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7. With the objective of combat security of our technical troops, to send to Cuba four separate motorized rifle regiments, with a tank battalion in each, at the expense of the 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Leningrad Military District, with an overall personnel strength of 7300. The regiments to be sent in June-July 1962.
4. For defense of coasts and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack on the island of Cuba to send one regiment of Sopka ["little volcano") comprising three battalions (6 launchers) with three missiles per launcher
- on the coast in the vicinity of Havana, one regiment (4 launchers)
on the coast in the vicinity of Banes, one battalion (2 launchers)
On the southern coast in the vicinity of Cienfuegos to locate one battalion (2 launchers), [already) planned for delivery to Cuba in 1962.
The Sopka complex is capable of destroying surface ships at a range of up to 80 km.
5. To send to Cuba as part of the Group of Forces:
-a brigade of missile patrol boats of the class Project 183-R, comprising two units with 6 patrol boats in each in all 12 patrol boats), each armed with two P-15 [trans: NATO SS-N-2 Styx] missiles with a range up to 40 km.;
a detachment of support ships comprising: 1 tanker, 2 dry cargo transports, and 4 repair afloat ships;
-fuel for missiles: fuel for the R-13 [trans: NATO SS-N-4 Sark] and P-15—70 tons, oxidizer for the R-13— 180 tons, oxidizer for the P-15—20 tons, kerosene for the S-2 and KSShCh (trans: probably NATO SA-N-1 Goa)60 tons;
-two combat sets of the P-15 missile (24 missiles) and one for the R-13 (21 missiles).
Shipment of the missile patrol boats Project 183-R class, the battalions of Sopka, technical equipment for the missile patrol boats and technical batteries for the Sopka battalions, and also the missiles, missile fuel, and other equipment for communications to be carried on ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.
Shipment of the warheads, in readiness state 4, will be handled by ships of the Navy.
8. Upon completion of the concentration of Soviet troops planned for Cuba, or in case of necessity, to send to Cuba on a friendly visit, tentatively in September:
A) A squadron of surface ships of the Navy under the command of Vice Admiral G.S. Abashvili (deputy commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet) comprising:
-two cruisers, Mikhail Kutuzov (Black Sea Fleet) and Sverdlov (Red Banner Baltic Fleet);
—two missile destroyers of the Project 57-bis class, the Boikii and Gnevny (Black Sea Fleet);
-two destroyers of the Project 76 class, the Skromnyi and Svedushchii (Northern Fleet);
Along with the squadron to send one refueling tanker. On the ships to send one full combat set of standard ammunition (including one combat set of KSShch missiles -24 missiles) and standard equipment.
Sailing time of the ships [is] 15 days.
18th Division of missile submarines of the Project 629 class [Translator's Note: NATO Golf or G-class] (7 submarines each with 3 R-13 (SS-N-4] missiles with range of 540 km.);
-a brigade of torpedo submarines of Project 641 class (NATO: Foxtrot or F-class] (4 submarines with torpedo armament);
-two submarine tenders.
If necessary, the squadrons can be sent separately.
Upon arrival of the squadrons in Cuba, they would be incorporated into the Group of Soviet Forces.
6. To send as part of the Group of Forces in Cuba in July-August:
-Two regiments of FKR (16 launchers) with PRTB, with their missiles and 5 special [Translator's Note: nuclear] warheads for each launcher. Range of the FKR is up to 180 km.;
-A mine-torpedo aviation regiment with IL-28 aircraft, comprising three squadrons (33 aircraft) with RAT-52 jet torpedoes (150 torpedoes), and air dropped mines (150 mines) for destruction of surface ships;
-An Mi-4 helicopter regiment, two squadrons, 33 helicopters;
9. For rear area security of the Group of Forces in Cuba to send:
-three hospitals (200 beds each);
—seven warehouses (2 for food, 1 for general storage, 4 for fuel, including two for automotive and aviation fuel and two for liquid fuel for the Navy);
-one company for servicing a trans-shipping base;
one field bakery factory; Create reserves:
-in the Group-fuel and provisions for routine maintenance of the troops for three months;
- in the troops—mobile (fuel, ammunition, provisions) by established norms;
11. To establish a staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba to command the Soviet troops. To form the staff of the Group convert the staff of the 49th Missile Army from Vinnitsa, which has a well-qualified integrated apparatus with support and service elements.
To incorporate into the staff of the Group a naval section, an air force section, and an air defense section. The Commander-in-Chief of the Group to have four deputies—one for general matters, one for the Navy (VMF), one for Air Defense (PVO), and one for the Air Force (VVS).
unanimously approved; see the translation that follows of the only record of that meeting, and of a follow-on meeting of 25 May, both entered in a hasty scrawl by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff and Secretary of the Defense Council, on the back of the May 24 memorandum. As noted, the decision of the Presidium was to approve the planned deployment, subject to Castro's agreement. After the Soviet delegation returned from Havana, another Presidium meeting was held on June 10, and finally approved the General Staff memorandum. This approval was also noted briefly by General Ivanov on the same back page of the original (and only) copy of the May 24 memorandum. In addition, on June 10 all members of the Presidium signed this original memorandum, writing across the first page on top of the text (not all of the signatures are legible, but it does indeed appear to be the entire membership of the Presidium).
Ivanov's notations are not fully readable, not only because of illegibility, but also because General Volkogonov's photocopy of the document from the General Staff Archive was askew and the right side of the page was not reproduced. This is, however, the only copy available at this time. It is translated below.
There also follows below a chart prepared by the General Staff, showing the organization of the Group of Forces as of June 20 and identifying the units designated to be sent. (Several of the unit members were subsequently changed to enhance security.) It is not known for whom the chart was prepared, probably the General Staff itself. It was made in only one copy and was found in the General Staff archive. It has previously been available, but only in the Institute of Military History 1994 study of the crisis, Na krayu propasti (On the Brink), published in only thirty copies.—R.G.)
12. The form of dress envisioned for the troops sent to Cuba, except for the Navy, is one set of civilian clothes and one tropical uniform (as for troops in the Turkestan Military District).
13. Food for the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be arranged from the USSR.
14. Financial support will be paid on the same general basis as for other troops located abroad.
15. Measures for creation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will proceed under the codename Anadyr.
We request your review.
(signature] R. Malinovsky
Document No. 2 S.P. Ivanov, Untitled notes on the back of the May 24
memorandum to Khrushchev
The question of aid to Cuba was discussed by the Presidium of the CC (Central Committee of the CPSU. N.S. Khrushchev presented a report. Statements were made by Kozlov, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Voronov, Polyansky and all other members of the Presidium and [illegible) approval of the decision.
[The memorandum translated above and dated 24 May 1962, was the first general plan for the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba prepared by the General Staff, in response to a request by Khrushchev after a May 21 meeting of the Defense Council. It was discussed at a CPSU Presidium (Politburo) meeting on May 24 and
1. The measures in Anadyr are approved entirely and unanimously. The document was approved subject to receiving agreement by F. Castro.
2. A commission is to be sent to (Castro, or Cuba; this copy of the text cut off] for negotiation. Comrade
25.5.62 11:00 AM
1. N.S. Khrushchev (met with) Malinovsky, Gromyko, Andropov, Troyanovsky, Rashidov, Alekseyev [Translator's Note: text partly missing on available copy, probably included Biryuzov and Ivanov, although by this time it had been decided Ivanov would remain in Moscow. Portion of text here was not readable.) [signed:) S.P. Ivanov
Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces General of the Army I.A. Pliyev
[The sheet at this point bears a notation made after the original notes of the meeting on Many 24. It reads:] Executed in one copy, on seven pages, no draft. Attested: Colonel General S.P. Ivanov (signature) 24.5.62
(A formal classification stamp by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff dated 26.5.62 gives the classification Special Importance" and a record number 394-illegible)
Staff (133 pers.) Lt. Gen. V.V. Akhindinov Sections Operational Directorate (22 pers.) Col. N.A. Ivanov Intelligence (11 pers.) Communications (11 pers.) Ballistics (6 pers.) Cartographic and Geodosy (9 pers.) Meteorological Service (8 pers.) Sixth Section (unidentified)
(4 pers.) Personnel and Records (7 pers.) Eighth Section (unidentified) (13 pers.)
(There then follows on the same page a third notation by General Ivanov entered on June 10:]
10.6.62 11:00 AM
Presidium of the CC CPSU meeting, with participation also of Gromyko, Malinovsky, (Zakharov), Yepishev, Biryuzov, and Chuikov [all deputy ministers of Defense)
Rashidov and Biryuzov reported (on their mission). [Remainder of the notation, four lines of script, is truncated and illegible on the Volkogonov copy.]
[Translator's Note: An account of this Presidium meeting, based on reading this same document in the General Staff archive, is provided by Aleksandr Fursenko, in Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 187-89. He also summarizes a presentation to that meeting by Malinovsky reading from the basic May 24 Anadyr plan which, as earlier noted, was then signed by all Presidium members and Party Secretaries present.)
Missile Forces (RV)
43rd Missile Division
665th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB) 668th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB) 79th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB) 181st Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB) 664th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB) (Eight launchers per regiment)
Air Defense Forces (PVO)
11th Antiaircraft Division
Ground Forces (SV)
302nd Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment 314th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment 400th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment 496th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
1. About the transport by air of special warheads (spetsial'nye boevye chasti; nuclear warheads) for the Luna (FROG] and R-11M (SCUD-B] missiles. Tests have been conducted at the test range and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of special warheads for R-11M missiles, two on AN-8 aircraft, and four on AN-12 aircraft.
The alternatives for transport of warheads for the Luna missile are analogous to those for the R-11M.
The transport of special warheads by Tu-114 is not possible owing to the absence of a freight hatch and fasteners.
Naval Forces (VMF)
2 cruisers, 2 missile destroyers, 2 destroyers
12 missile patrol boats (cutters)
[Trans: Includes 3 trainers]
2. About the transport by air of R-11M and Luna missiles.
Practice loading, securing and transport of training R-11M and Luna missiles has been carried out on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft, with 2 Luna or 1 RUM missiles on AN-8 or AN-12 aircraft.
Field Bakery Factory
3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launchers, special earth moving machines, and field missile-technical bases (PRTB) for the R-11M and Luna missiles. The Tu-114 aircraft, notwithstanding its large loading capacity (up to 30 tons) and long range (up to 8,000 km.), is not suitable for transport of missile equipment as it is not adapted in a transport mode.
II. Proposals of the Ministry of Defense for Reinforcing Forces of the Group in Cuba
In order to reinforce the Group of Forces in Cuba,
send: 1) One squadron of IL-28 bombers, comprising 10-12 aircraft including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile PRTB and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons;
capacity, doors and hatches) of the AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, Tu-104, Tu-114, and the not yet available larger AN-22 aircraft; and bomber aircraft (the Tu-95 [Bear), Mya-4 [Bison), Tu-16 (Badger), and IL-28 (Beagle) bombers), although none were suitable for transporting the rockets both for technical and political-strategic routing reasons. This informational annex was signed on the same date, 6 September 1962, by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It is not translated here.]
Document No. 5 Memorandum, R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov to Commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba,
8 September 1962
3) Two-three battalions of Luna for inclusion in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba.
[Overwritten: "Three Luna battalions. N.S.
Each Luna battalion will have two launchers and
To the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces
The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint defense against possible aggression toward the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.
A decision on employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement [of the situation will be made by the Soviet Government.
For the preparation and custody of special warheads for the Luna missiles, send one PRTB (150 men).
The indicated squadron of IL-28s, one R-11M missile brigade with PRTB, and two-three Luna battalions with PRTB, and the missiles are to be sent to Cuba in the first half of October.
Atom bombs (6), special warheads for the R-11M missiles (18) and for the Luna missiles (8-12) are to be sent on the transport Indigirka on 15 September.
The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on level terrain. At distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.
The results of computer calculations indicate the possibility also of successful use against naval targets.
In order to fire against land or sea targets using S75 complexes with the troops (in Cuba), small modifications in the missile guidance stations will be required by factory brigades together with some additional equipment prepared by industry.
1. The task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is not to permit an enemy landing on Cuban territory from the sea or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress.
Forces and means: Soviet troops together with the Cuban Armed forces.
2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba will be guided by the following considerations:
Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky (signature]
6 September 1962
a) With Respect to Missile Forces
The missile forces, constituting the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike on the most important targets in the United States of America (list of targets included in Attachment #1) [Translator's Note: This attachment was not included in the Volkogonov Papers).
Upon arrival of the missile division in Cuba, two R-12