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Poland, a situation that, from the military point of view, is known that the Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the campaign under way to infiltrate Solidarity. The aim was most committed officers openly said that Poland had to not only to compromise the organization and discredit its undertake far-reaching political reforms. Gen. XXX leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and bitterly accused "the Americans (of having] sold us out to activities." Kuklinski himself has recently described the Russia. Without the Americans' silent assent, the
infiltration programs about which he knew first-hand in 'comrades' would not dare to act this way.” We are now 1980 and 1981.62 These programs were aimed mainly at very desperate, but we have not lost hope that Gen. XXX recruiting informers and agents provocateurs in Solidarity. is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of
Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak information he is sending to you.
was discovered, security was tightened within the General
Staff's martial law planning unit, and an investigation was We Poles realize that we must fight for our own launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small freedom, if necessary making the ultimate sacrifice. I group of suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid remained convinced that the support your country has doing anything that might arouse suspicion. It is been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will interesting, however, that even at this perilous juncture, he bring us closer to our goal.
showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he
regarded his work there as too crucial to abandon. Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.
At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski
was surprised by the CIA's decision to transfer this highly With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV
sensitive information to Solidarity at a moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of
secret codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981—
be a rather short-sighted step that might undermine his Plans for Martial Law
whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the
planning for martial law, but he knew that the receipt of This third message recounts a landmark meeting of highly detailed information, especially codenames, would Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by Kraju, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK
infiltrators within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be consisted of high-ranking military and political officials hoping that the CIA would be more discreet in the future, and was chaired by Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime at least until a more precise timetable for martial law had minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the KOK took on a been set. supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead with the martial law
Document No. 3 operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be determined. The great importance of this secret meeting
WARSAW was first revealed by Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and 2030, 15 September 1981 it was then briefly discussed by Kania in his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, volumes of memoirs. Kuklinski's report says that which Kania attended for the first time, no final decision notetaking was forbidden at the KOK meeting, but that is was made about the imposition of martial law. Almost all not quite true. One of the participants, Gen. Tadeusz of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for the meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not taking notes of the session. His eight pages of handwritten question that such a development was inevitable, he notes, classified top-secret, were released from the
reportedly said, in these precise words, that "a Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military
confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This Archive) in Warsaw in 1997.
involves first a struggle using political means, but if that Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he should fail, repression may be adopted.” Note-taking was was briefed about it immediately afterwards. Although forbidden at the session. During the KOK's meeting, Tuczapski's notes (which are not a verbatim record, but Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak's plans, including Operation "Wiosna' and its secret agitated comments about the leak of the martial law plans codename. I should emphasize that this is a codenameto Solidarity, all evidence suggests that Kiszczak did in the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword fact deal with that issue at length in his opening speech, as needed to put it into effect. The officials responsible for Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish implementing the plans don't know the codename; hence, security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The
MSW was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer visited Szklarski and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future leaks. At present, Jasinski has taken command of planning at the national level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC official, with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski from MSW, a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television. Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of Warsaw.
Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.
'Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist) officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story. For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, “Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, “Zagadka Kuklinskiego,” Przeglad Tygodniowy (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception, to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully vetted for its accuracy.
For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the Cnited States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica smierc Leona Dubickiego," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.
See “Komenda Stoleczna: Plany przedsiewziec dotyczacych drugiego etapu akcji ‘Jodla»," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom (T.) IV.
See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in “Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December 1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.
In "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski, claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.
"See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” pp. 13-14.
The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980 to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.
8Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October 1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the program “Trojka pod Ksiezycem,” which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okecie airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on “Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
'These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in “Trojka pod Ksiezycem."
Long live free Poland!
Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!
Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University.
1°His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at sea in early January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident during the 4th of July weekend.
Il "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” pp. 3-55.
12Weiser's first article was “Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War Plans,” Washington Post 27 September 1992, pp. Al, A38, and the second was “A Question of Loyalty," Washington Post Magazine, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-29.
13Maciej Lukasiewicz, ed., Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawa pulkownika Kuklinskiego (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona Jurczenko, Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pulkowniku Ryszardie Kuklinskim (Warsaw: KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., Pulkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie, Dokumenty (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see especially the interview cited above, “Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp. 1, 12-14.
*The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in “Rewizje nadzwyczajna," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17.
15"Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December 1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior officials charged with the massacres. See “Proces-Grudzien '70, krotka: Rozpoczal sie proces oskarzonych ws. Grudnia 270,” Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 16 June 1998, p. 2.
16"Umorzono sledztwo przeciw plk. Kuklinskiemu,” Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23 September 1997, p. 1.
17 Jerzy Sadecki, “Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy Obywatel Stolecznego Krolewskiego Miasta Krakowa," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 29 April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykly zolnierz Rzeczypospolitej," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.
18"Juz nie chce stad wyjezdzac: Uratowal przed rozlewem krwi-oswiadczyl premier,” Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April
p. 2. 19 Adam Michnik, “Pulapka politycznej beatyfikacji,” Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw), 10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.
20"Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzezen," Rzcezpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.
2 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw: CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.
22 For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter administration, in “White House Diary, 1980,” Orbis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.
23 At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that “the situation with the lines of communication (in Poland), especially with the railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This
would also be a great blow to the economic interests of other socialist states. Let me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the transportation system. An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish] army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities and the main lines of communication (in Poland), and this plan must be implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the railroads." Quoted from “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.
24See, among many examples, “Unuberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen Feind,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; “Walesa uber Zusammenarbeit mit KOR,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p. 5; Jan Lipavsky, “Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; “V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy zeme,” Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and “Strana se upevnuje v akcji,” Rude Pravo, 1 December 1980, p. 6.
25Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev had held. See “Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewurdigt: Herzliche Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.
26The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the western USSR were on full alert. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the Polish Crisis, November-December 1980,” Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), January 1981, pp. 2–5.
27See Brzezinski, “White House Diary, 1980," p. 45.
30 The emphasis here is on the word “preparing.” It is unclear whether Soviet leaders were actually intending to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point below.
31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. See also “Erlauterungen,” Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 712. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).
32See my article about, and translation of, the Commission's document in this same issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), pp. 1-5 and CIA, “Approaching the Brink," p. 5.
“Einweisung," Bl. 16. 35 "Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militarbezirkes V, General-major Gehmert, uber die Ergebnisse der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchfuhrung der gemeinsamen Ubung,” Report No. A-575702 (Top Secret), 16 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, chief-of-staff of the East German National People's Army, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 23-27.
6 "Anlage Nr. 2," 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in “The Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military Intervention," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), p. 124.
37 "Werter Genosse Honecker!” letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November 1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/ 40593, Bl. 4-5.
38 "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers fur Nationale Verteidigung iber die Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmassnahme der der Vereinten Streitkrafte vom 06.12.1980,” Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, BI. 32-37; “Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes zur Gewahrleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenubung vom 06.12.1980,” No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Haupstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef Verwaltung Aufklarung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", pp. 197-208.
34 No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, the commander-inchief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation. The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, Soviet Theaters, High Commands and Commanders (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service, 1986); Michael J.
Deane, et al., “The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation,” Strategic Review, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 55-70; and Gregory C. Baird, “The Soviet Theater Command -An Update," Naval War College Review, Vol. 34, No. 6 (November-December 1981), pp. 90-94.
"Protokol Nr. 51 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 26 listopada 1980 r.," 26 November 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarnosc” 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 180-188.
*l For more on this, see Kuklinski's comments in “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 21-22.
*- "O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TsK PORP i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyatelei stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V. D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob’ednan Ukrainy (TSDAHOU), Kyiv, Fond (F.) 1. Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.
43 The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December, “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," p. 143.
44 Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-241; and Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-93.
"Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” pp. 140-196.
Ibid. 47 "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980 r.,” 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 189.
Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol'skii krizis nachala 1980-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.
49 This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were not going to oppose the Soviet Union.
49a Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law, as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.
50 "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81"," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.
52 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TSK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.
"Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP,” in TsKHSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 42, Ll. 2-4.
54 "V Ob’edinennykh vooruzhenykh silakh gosudarstvuchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 24 April 1981,
55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Centralny plan dzialania organow politycznych władzy i administracji panstwowej na wypadek koniecznosci wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan dzialania sil zbrojnych,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan przedsiewziec gospodarczych,” 2 April 1981 (Top Secret), all in Centralne Archywum Wojskore (CAW), Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/1V.
56 Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski's main contact at the CIA.
57 A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact’s Military Council was held in Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.
58 Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.
59 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” pp. 32-34; Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge, pp. 384-385; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-271.
60 "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.," 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me a copy of these notes.
61 See “Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe voevodstvo PNR,” Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I. Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU's Yaroslavl oblast committee, in Ts KhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and “Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei,” 20 November 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen”, p. 105.
62 “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," p. 26.
63 "Wiosna” (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and dissident intellectuals.
64 The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal Affairs).
Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was Kuklinski's commanding officer
66 Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law planning.
67 Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other officers on the Polish General Staff. He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation.