there used to be a doctrine: if there is a war, seven strikes at Germany, and Germany is liquidated. Eight, not seven, they said; I made a mistake.
According to the present orientation, the conference of the Ministers of National Defense is to be held in the first days of February of this year. The conference is to set up a working body with a task of developing within the next two-three weeks a specific draft of organizational structure of the command and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces.
Submitting for approval the setting up of the above working body, the Ministry of National Defense considers it advisable that the guidelines for our representatives in that body should be the proposals set out in this note.
In case that in the course of further works a situation arises where other proposals will need to be considered, the Ministry of National Defense will submit to the leadership additional motions.
Warsaw, 26 January 1966.
(Source: KC PZPR 2948/27-36, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.)
misex Prezi C. and we shte u mere
Count another number of strikes to destroy America. mankind, even though the threat worked, it really did, Comrades, it's hard to say it was bad, hard to say. Just under Khrushchev. Now, because of that threat-and look, comrades, maybe I'm wrong, but I would
this is my opinion but I can prove it—our Soviet characterize the situation like this: thank God we have comrades are going to push us to speed up the arming nuclear weapons. In my view, thanks to them there has and buildup of our units; this was proved last year in been no World War III. I think—and here, mind you, I am the signing of the protocol.58 I had sharp clashes with telling you my opinion, and I have told this opinion to our the unified command when they came up with the Soviet comrades, too—that this point has also been
demand to increase the number of our divisions. It noticed over there, by our potential enemies. And what took two days, two days it took, before I managed to have they done? They came up with the theory of limited convince one army general what is the economic war.57 Because for them the threat of a nuclear strike was a and human potential of our republic. Unfortunately, real threat. They were really scared. There was panic. Not comrades, I have to say that our political only among the public. There was panic in the staffs. And
representatives do not pay enough attention to these they realized what it meant, they took Khrushchev at his questions. And yet these are fundamental questions. word; maybe what Khrushchev was saying was eighty- And this point, that is, more independence in foreign nine per cent propaganda, but they took him at his word, policy, I see, in a way, as being relevant to the Warsaw and said: Well, if you do this to us, we shall go at you Treaty politics, not only in relation to the West, to another way—with the theory of limited war. The limited West Germany. war theory allows for the possibility of conducting war
We have to struggle to get a position of equality without nuclear weapons. And with this theory, it seems to within the Warsaw Treaty. me, they a little bit, to put it plainly, cheated and misled our Soviet comrades, who took the bait—the limited war theory, that is. Maybe the theory suits the Soviet Union (Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan from its point of view. But from the point of view of our Paulík, ed., Vojenské otázky československé reformy, republic, it doesn't suit us. Why doesn't it suit us,
1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967comrades? Because the limited war theory means—what? 1968) [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, Orientation toward classical warfare. And classical warfare 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the means—what? It means saturating the troops with high Czechoslovak Crisis), (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 78-80. technology and high manpower. In today's situation, in Translated by Vojtech Mastny.) today's economic situation of the capitalist and the socialist camps, this is something that the capitalist system can afford. Because its economy, like it or not, is superior,
Document No. 6 has greater possibilities. That's today. Maybe ten years Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the from now it will be different. But today, that's the way it Military Political Academy and Military Technical is. This means that we have agreed to—what, comrades? If Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party we have accepted the limited war theory we have agreed
Central Committee, 4 June 1968 to arming our units in competition with the West. Well, comrades, such a competition we can't win. Because their Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State economy is vastly more powerful than ours. Today we Interests in the Military Area say: careful, we must not stay behind. Of course, we can The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak use the slogan: catch up and overtake the West in
People's Army poses with a particular urgency the technology. But if we try to do that, comrades, we would question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the be walking in lapti (Russian peasant footwear), or else Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the barefooted.
point of departure ought to be the state interests of Because we are not capable of keeping up in this Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have competition. This, comrades, is the most vital question if not yet been formulated and constituted. you take the position of our republic. And we, the general The signatories of this memorandum, who are staff and the ministry of defense, we must defend the scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak interests of our army, even if we acknowledge our duties armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific to international friendship under the Warsaw Treaty. But examination and formulation of those state interests. In we must defend our interests.
sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning I don't want to scare you, comrades, but we have the present state of our military doctrine and military made calculations, of course, what would happen in a policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure possible conflict in a normal, classical war. This is not for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the advantageous for us. I myself, comrades, am not for any formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they kind of war, also not for nuclear war—it's clear to me, that justify the necessity of using scientific methods to would mean destruction of the world, destruction of
solve these problems.