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developments. And also in recent days, in April, we had some contact with the Polish leadership.

We strongly recommended that the Polish authorities pursue an active and offensive course in internal policy; we directly, boldly, and plainly made clear to everyone the situation in the country, its causes, and ways out of the crisis proposed by the party and government in the interest of the people. At the same time it is especially important to show with actual examples the destructiveness of the actions of those who are sowing anarchy, aggravating strikes and undermining governmental authority.

We strongly recommended that the Polish comrades actively make use of valid legal norms and if necessary introduce new ones (by declaring a state of emergency) in an effort to isolate and suppress the evident counterrevolutionaries, leaders of the anti-socialist campaign who are directed by imperialist forces from abroad.

In our opinion all that does not have to mean bloodshed, which Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski fear. Rather on the contrary, continuing to make concessions to the hostile forces could lead to the shedding of the blood of Communists, honorable patriots of Socialist Poland.

That which has been said of course does not preclude, but rather on the contrary assumes contact and work with the working masses, which are currently in the ranks of "Solidarity." And also with a certain part of the leadership of that organization, since it is far from homogeneous both in the center and also especially in the localities. Our friends must above all endeavor to expand the mass basis of their policies and in support of these unite patriots on whose hearts lies the fate of Poland.

We are having talks with the Polish leadership roughly along these lines. I have been telling them that there is still a chance to act decisively against the forces of counterrevolution by gathering and mobilizing the healthy forces in the party and by making use of instruments of state power such as the public security forces and the army.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski have agreed in words that it is no longer possible to retreat, but in reality they continue to retreat and are not taking decisive measures against the enemies of socialism. Take for example developments after the provocation in Bydgoszcz, 59 which was provoked by Solidarity. Impressions are rather gloomy. Our friends succeeded in averting a general strike. But at what price? At the price of further capitulation. Kania himself now recognizes that they made great mistakes and he blames [Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław] Rakowski but the latter is losing control.

It is difficult to say now how events will develop further. Given the present tactics of the PUWP leadership it is hardly possible to expect that the pressure of the antisocialist forces will diminish. Of course, that disturbs us all, all members of our community. The Polish comrades are preparing to undertake something at the upcoming session of the Sejm. We'll see what comes of that.

In my opinion our common obligation is to help the Polish Communists to take a stand against counterrevolution. They still have opportunities to do that if the leadership would only demonstrate sufficient political will.

As far as I know, comrades, we assess events in the same way and therefore we can influence the Polish comrades and so work in the same direction. It is not out of the question that developments will require a further meeting of the leaders of the fraternal countries on the Polish question. We will not decide on that now.

The crisis in Poland will of course have negative long-term consequences. We must all learn appropriate lessons from it.

For example such a fundamental question as this: how did it happen that within a few months a country was—in a word-thrown into chaos, with the economy on the verge of collapse and anarchy reigning? Whenever this question is addressed, what is usually mentioned is the continuation of private farming in the countryside, the activities of dissidents, the influence of the church, the diversions of Western intelligence agencies. That's without argument. But to be sure the forces hostile towards socialism were [present] in Poland even earlier. What has enabled them to emerge? It is obviously the erosion of relations between the party and the working class.

All socio-economic policies of the former leadership were basically calculated to achieve a leap forward with the aid of Western loans. Indeed they succeeded in some respects in modernizing industry. But what sense is there if the new factories are fully dependent on raw products, materials and assembled products which must then be obtained with hard currency?

Furthermore whole plants for prestigious production for example of color television sets, were bought from the West.

And when it was necessary to repay for the loans, they did not find any other way than to place this burden primarily on the working class. Living conditions of workers have worsened in recent years. The party began to lose its main societal support. And that enabled the enemies of socialism to engage in a struggle for power.

Capitalists will not voluntarily assist in the building of socialism—such is the truth that you all must be clearly aware of. If they provide us with loans, if they trade with us, then the best case is that they are applying market principles, and a worse case that they are pursuing purely political objectives.

When Polish representatives explain why it is difficult for them to take the offensive against counter-revolution, they openly say—we're dependent on the West.

That is the greatest lesson for socialist countries. All of them ought to once again assess the extent of their indebtedness abroad and do everything to prevent it from increasing and approaching a dangerous limit.

[...]

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/1981, 16 April 1981; translated by Oldňch Tůma.]

Document No. 5

Record of a Meeting between Representatives of the
CPCz CC and SED CC International Relations
Department in East Germany, 8 October 1981
(excerpt)

8 October 1981.

[...]

The Situation Inside the Party

The [PUWP] Party Congress has solved nothing. The change which took place at the highest party levels has led nowhere. Logically, it could not lead anywhere under the present conceptual conditions of maintaining dialogue with a class enemy. Following the end of the Solidarity Congress, however, a change in thinking has occurred, particularly amongst the party rank and file. Opinion. groups are forming, representing different conceptualizations of the optimal solution in the Polish

situation.

1. Particularly at the district level there is a group of honest comrades who had suffered illusions regarding the possibility of dialogue with Solidarity. Everyday reality, however, has shown them something quite different. The leaders of certain districts, with the exception of Poznan, Gdansk, and Cracow, have come to the conclusion that Kania's capitulationist policy has collapsed.

2. A crystallization of opinion is also taking place at the level of the CC. Recently even Kania and [Politburo member Kazimierz] Barczikowski have undergone a slight shift in position, particularly under pressure from their district comrades and from the Soviet leadership.

3. Definite changes in the positions of certain individuals can also be seen. Rakowski for example is turning from the right wing towards the center and is gradually acquiring a leftist flair. On the other hand, [hardline Politburo member Stefan] Olszowski is moving to the right. One can also note differences of opinion between Kania and Jaruzelski. This results from the fact that Rakowski is essentially the brains behind Jaruzelski and thus a change in Rakowski's position influences Jaruzelski's point of view, which then leads to his differences in opinion with Kania.

4. The CC apparatus is very strongly opposed to Kania. This emerges from conversations with PUWP CC members during both private and official visits to the GDR. The common thread of these changes in opinion is the realization that the tactic of dialogue, which permits the steady advance of the counterrevolution, is at an end. It is not known, though, how deep or expansive these differentiating changes are. Our Polish comrades themselves say that confrontation is unavoidable, as Kania's leadership, bereft of ideas, has failed to take steps

to mobilize the Party and is hostage to its own illusions regarding the last Party Congress. Kania and Barczikowski apparently fear more than anything else a general strike, a civil war, and the occupation of Polish territory by the Soviet Union. These are apparently the main reasons why they have chosen a tactic of dialogue. The district party committees are showing an increase in their own initiatives. Comrades are organizing their own actions against Solidarity with the goal of preventing illegality, maintaining the industrial process, organizing the supply of goods, and maintaining order at least at the district level. Yet this approach cannot be credited to all districts. It is dependent on two factors:

1. the personality of the district party secretary
2. the politico-ideological level of the membership
base

For example, in Wrocław the First Secretary is good, but the membership base is bad. In Leszno, Jelenia Gora, and Zelenia Gora the membership base is average, but the leading secretaries are not worth much.

Discussion circles in Katowice, Poznan and other cities are increasing and are changing into MarxistLeninist circles. These are increasing their influence. However, they have large conceptual problems (often leftist deviations), as well as organizational difficulties and poor material conditions. From all of this the question emerges-where to next? By all accounts the counterrevolution has its own objective laws. Under certain conditions it escapes from the hands of its organizers and takes on an uncontrollable character. The factors which have so far acted as a brake on the Polish counterrevolution (the influence of socialist society, moderate tendencies in the West, the Polish Church) will not continue to operate forever. The question emerges as to when this will all cease to function. American imperialism plays itself out in Polish events in two directions:

a) rapidly escalating the situation in Poland, and in an attempt at system change creating a bonfire of international provocation,

b) continuing the furtive process, institutionalizing and legalizing the achieved gains of the counterrevolution. The Polish Church has been a supporter of the latter course, and under [Cardinal Stefan] Wyszinski restrained the most radical wing of Solidarity, as the Church does not wish to lose what influence they have managed to gain within the country. The departure of Wyszinski has thus meant a weakening of the Church's restraining role. Increasing anarchy is proof that the counterrevolution's furtive phase is coming to an end. Destruction and the uncontrollable course of certain mass actions could change into an open stand-off. The spark could be provided by the emerging chaos in the supply of goods. The onset of winter will most likely speed up the mechanics of confrontation. This is not, however, in the interest of any of the parties. The question thus emerges of how to avoid the coming conflict.

In Poland a variety of solutions, at different levels, have been proposed:

I. Calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, at which Kania and the Polish delegation would be forced to sign a list of demands. Kania would, upon his return, have to carry out radical measures, for example declaring a state of emergency, during which it would be necessary to count on the occurrence of a general strike including armed confrontation. Both these clashes would definitely reduce the blood which would have to be spilled later in a larger confrontation. This point of view is prevalent in the Warsaw region.

II. Another prospect assumes intensively working on those Congress delegates who have a permanent mandate, gaining a majority, calling a new Congress, and electing a new leadership which would be capable of radical measures in both the Party and the state (purge the Party, make the state apparatus capable of action, declare a state of emergency, create an armed militia and partially arm party members). This is a perspective which is widely adhered to in the GDR border regions. [Tadeusz] Grabski is apparently also thinking along these lines.

III. A different opinion relies on the Soviet Union, the ČSSR and the GDR withholding military intervention against and hermetically sealing Poland inside its borders until the Poles solve their problems on their own. This would, however, mean an end to wholesome forces in the country.

IV. In the case of increasing anarchy we can presume that Kania and Jaruzelski, with the consent of Solidarity, will declare a state of emergency and put the army on alert, not, however, with the purpose of solving internal problems but in order to prevent the intervention of the Soviet Union and other countries. (This is the model of Polish history, of which Pilsudski once remarked, that “he got on the red tram and got off the white one.")

The opinion of the SED regarding these opinions is that it is worth discussing the first and second of them. The SED is working in 15 districts where it has cooperative contacts. It is sending the maximum possible number of delegates and also welcoming as many Polish party delegates as possible. It is trying to strengthen the confidence of healthy forces, but will send material support only where it can be sure that it will be properly utilized. The healthy forces need copying technology, communication technology, and propaganda and agitation materials. The GDR will send this by various channels and in varying quantities. It will send them perhaps to district committees, for example to Comrade [Tadeusz] Porembski in Wrocław, to Marxist circles in Poznan, and so on. The SED is working with the Polish state apparatus and especially with its headquarters through old and new contacts. (The Minister of Education is, for example, an accessible and reasonable comrade.) The SED leadership adopted last week a resolution by which all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, and leading divisions of the CC

should seek out contacts with their Polish partners and as far as possible influence them in a Marxist-Leninist sense. Comrade [Konrad] Naumann, who is a member of the SED CC Politburo and First Secretary of the Berlin Municipal Party Committee, has begun a visit to Poland. A similar approach has been taken by the leadership of the GDR Army, Security Services and militia. These, however, are organizing themselves along their own lines. The SED has contacts with all the deputy ministers in the PPR Department of National Defense. Jaruzelski himself is avoiding all contact with the GDR. Contacts with the security apparatus are good and take place at various levels.

Recently, our Polish comrades have requested that the GDR accept those comrades from the PUWP party apparatus who are unemployed. The GDR is prepared to do so and is just waiting for a list of these people.

The SED CC, following the lead of the ČSSR, will begin radio broadcasts to Poland on October 12. There are, however, personnel, language, and other difficulties with this.

Contacts with our Polish comrades show that great attention is paid to the Czechoslovak broadcasts. The broadcasts are interesting and evaluated positively. This has encouraged the SED CC to begin a similar type of broadcast, though from a historical perspective this is more difficult for the GDR than for the ČSSR.

The evaluation of certain comrades, with whom it is necessary to cooperate, is approximately as follows: Grabski is a good comrade, brave, willing to get actively engaged, but he is not a strategist and does not think in a very forward-looking manner. The best impression has been made by [Warsaw voivodeship secretary Stanisław] Kociolek. Kania wished to eliminate him and send him (as ambassador) to the USSR. However, the Soviets rejected him, which has saved him for future political developments. It seems that Kociolek is prepared to fight. Last week comrades from the CPSU CC consulted with comrades from the SED CC International Relations Department. Discussions with Comrades [CPSU CC Secretary Konstantin] Rusakov, [Deputy CC Department head Oleg B.] Rakhmaninov, and [Deputy CC Department head Georgy] Shakhnazarov show that we and our Soviet comrades evaluate the Polish situation almost identically. Comrade Rusakov pointed out that while the large maneuvers embarked upon, the sending of delegates and discussions by telephone, are indeed useful, so far they have brought no returns. Comrade Rusakov regards the situation as very dangerous, and anticipates that October will show when and to what degree the operation will be carried out. For the time being, though, he does not know how this will take place. Our Soviet comrades are continuing to pressure the Poles intensively, as they do not see for the moment any other choice. The Poles must fight on their own, and no-one can fight for them against KOR and the enemies of socialism. Comrade Rusakov does not agree with the prevailing sentiment in Poland that the

Soviet Union should be in the front line of the fight against the enemies of socialism in Poland. The Soviet Ambassador Aristov visited Kania and protested against the sharp anti-Sovietism in Poland. Kania asked for this to be given to him in writing. This request was met. All of this has led to the realization that Kania's concern is to be able to show concrete proof that he is only doing what he has been forced to do by the Soviet Union.

According to our Soviet comrades, 1968 will not repeat itself in Poland. Polish comrades cannot simply acquire power by means of Soviet tanks. They must fight for that power on their own. Our Soviet comrades state that they did not choose Kania and thus they themselves cannot remove him. That must be done by the Poles.

The idea of calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee should be discussed. We should not let ourselves to be influenced by Polish statements about the possibility of a general strike, a civil war or the like. The Polish leadership is using this to threaten and blackmail the USSR. The counterrevolution is horrible everywhere. Its street activity too is equally awful everywhere. It is necessary to remain calm and even more necessary to avoid losing patience.

The SED suggested to our Soviet [comrades] that due to the serious situation, closer contact should be maintained between the USSR, GDR, and the ČSSR. Rusakov expressed however, that this was too early, even though they do not rule the possibility out for the future. It is only necessary to coordinate on a bilateral basis.

The SED CC feels that our Soviet comrades are having difficulty determining an effective approach towards Poland. In addition to wanting to continue with the present mechanisms, they lack a concept. Their present evaluation of the Polish situation is one hundred percent identical to the evaluation of the SED, unlike their evaluation following the last PUWP Congress. Following the Congress our Soviet comrades acted upon an illusory hope of a possible consolidation of the situation in Poland. The SED very critically evaluated the course and results of the Congress, as Comrade Honecker told Comrade Brezhnev in the Crimea.

Comrade Sieber asked that the CPCz CC inform them about the assistance they were giving Poland, as the SED would like to share in some of the activities. For historical reasons Poles do not like to cooperate with Russians and Germans. This mostly concerns printers, paper and the like. [...]

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents; translated by Oldřich Tůma.]

Document No. 6

Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding the Polish Situation [n.d., late fall 1981]

Regarding the Polish crisis and our viewpoint

(Information)

For a long time developments in Poland have caused anxiety and concern in our country and in other countries of the socialist community.

The evaluation of events in Poland was presented by L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The CPSU CC has always kept the party and its friends informed of the situation in Poland, of our steps and of help in stabilizing the situation.

In October and November this year the situation heated up further. The "Solidarity" congress revealed counterrevolutionary intentions to seize power to change the basis of socialism in Poland by:

-transforming socialist public ownership into group and gradually private ownership;

- gaining political power by taking over the Sejm; weakening Poland's ties to the countries of the socialist community with an appeal to the peoples of Eastern European countries.

In reality, "Solidarity” has been changing into a political party.

In Poland:

1) The leading role of the party has been weakened. 2) Deformation of economic and political life is continuing.

3) The take-over of plants and distribution of production by "Solidarity" is continuing.

In fact, two actual governments exist. The disruption of the economy is evident in the reduction of the volume of industrial production by 15%, of coal output by 40 million tons and in great inflation.

4) Continuing attacks on the PUWP and as a result of that the disintegration and gradual extinction of the party. The causes of the crisis have their roots in the past: -long-standing disquiet in the country, created by the strong position of the Church, where more than 85 % are believers.

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the reality of 74% of agricultural land in individual ownership;

-the influence of petit-bourgeois ideology through the opening of opportunities for the infliction of all contagions of petit-bourgeois ideology;

- voluntarism in economic policy-efforts to achieve a "great leap" in the economy of the country at the price of Western loans;

in these circumstances a stream of bourgeois ideology arose, especially from the 12 million Poles living in Western countries;

underestimation of the growth of consumer petitbourgeois views among the people and members of the PUWP;

severing of the party from the masses:

violation of Lenin's principles of building the party. Quick acceptance [of new members] into the party in an effort to reach 3 million party members-they drew in everyone;

we drew all these facts to the attention of the

Polish leadership and many times made them aware of them, including at the 7th Congress of the PUWP.

But the Polish comrades failed to take measures. Nationalist smugness predominated. Many things were kept from us, particularly the economic relations with the West.

Nationalist forces joined with internal reaction— resulting in "Solidarity."

The leadership of the party and state showed itself to be unprepared and unresponsive. Regarding the international situation, great circumspection is necessary.

After Kania took office we advised him (in September 1980) and emphasized that, with the legalization of the counterrevolutionary forces, it was necessary under the circumstances:

[blocks in formation]

to strengthen the army and security organs;

to launch an open and decisive attack on counterrevolution.

Kania agreed with our recommendations but [only] in words, but pursued a policy of compromise with counterrevolution. This occurred out of unwillingness or disinterest. Instead of an attack-defensive tactics and retreat.

30 October 1980 meeting with Kania in Moscow. He agreed with our recommendations and criticisms, made promises but his deeds didn't follow.

5 December 1980 meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow, where all participants made the Polish leaders aware of their responsibilities. They also agreed and made promises, but in reality they made concessions.

4 March 1981 meeting with a PUWP delegation after the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

April 1981 Comrades Andropov and Ustinov hold discussions in Warsaw.

May 1981 meeting between Comrades Suslov and Rusakov and Polish representatives.

June 1981 meeting between Comrades Gromyko and Kania.

5 June 1981 letter from the CC CPSU to Polish Communists, which caused a clear delineation between the compromisers and the healthy forces in the CC of the PUWP and in the party.

Telephone conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and Kania before the congress, informing [the latter] of the necessity to defend the healthy forces and revolutionary line, the work of comrades [Politburo member Victor Vasil'evich] Grishin and [Politburo member Arvid Yanovich] Pel'she during the congress.

The letter prevented the destruction of the party, but the leadership continued on its original path.

At the meeting in Crimea in August L.I. Brezhnev again underscored that the PUWP was continuing to make concessions. But even despite this, further concessions were made to "Solidarity." The path of "renewal" through

compromise: "We Poles will come to an understanding."

During that time 37 of 49 county council secretaries had to give up their leadership positions. Kania was the main hindrance in the struggle for socialism. The question arose of restoring the leadership to a sound footing. The Poles put forward Jaruzelski. The army and security forces stand behind him. The healthy forces supported this. Change in the leadership is a positive fact, assuming that the results of the 4th plenum of the PUWP CC 61 are followed up on.

The difficulties in the PUWP as well as in the country remain, the situation is difficult.

Further developments will depend on how consistently the new leadership will work and struggle against Kania's course without Kania.

A conversation took place between Jaruzelski and L.I. Brezhnev62 in which it was stressed that

- choosing reliable co-workers was the most important thing;

- it was time to take decisive measures against counterrevolution.

The PUWP CC, the Sejm and the PPR government are taking some measures, but so far the outcome of this has somehow not been clearly apparent. So far they are relying on discussions. They are considering solving [the situation] by means of a National Unity Front.

We are pointing out the possibility that the party may lose its leading role in a coalition with "Solidarity” and the church.

We are securing the supplies of goods in their original volumes and also in the future. But hereafter everything will depend on the character of the internal political situation in Poland. The support of the healthy forcesone of our tasks.

Overall our course lies in:

preserving the PUWP as the leading force;

preserving the Polish People's Republic as an ally; saving socialism in the PPR.

The danger has not been eliminated, the struggle will continue.

Lessons from the crisis in Poland.

1. The successful building of socialism is [only] possible under conditions when general principles are consistently implemented in the building of a new society. Deviation from these [principles] leads to crises.

2. Maintaining high political vigilance. To see not only successes, but also errors and failures in time to analyze and eliminate [them].

3. We attach great importance to strengthening the party's leading role and of the party's connection to the masses, to the strengthening and development of socialist democracy, to internationalist education in the socialist spirit, to intensifying of the ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

4. The present international situation has become worse and the enemies would like to "feather their own nest" provoking us to become involved in Polish affairs,

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