By Mark Kramer

T

he behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski
during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 remains a
source of great controversy.

On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in 1980-81.' The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combatready troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet leaders actually intended to invade is a very different matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence, persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In 1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize. Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have wanted to create that impression—even if they did not intend to follow up on it-because they believed it would induce the Polish authorities to take action.2 In that respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and the "lesser of two evils."3

On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. Firsthand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to postpone the whole

operation in the hope that he would then be given a concrete external assurance.

The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in December 1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet officer, ArmyGeneral Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-inChief of the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, he played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81. Looking back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that, rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes critical."4 The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the plans for martial law."5

Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of two evils" in December 1981. Confronted by Gribkov's revelations, Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet military pressure and intervention in 1981. An acrimonious standoff between the two men ensued.

Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret records of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was very strong-strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-exculpatory claims-but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November 1997, when I obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about Jaruzelski's behavior in the lead-up to martial law.

Combined with all the previous disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated below) offers powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.

Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other evidence that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come from unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) during the Polish crisis. Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has described him as “a true hero" who in 1981 “had no choice" and “acted correctly." In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always had complete trust in Jaruzelski” and had "talked to him more openly and honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo." Gorbachev also has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot and a man of great honor" who "saved his country. "10 Hence, Gorbachev has no reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might have been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims about what happened in December 1981.

Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and November 1992, Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of military intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in Jaruzelski's memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law was introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski) had placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external threats, but would not be used against internal dangers." According to Gorbachev, Suslov's refusal to provide a military guarantee came as a shock to the Polish leader, who tried in vain to persuade Suslov to change his mind.

On all key points, Gorbachev's testimony closely parallels and reinforces Gribkov's account, even though the two men obviously did not consult with one another and were unaware of each other's comments until at least several weeks afterwards, when a controversy ensued in Poland. The accounts overlap both in their broad themes and in many of the details they contain (e.g., about Suslov's role). Because Gorbachev and Gribkov were both in a position to know first-hand about the events they described, the inadvertent similarity of their remarks enhances their credibility.

The accounts provided by Gorbachev and Gribkov were endorsed by a retired general of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), Vitalii Pavlov, who was the

KGB station chief in Warsaw from 1973 to 1984. In a series of interviews with the Polish press in early 1993, and in his memoirs (published in Poland in 1994 and in Moscow in 1998), Pavlov argued that Jaruzelski desperately wanted an assurance of military intervention in December 1981, but that Suslov and other Soviet leaders refused to comply.12 Pavlov claimed that Suslov had spoken with Jaruzelski by phone on 12 December and had told the Polish leader that "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union was “out of the question," adding that "we will help you materially, financially, and politically, but not with armed force."'13 Pavlov recalled that Yurii Andropov, a CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, sent the same message to General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.

The main elements of Pavlov's account were substantiated by Kiszczak himself, who is a close friend of Jaruzelski. In an interview in 1993, Kiszczak confirmed that Pavlov is one of the very few people who can speak authoritatively about the KGB's operations and Soviet policy during the Polish crisis.14 Elsewhere, Kiszczak acknowledged that Jaruzelski placed an urgent phone call to Moscow on 12 December to inquire about military "help from the allies." Because Brezhnev declined to take the phone, Jaruzelski ended up speaking with Suslov. 15 Kiszczak recalled, as Pavlov did, that Suslov admonished Jaruzelski not to expect Soviet military support “under any circumstances." Although Kiszczak's recollections differ on some points from Pavlov's, the similarities between the two are striking.

These various first-hand accounts have been supplemented over the past five to six years by the release of crucial documentation in Russia, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Although many Soviet and Polish documents have not yet been declassified, the items that have emerged lend credence to Gribkov's account of what happened in December 1981. Selected transcripts from some of the CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81 were released in late 1992, August 1993, and early 1994.16 A few of these transcripts, including one from 10 December 1981, bear directly on the question of Jaruzelski's stance in December 1981. Documents from some of the East European countries, notably Hungary and East Germany, also shed valuable light on the matter.17

One of the consistent themes in these documents is the lack of confidence that Jaruzelski and his close aides had about their ability to sustain martial law without external military aid. Even after mid-September 1981, when Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju, or KOK) reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law (leaving only the precise date to be determined), Polish leaders remained doubtful that they could handle it on their own.18 Although the Polish authorities had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union over the previous twelve months that they would "resolve the crisis with our own means," they had said this in the hope of somehow finding a political

solution that would not require the opposition to be wiped out (at least not all at once). The imposition of martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition, was an entirely different matter.

Newly released documents indicate that a few days after the KOK's watershed meeting in September 1981, "the Polish Communist leaders assessed their forces [and] found that their resources would be insufficient for this sort of action [i.e., martial law] and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed."19 Because Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) from September 1980 to mid-October 1981 (when he was replaced by Jaruzelski), both realized that "direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries" would "set back the development of socialism by decades" and "would be exploited by the imperialist forces," they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision. Although Kania claimed that he would not "exclude the possibility of steps that would unavoidably require the intervention of [Poland's] allies," he was still hoping that some alternative to martial law could be found.20 Kania's continued hesitancy sparked a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on 17 September, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to "prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."2 Soon thereafter, on 18 October, Kania was replaced as PUWP First Secretary by Jaruzelski, under Soviet auspices. (By that point, Soviet leaders had correctly surmised that Kania was doing his best to avoid imposing martial law.)

Once Jaruzelski assumed the top party post and began making all the final preparations for martial law, his demeanor seems to have changed a good deal compared to the previous thirteen months, when he had been working with Kania. The evidence suggests that Jaruzelski increasingly sought a concrete military guarantee from the Soviet Union, a request that Soviet leaders declined to fulfill. His position on this matter was discussed at a Soviet Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981 by Andropov and the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov:

ANDROPOV: The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our troops will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV: In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.22

To be sure, this passage can lend itself to different interpretations. Andropov's and Ustinov's perceptions of Jaruzelski's position may not have been fully accurate. Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Ustinov meant when he said that "the Poles are not ready to receive our troops." Most likely, he was arguing that if Soviet military units entered Poland to support Jaruzelski, they would

encounter vigorous armed resistance.23

Even if some ambiguity about this passage remains, Andropov's and Ustinov's comments tend to bear out the view that Jaruzelski was requesting Soviet military intervention or at least the assurance of military support if the martial law operation collapsed. Their remarks also imply that Soviet leaders had no intention of sending troops to Poland (either in support of or against Jaruzelski) unless some unforeseeable circumstance arose. In both respects the transcript bears out a key episode recorded by Gribkov, who recalled that just after a Soviet Politburo session in late October 1981, he and the Commander-inChief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, were ordered by Ustinov to inform Jaruzelski that the Poles "had better rely more on their own forces to restore order in the country and not hope that some big brother will step in and take care of everything for them."24 Gribkov's recollection of this matter is especially credible because his account of it was published well before he could have seen the transcript of the Politburo meeting, which was not declassified until more than a year later.

Further evidence that Jaruzelski was hoping to receive Soviet military backing in late 1981 comes from two highly classified documents prepared by the Polish General Staff and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of November 1981, which reviewed the ongoing preparations for martial law. One of the documents, compiled by the Polish General Staff on 23 November, indicated that "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [wojsk wlasnych i sojuszniczych] can be carried out fully and properly."25 This phrasing does not necessarily indicate that the "allied troops" would be intervening in support of the martial law operation—after all, the Soviet Politburo had consistently emphasized that lines of communication between the USSR's Northern Group of Forces and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany must be protected-but it certainly is compatible with the notion that Polish leaders would seek external military assistance. That notion is borne out even more strongly by another document, prepared two days later by the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, which noted that "assistance from Warsaw Pact forces would not be ruled out" if the martial law operation produced widespread violent turmoil.26 This position was in line with the views expressed earlier in the year by senior ministry officials, who argued that martial law would be infeasible unless the Polish authorities received external military support.27

Another indication that Jaruzelski was hoping to gain outside backing for the martial law operation came a week later, in early December 1981, when he sought an explicit Warsaw Pact statement “condemning the actions of the counterrevolution [in Poland] and the interference by NATO in [Poland's] internal affairs."28 Jaruzelski was unable to travel to Moscow for a meeting of the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December, but in his place he sent his closest aide, the chief of the Polish

General Staff, General Florian Siwicki. Jaruzelski instructed Siwicki to urge the assembled ministers and Warsaw Pact commanders to issue a strong statement “demonstrating to the whole world that the Polish Communists are not alone." Drafts of the proposed statement referred to “the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states" and pledged "complete support for the Polish people" in their "struggle against counterrevolution."29 These formulations sparked a protracted discussion, but in the end the meeting failed to produce the type of statement Jaruzelski had sought. The Romanian and Hungarian defense ministers, ColonelGeneral Constantin Olteanu and Army-General Lajos Csinege, argued that their governments had not given them authority to endorse such a statement, and the other ministers decided it would be inadvisable to release a document that was not approved unanimously.30

When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the meeting, the Polish leader complained that "the allies have forced us into an impasse" and "left us on our own." He could not understand why "the allies do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they have constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole Warsaw Pact, not just for Poland." Jaruzelski added that he was "still hoping for a miracle," but could sense that his "options [were] running out."32 Implicit in all these comments was Jaruzelski's distinct lack of confidence that martial law could be imposed without external military support.

Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski's position in late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on 10 December, barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking-or at least they believed he was seeking a military guarantee. Among those putting forth this view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs, who had been keeping close track of the situation from Moscow and was the main contact point in December 1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in Poland who needed to convey information to, or receive instructions from, the CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this matter [martial law] with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the territory of Poland. 33

Rusakov noted that "Jaruzelski, in expressing this hope, has been citing remarks by Cde. Kulikov, who supposedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I know, Cde. Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words

If Jaruzelski was indeed citing Kulikov at this point, as Rusakov reported, that would be interesting in itself. It is possible that Kulikov did in fact say something to Jaruzelski on 8 December-if only inadvertently-that seemed (in Jaruzelski's view) to be a pledge of Soviet military assistance if the martial law operation collapsed. During at least one previous occasion when Kulikov was in Poland in 1981 he brought up this very matter with Jaruzelski. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April 1981, Kulikov said he had indicated to Jaruzelski and Kania a few days earlier that "unless [the Polish authorities] used the Polish security organs and army [to impose martial law], outside support could not be expected because of the international complications that would arise." Kulikov said he “emphasized to the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve their problems on their own." However, he was careful to add that "if the Polish authorities tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, that would be a very different situation from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from the outset."35 Kulikov probably did not intend these remarks to be regarded as an ironclad pledge of a Soviet military guarantee, but he certainly may have given Jaruzelski and Kania the impression (whether rightly or wrongly) in April 1981 that they could count on Soviet military help if the martial law operation went awry. Although there is no evidence that Kulikov said something identical when he met with Jaruzelski in December 1981, Jaruzelski may have construed some of Kulikov's remarks at that time as a reaffirmation of what Kulikov had been saying to him earlier in the year. A misunderstanding in a tense situation like this would hardly be unusual. (Nor is it inconceivable that Kulikov mistakenly went beyond his brief in December 1981 and gave Jaruzelski the wrong idea about Soviet policy.)

Whatever the case may be, Jaruzelski's invocation of Kulikov's remarks (as Jaruzelski interpreted them) tends to bear out the hypothesis that—at least in Rusakov's view-the Polish leader expected and wanted to receive Soviet military backing.

That same inference can be drawn from a comment by Yurii Andropov at the 10 December meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Andropov voiced dismay that "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer... military assistance," and he urged his colleagues to resist any temptation to fulfill Jaruzelski's request:

Although we support the notion of internationalist assistance and are alarmed by the situation in Poland, the matter must entirely and unequivocally be handled by the Polish comrades themselves. We do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end.36

Andropov's sentiments were echoed by Soviet

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who argued that “we must somehow try to dispel the notion that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of [Soviet] troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate it to him."37 Andropov's and Gromyko's statements were endorsed by others at the meeting, all of whom agreed that Jaruzelski's last-minute effort to receive external military support for the martial law operation should not induce the Soviet Politburo to alter its stance.

Taken together, the documents and memoirs that were just cited provide powerful evidence that Jaruzelski was calling for and expecting Soviet troops to be sent to Poland in December 1981. Even so, a number of doubts—or at least differences of interpretation could remain. For example, one could argue, after poring over these materials, that Soviet leaders might have misperceived Jaruzelski's actions, or that Jaruzelski was raising the question of Soviet military intervention not because he wanted it to occur, but because he was probing Soviet intentions. One also might argue that without precise records of what Jaruzelski was doing and saying at the time, it would be impossible to reconstruct his motives with any certainty.

Fortunately, a first-hand, contemporaneous record of Jaruzelski's behavior in the last few days before martial law—including his repeated requests for Soviet military support and the consternation he felt when those requests were turned down-is now finally available. It turns out that Marshal Kulikov's personal adjutant, LieutenantGeneral Viktor Anoshkin, kept daily notes of Kulikov's phone calls, telegrams, conversations, and meetings.38 As Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Kulikov had been a frequent envoy to Poland throughout the 1980-81 crisis, performing sensitive missions on behalf of the CPSU Politburo. He and Anoshkin had been in Warsaw in late November 1981 when the final preparations for martial law were completed, and they were again in Poland from 7 to 17 December 1981, when the preparations were transformed into action. Anoshkin's records of Kulikov's interactions with Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law show that Jaruzelski wanted and requested Soviet military assistance, and that he was distraught when Soviet leaders informed him that no troops would be sent.

Among other things, Anoshkin's notebook reveals that Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev early in the morning of 10 December, right after a late-night meeting at the Polish General Staff where Jaruzelski and other top Polish military commanders unanimously approved a final decision to proceed with martial law.39 The Polish leader informed Brezhnev that the decision had been adopted, and he then asked "whether Poland can count on [Soviet] military assistance if the situation in the country becomes critical." Brezhnev evaded a direct response, but just a few hours later Kulikov received specific instructions from

Ustinov to let Jaruzelski know that "the Poles themselves must resolve the Polish question. We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland." When Jaruzelski received this message, he expressed concern that “you [the Soviet Union] are distancing yourselves from us," and he tried to find out whether the decision could be reversed.40

The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader again flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR the additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a response to Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed Jaruzelski that his request had been turned down, the Polish leader exclaimed: "This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-ahalf of chattering about the sending of troops went onnow everything has disappeared." Jaruzelski's comment here, as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. Any notion that Jaruzelski was simply probing Soviet intentions no longer seems tenable.

41

Jaruzelski's profound disappointment upon learning that he would not receive external military assistance was due to his continued lack of confidence that the martial law operation would succeed. According to Kania, Jaruzelski had long feared that chaotic turmoil might ensue and that Polish units would be unable to cope with violent upheavals on their own. He was convinced that if opposition forces withstood the "first stage" of the crackdown, the whole operation would collapse unless external aid were forthcoming. Although Jaruzelski may have "continued to hope for a miracle" (as he himself put it in a conversation with Siwicki), he could no longer contain his misgivings when the decisive moment arrived in December 1981. Having led himself to believe that the "first stage" of the operation would be unsuccessful, he desperately hoped that Soviet troops would come bail him out, just as Gribkov had claimed.

When Jaruzelski suddenly realized that "the Poles [would] have to fend for themselves," he seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather than steeling himself for the impending martial law crackdown, he repeatedly tried to persuade Soviet leaders to change their minds. In addition to conveying his "great concern" to Kulikov that "no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale... military assistance," Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with Andropov, warning him that military support was urgently needed. These overtures, however, bore no fruit, as Andropov bluntly informed the Polish leader that "there can be no consideration at all of sending [Soviet] troops."

Following this second rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever. Soviet officials had already been complaining, at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December, that Jaruzelski seemed "extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities" and was "back to his vacillations" and "lack of resolution."42 Those qualities