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21 Ibid.,









20 Pióro, Armia ze skazą, pp. 277-80.


280-82. Marginal note on Document No. 2. 23 Brezhnev to Ulbricht, 7 January 1966, J IV 2/202-248, SAPMO.

24 Memorandum by Rapacki, 21 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/48-53, AAN.

25 Memorandum by Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/27-36, AAN.

26 Memorandum by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, 31 May 1966, KC PZPR 2948/54-57, AAN.

2? Record of the Berlin meeting of deputy foreign ministers, 10-12 February 1966, J IV 2/202-257 Bd 9, SAPMO; report by Naszkowski, 17 February 1966, KC PZPR 2948/64-69, AAN.

Raymond L. Garthoff, “When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 111.

p 29 Gerard Holden, The Warsaw Pact: The WTO and Soviet Security Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 43.

30 Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., Vojenské otázky åskoslovenské reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968) [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis] (Brno: Doplněk, 1996).

31 Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 69-95.

32 For example, Černík to Novotný, 20 May 1966, in Benčík, et al., eds., Vojenské otázky, pp. 314-16.

Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 95-97, attributes to the memorandum unsubstantiated features claimed by its later pro-Soviet critics. Cf. footnotes 47 and 48 below.

34 Lidová armáda, 2 July 1968.

35 The comical hero of Jaroslav Hašek's antiwar novel of 1920.

36 John D. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 151-93.

37 Michael McGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 381-405; Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 58-92.

38 The assertion in the 6 March 1968 commentary on Prague radio by Luboš Dobrovský (later minister of defense in postcommunist Czechoslovakia), according to which a Czechoslovak delegate at the Sofia meeting joined Romania in expressing doubts about the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe and alluded approvingly to De Gaulle's decision to leave NATO's integrated command because of his similar doubts about U.S. protection (cited in Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 489), cannot be substantiated from the records of the Sofia meeting in Polish, Czech, and former East German archives: KC PZPR 2663/381411, AAN; MNO/sekr. min., 1968/boxes 4 and 5, Vojenský historický archív (Military Historical Archives), Prague, (VHA); J IV 2/202-263 Bd 15, SAPMO.

“Notatka o wynikach narady szefów sztabów generalnych armii państw-członków Układu Warszawskiego” (Note about the Results of the Consultation of the Chiefs of Staffs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty), n.d. [March 1968), KC PZPR

2663/366-80, AAN.

Speech by Ceauşescu and rejoinder by Gomułka at the Sofia meeting, 7 March 1968, KC PZPR 2663/389-411, AAN; Soviet party central committee to Romanian party central committee, undated (early 1968), KC PZPR 2663/359-61, AAN.

41 Information by the international department of the Czechoslovak party central committee, 22 February 1968, in Jitka Vondrová, Jaromír Navrátil et al., eds., Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967-1970: Prosinec 1967červenec 1968 [International Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1967-1970: December 1967-July 1968] (Brno: Doplněk, 1995), pp. 54-61, pp. 59-60.

Report for cabinet meeting, 12 March 1968, MNO/sekr. min. 1968/10, VHA.

43 Speech by Dzúr in Bratislava, 9-11 July 1968, and Dzúr to Dubček, 2 August 1968, in Benčík, Vojenské otázky, pp. 202-27 and 249.

44 Ibid., p. 125.

45 Antonín Benčík, Operace Dunaj: Vojáci a Praňské jaro 1968 (Operation Danube: The Military and the Prague Spring of 1968] (Prague: Institute for Contemporary History, 1994), p. 38.

Iakubovskii to Dubček, 18 July 1968, in Benčík, et al., eds., Vojenské otázky, pp. 236-37.

Anatoli Gribkow, Der Warschauer Pakt: Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses (Berlin: Ed

on Q, 1995), p. 153.

48 Statement by ČTK press agency, July 28, and “Stanovisko vojenské rady ministra národní obrany” [The Position of the Military Council of the Minister of Defense), 13 August 1968, in Benčík, et al., eds., Vojenské otázky, pp. 241-43, 253-56.

49 “Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present, the Basic Ways to Resolve Them,” July 1968, in Jaromír Navrátil et al., ed., The Prague Spring '68: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 268-76, at p. 275.

30 Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 95-97.

si Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 640-42.

52 Milan Ždímal, Memorandum: 1968-1990 (Bratislava: Vysoká pedagogická škola, katedra politológie, 1992), pp. 3-5. The author was one of the signatories of the memorandum.

53 Successive drafts of the appeal for the convocation of European security conference, 17 March 1969, J IV 2/202-264 Bd 16, SAPMO.

54 Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Non-invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 23 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998).

Ryszard Majchrzak, at the time Director of Minister Rapacki's Secretariat.

56 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet bloc's organization for economic cooperation also known as COMECON.

In the original, the term “local war" is used. 58 Three-year agreement on the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces, signed in 1967.

59 The Hungarian and Berlin crises.

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New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Editor's Note: With the following essay and documents, CWIHP continues its efforts to document the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962. At our request, Raymond L. Garthoff has prepared new, full translations of the memoranda of 6 and 8 September
1962, which were featured in CWIHP Bulletin 10, following the article by Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko on The
Pitsunda Decision.He has also translated, at our request, several additional memoranda from May, June, and October
1962. All of these are photocopies from the General Staff archives now in the Volkogonov papers, Reel 6 (Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division). In some cases these copies contain passages difficult or impossible to read, not only
because the originals are handwritten but also because Volkogonov's photocopies in some cases do not fully reproduce the
original pages. Nonetheless, the texts are nearly complete, and the documents are of considerable interest and value to
research on this important subject.

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TV Linsights in their CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March

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1998) article on “The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons."! Based on two Soviet Defense Ministry documents from September 1962, it is an interesting and provocative account, building on their important earlier study "One Hell of a Gamble." These documents are among others related to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Volkogonov Papers, a collection gathered by the late Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov and now held by the Library of Congress. Partial translations of these two documents are appended to their article.

Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban missile crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones. It is clear from these materials (and some others earlier addressed in One Hell of a Gamble) that Khrushchev made certain adjustments in Operation Anadyr, his plan for military deployments in Cuba, in September 1962, evidently in reaction to President Kennedy's public warning of September 4. It is less certain, much less certain, that Khrushchev saw Kennedy's warning as a “signal” that he knew about the planned deployment of missiles, as suggested by Fursenko and Naftali. Khrushchev may simply have become less confident that the deployment could be kept secret. It is also not clear that Khrushchev had, in any meaningful sense, "a chance to stop the operation" on September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's warning. True, as the authors state, on that date “there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba.” But the first missiles were already en route. Khrushchev theoretically could have "terminated the deployment” at that time, but in practical (and political) terms he could hardly have done so. Instead, these documents show, he sought to expedite the dispatch of weaponry already underway, and also to send some additional tactical nuclear weapons (six bombs for an additional squadron of nine specially fitted IL-28 bombers, and 12 warheads for 12 Luna (FROG) short-range tactical

rockets). According to Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's warning was thus “to rachet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture.”

Although it is true that Khrushchev sought to expedite the remaining planned shipments, and on September 7 added the Lunas and nuclear-equipped IL-28s, he also rejected a Ministry of Defense proposal to add a brigade of 18 R-11M nuclear-armed missiles—the SCUD B (SS-10) missile with an 80 mile range (for nuclear delivery). And the augmentation did not "introduce" tactical nuclear weapons; the original General Staff Anadyr plan of 24 May 1962, finally approved by Khrushchev and the Presidium on June 10, had provided for 80 nuclear-armed tactical cruise missiles (with 16 launchers), with a range of 90 miles. Moreover, not mentioned by Fursenko and Naftali in their article, although noted in their book, two weeks later, on September 25, Khrushchev canceled the planned deployment to Cuba of the major part of the Soviet Navy surface and submarine fleet previously planned for deployment. This included canceling the planned deployment of seven missile-launching submarines, as well as two cruisers, two missile-armed destroyers, and two conventionally armed destroyers.

In sum, in September Khrushchev added six IL-28 nuclear bombs and 12 short-range Luna tactical nuclear rockets to the 80 tactical cruise missile warheads previously authorized, but rejected addition of 18 longerrange tactical ballistic missiles. And he canceled most of the Navy deployment, including seven missile-launching submarines with 21 nuclear ballistic missiles. In short, I do not believe it is correct to conclude, as do the authors, that Khrushchev "chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons."

In their article, Fursenko and Naftali have misread the second document, reporting that Khrushchev approved an order to arm Soviet attack submarines with nuclear torpedoes to be prepared, upon receipt of specific orders from Moscow, "to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on U.S.

coastal targets," the list of targets being appended to the forced to surface during the crisis, sometimes by dropping revised mission statement (but regrettably missing from the small depth charges! copy available in the Volkogonov Papers). As the authors Perhaps additional documents will be found that had previously reported in their book, the four Soviet further clarify these issues. Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarines sent on patrol to the It is very helpful to have the texts of key documents area in October were each equipped with one nuclear- made available in translation, as the Cold War armed torpedo in addition to conventionally armed

International History Project has sought to do in torpedoes. These nuclear torpedoes were, however, as we connection with the article by Fursenko and Naftali. In know from other sources, intended for use against U.S. this case, however, there are extensive unacknowledged Navy ships, in particular aircraft carriers, in case of

omissions and errors in the translations. In the September confirmed U.S. Navy attacks on the submarines. The 6 document, several paragraphs have been omitted with no submarine-launched nuclear attacks against the most ellipses or other indication of that fact. And the second, important coastal targets in the USA" mentioned in the September 8, document should probably be identified as September 8 document were explicitly identified as strikes “Extracts," inasmuch as over half the document has been by “nuclear-missile equipped submarines," still scheduled omitted, again without indication. Moreover, while much for deployment to Cuba until that deployment was

of the omitted material may be of little interest to most canceled on September 25. Incidentally, the seven missile readers, it does include such things as unit identifications submarines planned for deployment in Cuba until

and a number of other new data. One interesting September 25 were the diesel-powered Golf-class, not the disclosure in the September 8 document, not included in nuclear-powered Hotel-class (as misidentified in "One Hell the translated extracts, is the fact that one of the nuclearof a Gamble"), and they each carried three relatively short- armed cruise missile regiments had as its designated target range ballistic missiles (325 mile R-13, SS-N-4, missiles), the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. not “intermediate-range” missiles.

It is also of interest that the full text of the September I agree fully with the conclusion by Fursenko and 8 guidance to the Soviet commander in Cuba gives as a Naftali that “Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on mission for the four Army ground force regiments not the (potential] battlefield without any analysis of the only protection of other Soviet forces and assistance to the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.” I am Cuban armed forces in combating invading forces, but less certain that an "inescapable” further conclusion is that also assistance in liquidating "counterrevolutionary “Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in

groups" in Cuba. battle, not as a deterrent.” That may well be, but I do not Another interesting fact not noted in the article or believe it is that clear that the Soviet leadership necessarily included in the translated extracts is that the separate IL-28 “intended to use” the nuclear weapons in Cuba, although it squadron for nuclear bomb delivery (comprising nine clearly did deploy the weapons for possible use against an aircraft) was a Soviet Air Force unit and was located at invading force. In all, I believe it goes too far to see Holguin airbase in eastern Cuba (at the time of the Khrushchev's decision on dispatch of additional tactical September 8 document it was postulated as “10-12 aircraft," nuclear weapons to Cuba as “embrace of a nuclear

and was designated for Santa Clara airfield). The IL-28 warfighting strategy in September 1962." We know that regiment originally assigned under Anadyr in May-June as the crisis arose in October Khrushchev clearly reiterated was a Navy unit (comprising 30 light torpedo bombers and that no use of any nuclear weapons was authorized

3 training aircraft) and was located in the far west of Cuba without explicit approval from Moscow, that is, by

at San Julian airfield. After the climax of the missile crisis himself.

on October 28, it was observed that uncrating of IL-28s at I do, however, agree with what I believe to be the San Julian continued in early November while the issue of main thrust of the argument by Fursenko and Naftali, that withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers was thrashed out in the Khrushchev had no conception of the risks of escalation in U.S.-Soviet negotiations (and between Mikoyan and any use of tactical nuclear weapons against a U.S.

Castro in Havana). At that time, observers in Washington invading force. Moreover, the fact that the maximum were perplexed by the fact that IL-28s at San Julian range of some systems meant they conceivably could have continued to be uncrated and assembled, while no effort been fired at southern Florida (the IL-28s and the FKR-1 was made to uncrate or assemble the nine crated IL-28s at cruise missiles), even though their designated role was to Holguin. In retrospect, it seems clear that the Soviet attack an invasion force on or around Cuba, was

command in Cuba was uncertain about the future of the unnecessarily dangerous. The fact that the four F-class nuclear-armed bomber squadron, but assumed the diesel attack submarines each carried a nuclear torpedo for conventionally armed coastal defense torpedo-bomber use against attacking U.S. Navy ships on the high seas was regiment would remain. Thus one minor mystery of the particularly provocative, inasmuch as their use would not crisis denouement is clarified by these details in the only have escalated to nuclear warfare but also

September 8 document. It also is clear that the failure geographically extended beyond Cuba to war at sea. during the crisis even to begin the assembly of the nuclearThese are the submarines that the U.S. Navy repeatedly capable IL-28s shows that these tactical nuclear systems




were not given any priority, as one would expect if Khrushchev's decision in September had meant greater reliance on nuclear warfighting.

To note but one other item of interest in the untranslated portions of the document of September 8, the instructions on employment in combat of the air defense forces assigned responsibility to the Commander of the Group of Forces in Cuba, in contrast to the guidance on employment of the nuclear MRBM and IRBM missile forces (and the planned Naval submarine nuclear missile forces) which was specifically reserved for a signal from Moscow. The employment of Army (Luna) and Air Force (cruise missile FKR-1 and IL-28) tactical nuclear forces was not specifically limited to advance approval from Moscow, with one interesting exception: the employment of nuclear cruise missiles against the U.S. base at Guantanamo was reserved for a "signal from the General Staff.” This relative laxity in the general guidance for most tactical nuclear forces tends to support the general argument by Fursenko and Naftali, although they do not note it and incorrectly state that the September 8 document revised the original Anadyr plan to provide that any use of nuclear weapons required direct orders from Moscow. Nonetheless, while the original and revised plans are ambiguous on possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in meeting an invasion of Cuba, as Fursenko and Naftali acknowledge at the outset of the crisis on October 22, and again on October 27, Khrushchev clearly reaffirmed a requirement for advance approval by Moscow for the use of

weapon. In addition to omissions in the appended documents, there are many infelicities and downright errors in the translation. For example, the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is variously translated as "Soviet armed force group”, “Soviet Military Group”, “group of Soviet troops”, but never by the standard translation which would have indicated it was considered a major expeditionary force equivalent to the Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The term divizion is translated throughout as "division," which is inaccurate. For artillery and missile units the standard translation is battalion. The air defense missile units in Cuba comprised two divisions (divizii), with 24 subordinate battalions (diviziony). Similarly, boevye chasti is translated throughout literally as “battle parts," when it should be “warheads.” The phrase translated as “one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo (sic) and guard (countermeasures) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind” should read “one squadron of IL-28 bombers comprising 10-12 aircraft, including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile field missile-technical base (PRTB).” Reference to "successful onland firing tests of C-75 (sic) anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, (they were) exact within 100-120 meters" is incomprehensible; it should refer to “successful firing tests of the S-75 antiaircraft system against surface targets on

level terrain; at distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.” Admittedly, some of the terminology is specialized, but greater accuracy is required to make such documentation reliable and, indeed, usable.

There are also a few errors of detail in the article. Fursenko and Naftali, in addition to misidentifying the R-11M as a cruise missile rather than the Scud ballistic missile, follow the translation in using divisions, rather than battalions, for divizion. They also state that the Indigirka carried 45 warheads for the R-12 MRBMs; the correct figure is 36. Finally, in a footnote they refer to the Ilyushin (IL-)114, described as "the workhorse of the Soviet air force,” as unsuitable for carrying missiles and nuclear weapons. There was no IL-114; the aircraft in question is the Tupolev (Tu-)114, and it was not used in the Soviet Air Force at all-it was configured as a civilian passenger liner, and for that reason was not suitable for loading and carrying the missiles or warheads (as indicated in the full text of the document).

Again, these corrections are noted only because the article and documents are so important, and the Bulletin is the only available reference for those who are not able to personally research the Volkogonov Papers.

In concluding, I would like to note that there are a couple dozen other documents on the missile crisis in the Volkogonov Papers. Among them are the original Ministry of Defense military deployment plan for Anadyr (dated 24 May 1962), and a one page summary of meetings of May 24, May 25, and June 10 with the decisions to proceed, and a diagram of the whole deployment prepared by the General Staff on June 20. These documents are translated below. Not translated here are others, including Instructions from Defense Minister Malinovsky to the chief of the advance military group sent to Cuba (issued July 4), and the list of the 161 members of that group (including a change noted in pen, naming General of the Army Issa Pliyev as commander in place of Lt. General of Aviation Pavel Dankevich of the Strategic Missile Forces).

There are also a number of Defense Ministry documents on preparations for the dispatch of the forces, instructions on loading and transporting them, and the like. One of the most interesting of these documents is a revised instruction to ship captains and troop leaders ordering that in the event of “a clear threat of seizure of our ship by foreign ships" the ship is to be scuttled. This change appears, although undated, to represent another response to Kennedy's warning of September 4. Other documents from mid-September describe the arming of these merchant ships with 23 mm. antiaircraft guns.

Also of interest are draft instructions to the commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba prepared in August stressing the need for all personnel in Cuba to be “examples of the Soviet socialist ideology” (and not to visit “restaurants, cabarets and beaches" or take walks unaccompanied or “become acquainted with any unknown

any nuclear

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Finally, Marshal Malinovsky's laconic one page report to Khrushchev on the shooting down of the American U-2 aircraft on October 27 (signed on October 28 nearly 15 hours after the incident) makes no excuses. It simply states as a fact that the plane was shot down “in order not to permit the photography to reach the United States.” As we know from other sources, Khrushchev rightly took a very different view of this unauthorized action. (This document is translated below.)

In sum, these documents are of interest on many aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Certainly one of the most important is the subject of Khrushchev's views on nuclear weapons, raised by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali in their article, which I have sought also to address in this discussion.



In CWHIP Bulletin No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 223-25.

Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton & Co., 1997).

Ibid., p. 214.

See Aleksandr Mozgovoi, “Order: In Case of Firing, Use Nuclear Weapons," Komsomol'skaya pravda, 27 June 1995, ar account by the commander of one of the submarines.

Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble," p. 213.


with eight launchers each, in all 16 launchers.

-In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.

With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 missile at each launcher.

Deployment of the R-12 missiles is planned in the [illegible) variant with the use of SP-6. Prepared assemblydisassembly elements of the SP-6 for equipping the missile pads will be prepared at construction enterprises of the Ministry of Defense by 20 June and shipped together with the regiments. Upon arrival at the designated locations, personnel of the missile regiments will within ten days equip the launch positions by their own efforts, and will be ready to launch missiles.

For deployment of the missile units armed with R-14 missiles, construction on site will last about four months. This work can be handled by the personnel of the units, but it will be necessary to augment them with a group of 25 engineer-construction personnel and 100 construction personnel of basic specialties and up to 100 construction fitters from State Committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology and radioelectronics.

For accomplishing the work it is necessary to send:

– 16 complete sets of earth equipment for the R-14 produced by [the machine) industry in the current year; -machinery and vehicles: Mobile cranes (5 ton)

-10 Bulldozers

-20 Mobile graders

-10 Excavators

-10 Dump trucks

-120 Cement mixers (GVSU)

-6 Special technical equipment for (illegible) and testing apparatuses

-Basic materials

-2,000 tons Reinforced concrete

- 15,000 sq. meters (not counting access roads) Metal

-2,000 tons SP-6 sets

-30 GR-2 barracks

-20 Prefabricated wooden houses -10

Cable, equipment and other materials. Further accumulation of missile fuel, missiles, and warheads for the units is possible depending on the creation of reserve space and storage in Cuba, inasmuch as it would be possible to include in each missile regiment a third battalion with four launchers.

The staff of the Group and of the missile division can expediently be sent from the Soviet Union in the first days of July 1962 in two echelons: the 1st echelon (R-12 regiments) and the 2nd (R-14 regiments).

3. For air defense of the island of Cuba and protection of the Group of Forces to send 2 antiaircraft

Document No. 1 R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba, 24 May 1962

Top Secret Special Importance

One Copy

To the Chairman of the Defense Council

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

In accordance with your instructions the Ministry of Defense proposes:

1. To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Soviet Forces comprising all branches of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.

2. To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division Major General (Igor) Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments:

—The 79th, 181st and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 24 launchers.

-The 665th and 668th R-14 (SS-5) missile regiments

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