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leadership, but also a member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover, according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any pressure put on Poland (“davleniia ne bylo"). However, other Soviet politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned before).

On page [6] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]). I read the Polish edition carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that Suslov "refused." Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or Pavlov's book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December 1981. I quote:

JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure and, for us a way to check their inclinations for

intervention. In a way, it was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they were keeping some cards hidden.

(Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czeslaw Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki, and Michal Janiszewski.)

JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we [would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, “And what is the guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?" With the generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone. He wasn't very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick. I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He said, "Yes." "And if the situation becomes more complicated?" I asked (I remembered the words

Brezhnev never took back: 'Esli bud'et uslozhniatsia, veid'em' [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in]

as well as the constantly repeated 'my Pol'shi ne ostavim v b'ede' [We will not leave Poland in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov's answer was, “But you have always said that you can manage by yourselves." That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August 1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome facts and signals.

In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov "confirmed then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put Jaruzelski at ease." In saying that it "put me at ease," Pavlov admits that there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.

On page [6] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book carefully. There is no mention there of "sending a message." However, there is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically. I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact confirms by not mentioning it in his book.

On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September] 1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code name of “Kraj-73” (“Country-73"). The

intensification and concretization of work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by thenpremier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed a document called “The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law.” There is also a protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September 1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to the "imposition of martial law" (four) times), I always preceded it with the word “potential” [ewentualne]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my statement, it says that “he pointed out the particular importance and necessity of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic support from neighboring socialist countries." So where does "Jaruzelski's demand" come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified exclusively in myself necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in forming ad hominem attacks.

Moreover, on page [7], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own forces may not be enough to impose martial law “and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed." Then follows a statement that does not accord well with the previous one: “Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania... both realized that 'direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries' would 'set back the development of socialism by decades' and 'would be exploited by the imperialist forces."" Therefore "they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision." Such hesitation resulted in "a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to 'prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland.”” Again, if we are to talk about strict historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee's statement made? On September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of 1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would "set back the development of socialism by decades," and three months later "he desperately hoped for it." What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in September.

On page [7] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania "under Soviet auspices." I regret that Mr. Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka

conference, makes such a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document (acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October 18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I agreed only as a result of the insistence of Polish comrades. Prof. Jerzy Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the "good" Polish comrades who mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that Andropov said, “Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo." Finally, does the word "auspices" not sound offensive with respect to the CC PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my candidacy, but 179 supported me in a secret ballot. Were they all "agents of the Kremlin”?

On page [7] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October 29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, “the Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries." But which leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following statement: "I don't believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything constructive. I think he is not bold enough." But Mr. Kramer does not notice any of that. Following the words "Polish leaders,” just a few lines below he deduces that it was Jaruzelski who "was requesting military intervention from the Soviet Union." It seems that there is a great need to put me in the worst possible light. But it should have been done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural "Polish leaders" immediately change into the name “Jaruzelski?”

On page [8] we find the following quotation from Andropov's statement of December 10: "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer... military assistance." I must here confirm a very unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual statement went exactly as follows: "Jaruzelski states economic demands strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question of military aid." Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to is Miroslaw Milewski. What he says conflicts with what

Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned, Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in Polska Zbrojna.

On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie. I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure phone?" [...] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states that this is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are references to my alleged opinions and assessments stated during the meeting of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone on December 7, does not say anything about that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for military aid.

It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union, asked for help, and they did not give me any." At the same time, the Poles are clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle. But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a de facto accusatory statement against me is being concluded.

On page [7] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [. . .] can be carried out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance." On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone

[graphic]

Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General Wojciech Jaruzelski at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo

courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

who lived in Poland at that time remembers the fears that any little damage to the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention. Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law) meant looking for help from the outside is not only absurd, but politically and strategically infantile.

On pages [7-8] is another example of how Mr. Kramer is being led up a "blind alley." He is, as far as I am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I assume that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the proper spirit. It will become clear to him from it how thin the different arguments are of people wishing at any cost to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are reduced to using such "evidence.”

On page [11] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen. Siwicki and I attempt to make secret Polish documents public. There are already many documents (particularly protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different materials from other institutions and bodies) that have been made public in different ways, but Mr. Kramer is clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true that there is no access to many documents, particularly those of the Ministry of National Defense. Perhaps Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform Mr. Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the Jachranka conference and asked for access to be made possible in Polish institutions. I even wrote statements which were intended to help in those efforts. Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended unsuccessfully (it is true that I did not at the time foresee the possibility that after the conclusion of such an important international conference some kind of "work notebook" would be "pulled out of a pocket" and become a "decisive" source for Mr. Kramer).

However very distasteful-to use just such a term—is this statement about our notes (Gen. Siwicki's and mine)—“assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with." So only Polish generals would falsify things, while Soviet notes are above any suspicion? I would like to ask here whether we really can treat them [i.e., the Anoshkin notes] as reliable "evidence" (Mr. Kramer calls it "decisive") for describing events of great political, historical, and moral importance? At the same time, considering the threats and announcements coming even from the highest offices and leading political circles, should one treat the suggestions of an American historian as a welcome gesture in this campaign? I trust that this was not Mr. Kramer's intention. All the more so, since

when he wrote his article he did not know many of the circumstances, facts, and arguments I have presented here. I understand that Mr. Kramer's article is based exclusively on words written then as well as years later. But this is only a partial base. I do not deny the necessity and importance of his research. But to make the picture objective, one needs to look also at evident facts, phenomena, and symptoms from the time in question. Many of them have been presented by many witnesses who testified before the Commission of Constitutional Oversight under the rules of the Penal Code. I did not notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr. Kramer's article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation of "if the facts indicate something different, then too bad for the facts."

Therefore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, an outstanding specialist in contemporary history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to reevaluate the text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of which is to be Anoshkin's "working notebook." Gen. Siwicki, myself, and other people have a number of important comments about it, which we will present at a later point. I am ready for conversations which will lead to better mutual understanding, will confront and verify views, and above all, which will bring us closer to the very complex truth.

To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities-I am not talking of Mr. Kramer, of course, since I don't know his views are suddenly turning into defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the Polish People's Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I always have said and to this day keep saying openly that the Soviet Union was our ally within the “sick" reality of those years and with all the heavy load of limited. sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually the most advantageous configuration of Polish territory in history (although I admit that such a configuration suited Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet Union was the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the Russians. I think that the relations between our countries which are now equal should be good and mutually advantageous. Also, when I look back at those years I try to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a general I know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I used to say that if I had been a Soviet marshal or general I would have perceived Poland as a territory endangering the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of course. We were fully aware of that situation, which was assessed similarly in the American documents disclosed at Jachranka. All this required from us, the Polish

authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures.

Their effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed and carried out martial law alone, and then, walking along a rough road, reached the Round Table [of 1989] and the groundbreaking changes which became an impulse and model for other countries of the region.

Wojciech Jaruzelski

Warsaw, 27 April 1998

Appendix

The supposition that Poland was interested in socalled "fraternal aid" is disgraceful and absurd. People included in the Preliminary Summons, the witnesses, and some historians have explained this in detail. However, some members of the Commission (Parliament member Jacek Taylor in particular) during the Commission's deliberations referred to a "document" from the MSW (Ministry of Internal Affairs) files which can presently be found in the Sejm archives (file 228/IB). The document is called An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country on 25 November 1981." The following passage can be found in appendix No. 2 to that Assessment of the Situation:

Implementation of martial law may result in the following developments:

Scenario 1: Political organizations submit to the requirements of martial law. At the same time, there is a possibility of small-scale strikes and limited hostile propaganda.

Scenario 2: Massive strikes are organized in some parts of the country without workers leaving the workplace.

Scenario 3: A general occupation strike, with workplaces taken over; some workers go out in the streets; there are street demonstrations and attacks occur on buildings housing party offices and state administration, on police stations, etc. Strong intervention of police and armed forces takes place. Aid from Warsaw Pact troops is not out of the question.

People who attempt to use this [document] as evidence against those included in the Preliminary Summons are misusing it. The reasons I say this are as follows. First, [the document was] in a file in which only loose, preliminary materials can be found. Secondly, the said Assessment of the Current Situation is really only a draft, without any filing number, without any annotations, and was not signed by anybody or distributed anywhere. There is also another telling factor, one that remains conveniently not mentioned, which proves the ill will of the people who insist on the basis of such material the contention that Poland allegedly expected so-called “aid.” This is the fact that in the same file-about which there was no mention there is another, later document, called An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country and

Proposals for Solutions, dated 5 December 1981. There is not even one word concerning any kind of “aid” there. However, unlike the earlier document of November 25, there are many hand-written comments and corrections of Czeslaw Kiszczak, who was at the time the Minister of Internal Affairs. And although that document has not been signed or distributed either, the very fact that the Minister made many annotations on it makes it more trustworthy. But in spite of that it remains unmentioned.

It is necessary to add here that although the Commission had access to an enormous amount of different material and documents, no traces of expectations or requests for this so-called "military aid" have been found. On the contrary, the claim that we need to solve our Polish problems on our own appears repeatedly in many secret as well as public statements made by the representatives of the PPR government at the time. Therefore, using the said "Assessment of the Situation" of 25 November 1981 as an argument is evident manipulation. Perhaps it was hoped that nobody would be inclined to go through the pile of files where less important, loose materials were kept.

The selective character of omissions described above can be further illustrated by the following fact. Solidarity activists have been claiming that all kinds of anti-Soviet excesses, such as the desecration of monuments and graves of soldiers were provocations organized by the State Security. But surprisingly enough, in the Assessment of the Situation of November 25 (appendix no. 1), is the information that from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (18 October 1981) until the time the said Assessment was written, 26 criminal investigations concerning the above mentioned acts were started. At that time eighteen people had been found who had vandalized monuments in Jedrzejow and one person who had desecrated the graves of Soviet soldiers in Gryfin. Remembering these facts is not convenient now. Nor is remembering (in accordance with the described

Assessment) that on November 25, eleven public buildings were under occupation, and a note made of plans to occupy another fourteen.

[Translated from Polish by Anna Zielinska-Elliott and Jan Chowaniec.]

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski served as prime minister of Polish People's Republic from 1981-1985.

'Editor's note: For the Jachranka conference, see Malcolm Byrne's introduction to this Bulletin section and Ray Garthoff's report in CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March 1997), pp. 229-232

2 Editor's note: The conference organizers are planning to publish the Jachranka proceedings; transcription of the audio tapes of the conference is in progress.

3 Editor's note: On this document, see also the article by Pawel Machcewicz in this Bulletin.

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