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(SS-4] regiments (539th and 546th) and one R-14 (SS-5) regiment (564th) will deploy in the western region, and one R-12 regiment (the 514th) and one R-14 regiment (the 657th) in the central region of Cuba.
The missile units will deploy to the positional areas and take up their launch positions; for R-12 missiles, not later than (illegible) days; for the R-14 missiles with fixed launch facilities (illegible) period.
With the establishment of launchers on combat duty, (illegible--all?) regiments will maintain Readiness No.4 [Translator's Note: The lowest level of combat readiness, and the least provocative.).
b) With Respect to Air Defense (PVO) Forces
PVO forces of the Group will not permit incursion of foreign aircraft into the air space of the Republic of Cuba (illegible words) and strikes by enemy air against the Group, the most important administrative political (and industrial] centers, naval bases, ports (illegible). Combat use of PVO forces will be activated by the Commander of the Group of Forces.
The PVO divisions will be deployed:
—12th Division (surface to air missiles)—the Western region of Cuban territory
(illegible] -27th Division (surface to air missiles the Eastern region of Cuban territory
[illegible] 213th Fighter Air Division will be deployed at Santa Clara airfield.
After unloading in Cuba of the surface-to-air missiles and fighter aviation will be deployed (illegible) and organization of combat readiness.
d) With Respect to the Navy
The Naval element of the Group must not permit combat ships and transports of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, and provide cover for our transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.
Missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, nuclear missile strikes on the most important coastal targets in the USA (List of targets in Attachment #1).
The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One detachment of the brigade of missile patrol boats should be located in the vicinity of Banes.
The battalions of Şopka (coastal defense cruise missiles) should be deployed on the coast:
-One battalion east of Havana in the region of Santa Cruz del Norte;
-One battalion southeast of Cienfuegos in the vicinity of Gavilan;
—One battalion northeast of Banes in the vicinity of Cape Mulas:
-One battalion on the island Piños [Isle of Pines) in the vicinity of Cape Buenavista.
The torpedo-mine air regiment (IL-28s) will deploy at the airfield San Julian Asiento, and plan and instruct in destroying combat ships and enemy landings from the sea.
c) With Respect to the Ground Forces
Ground forces troops will protect the missile and other technical troops and the Group command center, and be prepared to provide assistance to the Cuban Armed Fores in liquidating sillegible) enemy landings and counterrevolutionary groups on the territory Republic of Cuba
The independent motorized rifle regiments (OMSP) will deploy:
-The 74th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the Western part of Cuba in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [trans: in the San Cristobal and Guanajay areas) and to operate in the sectors Havana and Pinar del Rio;
—The 43rd OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the vicinity of Santiago de las Vegas in readiness to protect the Command of the Group of Forces and to operate in the sectors Havana, Artemisa, Batabano, and Matanzas;
-The 146th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the area Camajuani, Placetas, Sulu... [illegible), in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [Translator's Note: in the Sagua la Grande and Remedios areas) and to operate in the sectors: Caibarien, Colon, Cienfeugos, Fomento;
-The 106th OMSP in the eastern part of Cuba in the vicinity of Holguin in readiness to operate in the sectors Banes, Victoria de las Tunas, Manzanillo, and Santiago de Cuba.
e) With Respect to the Air Force
The squadron of IL-28 delivery aircraft will be based on Santa Clara airfield in readiness to operate in the directions of Havana, Guantanamo, and the Isle of Pines. [Translator's Note: This deployment was later changed to Holguin airfield.]
The independent aviation engineering regiments (OAIP] (FKR) (cruise missiles [Translator's Note: The OAIP designation was a cover; the real designation was FKR regiments) will deploy:
-231st OAIP—in the western region of Cuba, designated as the main means to fire on the coast in the northeastern and northern sectors, and as a secondary mission in the direction of the Isle of Pines.
—222nd OAIP—in the eastern part of the island. This regiment must be prepared, upon signal from the General Staff, in the main sector of the southeastern direction to strike the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. Secondary firing sectors in the northeastern and southwestern directions.
The fighter aviation regiment armed with MiG-21 F13 aircraft is included as a PVO (air defense) division, but crews of all fighters will train also for operations in support of the Ground Forces and Navy.
3. Organize security and economy of missiles, warheads,
8 September 1962 [Translator's Note: "8 September" is written over the original version of “. July 1962,” suggesting that this document was drafted in July]
No. 76438 Send in cipher
(Various illegible signatures dated July 9, and one noting it was read by General V.I. Davidkov on 3 October 1962]
Rear area bases will be located in the regions as follows:
— Main Base-comprising: the 758th command base, separate service companies, the 3rd automotive platoon, 784th POL fuel station, the 860th food supply depot, the 964th warehouse, the 71s bakery factory, the 176th field technical medical detachment—Mariel, Artemisa, Guira de Melena, Rincon; -Separate rear base-comprising: 782nd POL station, 883rd food supply depot, a detachment of the 964th warehouse, (the 1st] field medical detachment, a detachment of the 71s bakery factory-Caibarien, Camajuani, Placetas; -Separate rear base-comprising: separate detachments of the 784ch POL station, the 883rd food supply depot, the 964th warehouse, [the 71s' bakery unit, and the 1st field medical detachment_Gibara, Holguin, Camasan.
Document No. 6 Handwritten Note for the Record by Colonel General
S.P. Ivanov, 5 October 1962
By VCh [secure telephone]
17:20 hours 5 October 1962
Executed in one copy,
on one sheet, without a draft
Soviet Moldavia and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis:
A Report on the Political “Spill-Over”
Introduction and translation by Mark Kramer
his brief memorandum to the Soviet Communist
Second Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, Yurii Mel’kov, on 1 August 1968. As a rule, the Communist Party in each of the union republics in the USSR was headed by an official whose ethnic background was that of the titular nationality, while the Second Secretary was an ethnic Russian. Often the Second Secretary carried as much weight in Moscow as the republic's First Secretary did. (The main exception was when the First Secretary was also a member or candidate member of the CPSU Politburo.) In this particular case, Mel’kov did indeed seem as influential as the Moldavian CP's First Secretary, Ivan Bodiul. Although Bodiul was one of several union-republic First Secretaries who delivered speeches at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in April 1968—a plenum that focused on the situation in Czechoslovakia—he played little discernible role after that.
It has long been known that Soviet officials in both Moscow and Kyiv were worried about the political spillover from Czechoslovakia into neighboring Ukraine (see, for example, the passages from Petro Shelest's diary in issue No.10 of the Bulletin), but new archival materials show that official concerns about the spill-over extended well beyond Ukraine. This document reveals the effects that the crisis was having in Moldavia, a small republic abutting Romania and southern Ukraine. Other newly declassified materials indicate similar concerns about Soviet Georgia and the three Baltic states. (See, for example, the top-secret memorandum No. 13995, “TSK KPSS," 23 May 1968, from V. Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the Georgian CP CC, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 22, Ll. 5-9.) All materials about a possible spill-over from Czechoslovakia were closely reviewed by Mikhail Suslov, one of the most powerful members of the CPSU Politburo who was also the CPSU Secretary responsible for ideological affairs. He often wrote comments and instructions in the margins of these documents. The materials were then routed to other members of the CPSU Secretariat and to top officials in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.
Mel'kov's cable notes that “certain individuals" in Moldavia failed to “comprehend the essence of events in Czechoslovakia" and had "expressed support for the KSC's course toward ‘liberalization.'” He reported with dismay that publications, letters, and other materials casting a positive light on the Prague Spring were pouring into Moldavia from Czechoslovakia. Mel’kov assured the CPSU Secretariat that the Moldavian party was carrying out “increased political work” and related measures to
In connection with the events in the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), the party aktiv in Moldavia, including lecturers, political workers, and agitators, are conducting necessary explanatory work among blue-collar workers. An absolute majority of the republic's population wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government aimed at strengthening the positions of socialism and consolidating the unity of the world socialist commonwealth. At present, all blue-collar workers are awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations at Cierna nad Tisou with great hope.
At the same time, certain individuals have shown that they do not comprehend the essence of events occurring in Czechoslovakia, and some express support for the course of the KSC toward so-called “liberalization.” Individual explanatory work is being undertaken with these people.
Recently it has been noted that some Soviet citizens who have relatives or friends in the CSSR have been receiving letters with articles enclosed from Czechoslovak newspapers and magazines. The director of the Czechoslovak public relations firm “Merkur” in Prague, Jiri Donda, sent to the Moscow directorate of advertising of the State Committee on the Press of the USSR Council of Ministers a letter appealing to Soviet citizens, which attempts to convince the Soviet people that the policy conducted by the KSC leadership is correct. This letter is signed by the secretary of the firm's party organization and by other people.
The party organizations are taking measures aimed at further increasing political work among the population.
(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 2, L. 30. Obtained and translated by Mark Kramer.)
Microfilm Projects in East European Military Archives
By Ronald D. Landa
Military History," with the presentation of papers utilizing the microfilmed records from the East European military archives.
U.S. Government initiative has been quietly opening new avenues of research. In 1996 the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Library of Congress (LC) inaugurated a program to microfilm military records and inventories in former Soviet-bloc countries focusing primarily on World War II and the early Cold War years. Expected to continue at least through the year 2000, the program has so far generated more than 300 reels of microfilm.
Projects are now underway at three institutions: the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) outside Warsaw, the National Defense Ministry Archives (Archivele Militarie ale Ministerului Apararii Nationale) in Bucharest, and the Archive for Military History (Hadtortenelmi Leveltar) in Budapest. The projects are designed to assist these archives with their records preservation programs, to make their records more accessible to scholars in the United States, and to promote closer contacts between former Cold War adversaries. Alfred Goldberg, Historian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, coordinates the program, with assistance from historians in the military services and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several non-governmental specialists render advice and assistance.
Under the terms of formal agreements, DoD provides the military archives with microfilm cameras on a longterm loan basis, along with other equipment, film, and supplies. DoD also pays the cost of processing the microfilm. The archives furnish the labor to do the filming. Records are selected for filming by mutual consent. One copy of the processed microfilm is given to the Library of Congress, where it is available to researchers in the European Division's Reading Room in the Jefferson Building. The archives retain both a positive and negative copy for themselves.
The program involves the reproduction of records inventories as well as records themselves. The intention is not only to facilitate research by American scholars at a centralized location in the United States, but also to allow them to prepare for and more knowledgeably plan their visits to the East European military archives.
Consideration is being given to starting similar projects with the Slovak Military History Institute in Bratislava and the Russian Central Naval Archive at Gatchina near St. Petersburg. Earlier attempts to establish microfilm projects in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and with other Russian archives did not yield results.
The Library of Congress and the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) are planning a conference on the theme, “Early Cold War
Origins of the Program
The microfilm program has its roots in two developments growing out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loosening of its hold over countries in Eastern Europe.
First, the opening of formerly closed Soviet-bloc archives, for the most part, made available to researchers diplomatic and Communist party records. Military and intelligence records remained less accessible. In 1991, for example, an American scholar noted that little was known about records at the Polish Central Military Archive, which is located in Rembertow just east of Warsaw. Military documents here, he observed, were “still considered to be 'top secret'—even for the 1940s and 1950s.” Researchers were allowed access to the records only by special permission of the Ministry of Defense, but apparently no one had yet received such permission.? Thus, the need became apparent to encourage the opening of military records, not only in Poland, but also throughout the former Soviet bloc.
Second, the end of the Cold War allowed greatly increased contacts and communication between Department of Defense historical offices and their counterparts in Russia and Eastern Europe. During the late eighties and early nineties a series of bilateral visits kindled a new spirit of cooperation among them. A key milestone was the April 1990 address to a standing-room only audience in the Pentagon auditorium by the former director of the Russian Military History Institute, General Dmitri A. Volkogonov, about the research and writing of his biography of Josef Stalin.
Out of this new atmosphere emerged plans by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to hold a conference in
a Washington, D.C., in March 1994 on the military history and records of the Cold War. Nearly 140 representatives from 17 countries, including former Warsaw Pact nations, attended the conference, which was hosted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.4 Military archivists from Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary presented papers describing their holdings." Participants also discussed a number of ways to continue their collaboration, including bilateral research visits, publication of a newsletter on Cold War history, joint publications, and the microfilming of archival materials.
Following the conference a Department of Defense Cold War Historical Committee, chaired by John Greenwood of the U.S. Army Center of Military History,