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24Translator's Note: Kulikov's concern about this matter can be better understood in light of remarks made at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December by Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Administration, who had been in Warsaw from 8 to 10 December: "In accordance with the [Soviet] Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. ... The produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. When the produce is being transported to the Polish stations, blatant sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing outrageously obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep track of all the insults that have been directed against us.” See “Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," LI. 4-5.

25 Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Solidarity.

26 Translator's Note: These two sentences recapitulate a passage in the 11 December Pravda article (cited above), which reads: “As Polish television reports, the leaders of local "Solidarity' organizations have begun to create 'fighting groups at enterprises. Each shock group includes up to 250-300 people.

Young thugs from the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland have shown up on Polish streets sporting symbols of the Homeland Army, which in its time, as is known, took up arms in a struggle against the establishment of a people's-democratic order in Poland.”

27Translator's Note: This is the way the sentence reads in the original. The word “someone" appears to be missing after the word “send."

28Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Wojciech Wladyslawowich-that is, Jaruzelski. Patronymics are used only in Russian, not in Polish. However, Soviet leaders often referred this way to their closest Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts.

29Translator's Note: The “2nd stage” of the operation, slated to begin as early as 14 December, would have been gravely complicated if the initial crackdown had not prevented widespread turmoil and resistance.

30Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (conversation at Jachranka, 9 November 1997), these remarks at the left were Andropov's response to Jaruzelski's request.

3.Translator's Note: Anoshkin's comments here are very similar to remarks by Andropov at the CPSU Politburo session on 10 December: “The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of 'Solidarity.'” That view was echoed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who declared that “there are no longer any neutrals.” (Both cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 6, 8.) The same point was made in the 11 December Pravda article (cited above), which reads: "Church circles and organizations have noticeably stepped up their activity. The number of sermons in the churches aimed at discrediting the government's efforts to defend socialism has increased."

32Translator's Note: Baibakov reported to the CPSU Politburo on 10 December that Jaruzelski "was deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as you know, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorites." (Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” L. 4.)

Archbishop Jozef Glemp had met with Lech Walesa on 5 December 1981 and then, two days later, sent separate letters to Jaruzelski, Walesa, all the deputies in the Polish Sejm, and the National Students' Union. In the letters to Jaruzelski and Walesa, the primate called for the resumption of tripartite (governmentSolidarity-Church) talks. In the letters to Sejm deputies, he urged that Jaruzelski not be granted “extraordinary powers.” In his letter to the National Students's Union, Glemp called for an end to the recent spate of university strikes. In none of the letters did he even remotely call for anything tantamount to “a holy war against the Polish authorities."

3 'Translator's Note: This again refers to the 30,000 tons of meat that the Soviet Union had promised to ship to Poland. At the Politburo meeting on 10 December, Baibakov indicated that 15,000 tons of the meat had already been sent. (Suslov later cited the figure of 16,000 tons already sent, but Baibakov's figure is probably more reliable.) See ibid., Ll. 4-5, 13.

3*Translator's Note: The word translated here as “adventurist action," avantyura, can also be translated as a “dangerous” or “hazardous" action, but the word “adventurist" is more appropriate for reasons that will become clear below.

3“Translator's Note: The three points to the left of this vertical line are the three issues raised by Jaruzelski. Scrawled diagionally to the right of the vertical line is: “4 questions-a request."

30Translator's Note: This sentence in Anoshkin's book contained two quotation marks at the end, as indicated.

3'Translator's Note: Evidently, Anoshkin means that the church was continuing to urge caution and restraint on the Solidarity leadership.

3*Translator's Note: This refers to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December 1981 in Moscow. Jaruzelski was Poland's national defense minister (as well as prime minister and PUWP First Secretary), but because he was so preoccupied at home, Siwicki attended the meeting in his place.

3°Translator's Note: Kulikov was aware that a “final” decision to proceed with martial law had been adopted on the night of 9 December, but his comments here suggest that he was beginning to worry that Jaruzelski might try to back away from the decision.

40Translator's Note: Baibakov, as noted earlier, had recently been in Warsaw to consult with the Polish leadership. When Baibakov returned to Moscow on 10 December, he briefed the Soviet Politburo. See “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," LI. 1-4.

4'Translator's Note: The extra “our” is in the original.

42Translator's Note: Anoshkin rendered this abbreviation for "postscript" in the Latin alphabet.

“'Translator's Note: All troop deployments listed here and on




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this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind.” (The actual sanctions that materialized were probably less severe than Soviet and Polish leaders had feared.) In early December 1981, Polish vessels were ordered to avoid entering foreign ports and to stay in neutral waters so that their property could not be seized. Baibakov had assured Jaruzelski on 9 December that Poland's requests for economic aid to offset the sanctions "will be given due consideration in Moscow," but at the 10 December meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Soviet leaders displayed relatively little willingness to consider large-scale economic assistance for Poland. Andropov remarked that “as far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give.” He accused the Polish authorities of being “insolent” and of "approaching things this way merely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they will be able to lay all the blame on us." The Soviet Politburo decided simply to give further consideration to the "question of economic assistance to Poland.” All quotations here are from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 6, 8-9.

50 Translator's Note: This word was inadvertently omitted by Anoshkin, but the context and the adjectival endings make clear that “change” or “replacement” (smena or peremena or zamena or perestanovka) should be here.

si Translator's Note: The preceding line was inserted by Anoshkin to replace the following words, which he had crossed out: "Supervision of the struggle against the counterrevolution in locales around the country ..." Initially, he had replaced this with “An analysis of the situation in the country ...," but then he chose a third way of phrasing it. Anoshkin crossed out “An analysis of,” but he neglected to cross out the words “situation in the country,” which are squeezed above crossed-out lines.

52 Translator's Note: Anoshkin had another brief sentence here —“The authority of the leading organs has been strengthened” —which he subsequently crossed out.


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the next page refer exclusively to Polish, not Soviet, units. The two Soviet divisions in Poland were ordered to keep a low profile throughout the martial law operation. In addition to the units mentioned by Anoshkin, three other Polish army regiments —the 2nd Mechanized Regiment of the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Air Regiment of the 6th Airborne Division in Krakow, and the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin—took part in the operation, performing administrative tasks and providing support for the Mechanized Detachments of Civil Police (ZOMO) and other security forces that actually carried out the crackdown. Siwicki later noted that these army units constituted an elite force selected for their “outstanding level of political readiness”—that is, their willingness to use force on behalf of the Communist regime. See "Pelna gotowosc obrony socjalistycznego panstwa: Konferencja sprawozdawcza PZPR Instytucji Centralnych MON,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 February 1983, pp. 1-2.

44 Translator's Note: Anoshkin drew a curved arrow from these lines to the names on the right.

s Translator's Note: This sentence and the four names were crossed out with a diagonal line running downward from left to right. It is unclear why Ustinov would have claimed that these officials had already flown to Poland. It is also not known why they ended up not coming to Poland. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in 1981, has claimed that the Soviet Politburo proved unable to reach a consensus on whether to send this highranking delegation to Poland as a gesture of solidarity—see Gribkov's “Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 56—but he provides no specific evidence to support this claim or to explain why a consensus was infeasible.

46 Translator's Note: Just below this line, written diagonally from left to right, is the following:

“1) to Merezhko
2) to Borisov
3) Emelyanov—answer

The word chasy in this last line might also be translated as
“wristwatch.” The context leaves open either possibility.

47 Translator's Note: In fact, the Military Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, or WRON) consisted of 21-not 15 or 16_high-ranking military officers, chaired by Jaruzelski. The other members were Jozef Baryla, Kazimierz Garbacik, Miroslaw Hermaszewski, Tadeusz Hupalowski, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Michal Janiszewski, Jerzy Jarosz, Czeslaw Kiszczak, Tadeusz Krepski, Roman Les, Longin Lozowicki, Tadeusz Makarewicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, Wlodzimierz Oliwa, Czeslaw Piotrowski, Henryk Rapacewicz, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, Jozef Uzycki, and Jerzy Wlosinski.

48 Translator's Note: For the full text of the speech, see “Ukonstytutowala sie Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego: Przemowienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego,” Zolnierz Wolnosci (Warsaw), 15 December 1981, pp. 1-3.

49 Translator's Note: Soviet and Polish leaders expected all along that Western countries would adopt sanctions against Poland (and perhaps against the Soviet Union) if martial law were imposed. Gromyko had noted on 10 December 1981 that “of course if the Poles deliver a blow against ‘Solidarity,' the West in all likelihood will not give them [further) credits and will not offer any other kind of help. [The Poles) are aware of

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Editor's Note: Earlier this year, CWIHP asked General Wojciech Jaruzelski, former Polish Prime Minister and a key participant in the Polish events of 1980-81, to comment on Mark Kramer's introduction and translation of the Anoshkin notebook. We are pleased to print his commentary below. A few editorial changes (indicated by brackets) were necessary due to the fact that General Jaruzelski commented on a Polish translation (and differently paginated version) of Mark Kramer's article. CWIHP encourages the release of further documents from Polish and other archives on the events of 1980-81.

By Wojciech Jaruzelski


\he limitations of time, as well as an eye ailment,
make it difficult for me at this time to comment

fully and essentially on Mr. Mark Kramer's article entitled, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition Martial Law in Poland” — all the more since General Florian Siwicki and I are simultaneously preparing materials in relation to General Anoshkin's "working notebook." These materials will contain concrete, factually argued comments dealing also with some questions not dealt with or discussed at length in this letter.

Trusting in the professional competence of Mr. Kramer, I wish to avoid the inevitable polemics should his text be published in its present form. Polemics as such, of course, are not a bad thing, they can even be useful and desirable, but it would not be good if I had to present publicly specific criticisms questioning not only the logic, but also the veracity, of many statements, facts, and quotations cited in the above mentioned text. I believe Mr. Kramer wrote the text under the pressure of a deadline and that is why he was unable to consult other supplementary and verifiable documents. He was unable at the same time to confront and appraise in a more profound way the credibility of the sources he summoned. As a result, his outlook on a very complicated weave of facts, events, and processes at the time through the prism of only a few and selectively revealed sources is by its nature restrictive, simplified, and on a series of issues completely pointless. Unfortunately, the summary judgments in Mr. Kramer's text go quite far. If this was simply a historical debate about the distant past, I would not see it as a serious problem. In this case, however, the matter refers to a “hot” topic that is still, and lately even more so, the object of political games and confrontations.

Moving to matters of substance, I will limit myself to commenting on just some. First, let me deal with those that have to do with manifest facts as well as with elementary logic. From the sources quoted by Mr. Kramer, it is allegedly clear that during those few days of December 1981 he describes I was supposedly depressed, "unnerved,” “extremely neurotic and diffident about (my] abilities," vacillating, “psychologically...gone to pieces.” Consequently, not seeing any possibility of implementing martial law with my own forces, I “desperately implore(d), want(ed), ask[ed)" for foreign troops to be brought into Poland. I would like to put aside the moral and political aspects of such a statement, which, for me as a Pole, front-line soldier, and a commander of many years are, to

put it simply, offensive. I would like to put aside the "poetic" moods from which I allegedly suffered. There is no question that deciding to implement martial law was an unusually and dramatically difficult step, and it was extremely hard on me. But there are scores, even hundreds, of people with whom I met and talked directly at the time, and nobody can say that I lacked in decisiveness or self-control. Let me describe one event to illustrate this. In the afternoon hours on December 13, that is, after the decision had already been made, I met (and proof of that can be found in newspapers) with a delegation (consisting of several score people) of the Housing Cooperative Congress, which was taking place in Warsaw at the time. I wonder what those people would have said about my behavior at the time. I am supposed to have been “crushed by the refusal” (i.e., of Suslov to guarantee Soviet intervention — trans.). Nothing of the sort was in fact the case I was relaxed and calm. Besides, the course of the whole operation confirms this. At this point, one question comes to mind: In whose interests was it to portray my mood in such an extremely deformed way? What about the entry in Anoshkin's "notebook" that says, "The Commander-in-Chief of Unified Armed Forces had his hands tied by Moscow”? Perhaps historians should analyze this track.

The core of the “vivisection” of the state of my soul conducted by Mr. Kramer in his article is to show my thinking to have been as follows: First, that the reaction and resistance of the opposition and of the majority of the society would be so strong that we would not be able to deal with it using our own forces; and second, that the Polish Army was not sufficiently reliable or loyal.

Neither the former nor the latter makes any sense, which was very convincingly proved by real life. In another place describing Anoshkin's “notebook," I will prove this point in a more concrete way. Before that, however, I would like to ask a question that has been stubbornly on my mind since I read Mr. Kramer's article. If Jaruzelski indeed was almost panic-stricken, full of fear, apprehension, and doubts whether we would be able to impose martial law by ourselves, why then did he not abandon the idea of imposing it in the first place? Or did he, by imposing martial law, entangle himself in a hopeless, suicidal mess that would end in unavoidable ruin?! As everyone knows, neither the former nor the latter happened.

Another piece of information cited by Mr. Kramer is




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the supposed readiness expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies that any such considerations took place. After all one of the key conditions for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed, was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity). I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the workday. It was never considered, not even for a moment. Such an entry completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of the person who wrote such a thing in the said "notebook," or passed such information to their political superiors.

On page 5 (page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this Bulletin-ed.) of Mr. Kramer's article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii Gribkov "played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81." It is not my intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact. Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in 1992 by Istoricheskii Zhurnal are almost literally identical with some phrases from Anoshkin's “notebook.” It looks as though many roads lead to that very same “source.”

The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer's article is strangely one-sided. Why does he not mention Gen. Siwicki's polemical response to the above-mentioned article by Gribkov, which was published in Polska Zbrojna on 22 December 1992? Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about the “sergeant's widow who whipped herself.” On page [6] his article, Mr. Kramer talk,

pout a document which allegedly constitutes “powerful” evidence. He means Anoshkin's “notebook.” Treating the

“notebook” in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds. After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained thereclaiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by the “Russian side" during the Jachranka conference. This made it impossible for the [Polish] "government side” to take a stance concerning them and to directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be published. As a result, the "notebook"-which, as it turns out, is being prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact, removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.

I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues. Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records, particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals (gryf] or marked by page numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts with Kulikov's arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation with me the night of the 8th, which

a Baibakov reported about on December 10 during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what is peculiar is that there is not even one word in Baibakov's report about the Polish side waiting for military help. Maybe that is the reason why there is no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin's notebook.

As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16 about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion, which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded and interpreted?

I am sorry to say that regardless of what might


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Republic). Mr. Kramer, who usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev, chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly “meant.” Since I do not have the said interview in Rzeczpospolita handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm (Parliament) of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

generously be described as the “defects” of the notebook, Mr. Kramer's interpretations sometimes go well beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: “This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on-now everything has disappeared.” [In his introduction on page 9), Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, "What is Jaruzelski's situation now?!" But these words make it obvious that somebody else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer's intentions become obvious. He says: "Jaruzelski's comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. (my emphasis - W.J.)." Thus this carefully

” prepared quotation, in fact "robbed" of the element clearly indicating that it was not me who said those words, becomes to the author more important than all other documents." This is scandalous manipulation.

Besides, what does the talk of “a year-and-a-half of chattering” mean when my reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski's report in an interview for the Paris Kultura, April 1987) and many public statements, as well as statements (made) during the topsecret meetings when I talked about the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing—that he judged the situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin's dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call me "general-liberal."

On page [6] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev's are also quoted. Mr. Kramer writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave several interviews to Polish journalists. [...] The focus is on an interview for the Warsaw newspaper Rzeczpospolita (The

It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. (...) The Soviet leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been used in extreme circumstances.

Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej Płażyński, the Speaker of the Sejm (published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 5 December 1997). And all this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet





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