« 上一頁繼續 »
See Monika Tantzscher, “Was in Polen geschieht, ist für die DDR eine Lebensfrage!'—Das MfS und die polnische Krise 1980/81,” Materialien der Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland" (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), Deutscher Bundestag, vol. V/3: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), pp. 2601-2760, here p. 2616 ff.
"Information on the Situation in Poland,” Militärisches Zwischenarchiv im Bundesarchiv (MZA-BArch) Strb AZN 28895, 11. 5-10. These files of the former Military Archive in Potsdam are now available in the Military Archive in Freiburg/ Br. See, e.g. “Information on the Situation in Poland,” 20 August 1980, MZA Strb AZN 28895, 11. 11-14.
For an analysis of the attitude of GDR workers toward the events in Poland see Burkhard Olschowsky, Die Haltung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und der DDR-Gesellschaft gegenüber den Ereignissen in Polen in den Jahren 1980-1983 Magisterarbeit (Ms.), Berlin, April 1997, pp. 53 ff.; and Olschowsky, “Die Haltung der Berliner Arbeitnehmer zu den Ereignissen in Polen 1980/81," in Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat, No. 6, to be published in Summer 1998.
See Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen, pp. 17 ff.
See Krolikowski's note documented in the annex “Comment on the report of the PB to the 13th plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Guenther Mittag,” handwritten, 5 December 1980; his “Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November, 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also Przybylski vol. 2, pp. 353-357.
On the CC plenum on 11-12 December 1980 and the politburo report, see Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen,
also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.
Tisch is not expressing himself here in a grammatically correct way, and this particular sentence, as it is in the source, is confusing. From the context, however, follows quite clearly what he wanted to say. The passage has been translated to reflect what he meant to say. The German original reads as follows: "... und wo Honecker um die Vollmacht gebeten hat, alle Schritte einzuleiten, daß da nichts passieren kann, ohne daß er das Politbüro noch mal fragen muß."
Interview with Harry Tisch for the TV documentary That was the GDR-a history of the other Germany, broadcast on 3 October 1993 by German television (ARD). The quoted passage can be found in the book which was published under the same title by Wolfgang Kenntemich, Manfred Durniok, and Thomas Karlan (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993). The omission in the quotation is in the source. Despite permission from the broadcasting corporation, MDR, to see the complete interview with Harry Tisch, Manfred Durniok, whose film company produced the documentary on behalf of the MDR, rejected the author's request to view the entire interview, "because we made the interviews with the contemporary witnesses only for the MDR.” Letter to the author, 29 August 1996.
p. 208. See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session from 28 November 1980 in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen, pp. 123 ff.
32 Editor's note: On this day in 1956, all units of the National People's Army declared their combat readiness.
Honecker to Brezhnev, 26 November 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, SED contra Polen, pp. 122 ff.; for an English translation, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 127.
See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session of 28 November 1980, in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen, p. 123 f.
See “Es war eine sowjetische Intervention.' Oberst a.D. Wolfgang Wünsche zur militärischen Erdrosselung des Prager Reformkurses 1968," interview with Karlen Vesper in Neues Deutschland, 21 August 1995, p. 12.
See Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen,
See politburo minutes No. 49/80 of the session from 2 December 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, SED contra Polen, pp. 138 ff.
See stenographic record of the meeting of leading representatives of Warsaw Pact states in Moscow on 5 December 1980 in Kubina and Wilke, eds., SED contra Polen, pp. 140-195; for Honecker's speech see pp. 166-171. For an English translation, see this issue of the Bulletin (below).
Ibid., pp. 171-178.
“Commentary,” handwritten, 16 December 80, also in Przybylski, vol. 1, pp. 340-344.
See politburo minutes No. 50/80 of the session of 9 December 1980, in Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin G. Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, und Hans-Peter Mueller, eds., SED-Politbüro und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbüros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR, vol. I: 1980, Berlin, January 1993 (Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat No. 3/1993), p. 533.
Krolikowski, “The lessons for the X. Party Congress of the SED,” handwritten, 12 November 1980.
Krolikowski, “On the relationship between EH und GM,” handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.
Krolikowski, “On the relationship between EH und GM," handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.
On the attitude of Stoph and Mielke toward Honecker see, “Byl li Chonekker igrushkoy v rukach Moskvy,” interview by Sergej Guky with Yury Andropov, Izvestia, 11 August 1992, p. 6; “Wir wechselten zum Du,” Der Spiegel, 17, August 1992, pp. 20-22. According to Abrasimov, Mielke in Moscow often “dumped on him,” whereby Honecker is to have been completely unsuspecting of Mielke's double role.
P.A. Abrasimov was Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin from 1975 until 1983.
See “Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November 1980,” handwritten, 5 December 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.
Mielke is talking here about Honecker's so-called “Gera Demands.” After the SPD-FDP coalition in West Germany had won the elections, Honecker demanded that the FRG clear up some fundamental questions with the GDR before talks could resume on "humanitarian improvements.” For further information, see the literature cited in Kubina and Wilke, SED contra Polen, p. 11 (fn. 10).
"Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13 November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980,
Bulgaria and the Political Crises
By Jordan Baev
n recent years, new evidence has come to light from put our armies in action.” The statement of Zhivkov is Bulgarian archives concerning the position of the indirectly confirmed by documents from the former Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and state
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) archives in leadership on the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Moscow. At a CPSU CC Plenum on 21 March 1968 Poland in 1980/81.'
dedicated to the situation in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev
remarked: “In Sofia and afterwards Com[rades] Živkov, Bulgaria and the Prague Spring
[Polish Leader Władysław] Gomułka, [and Hungarian In the fall 1993 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, Mark leader János) Kádár addressed us with requests to Kramer presented hypotheses on the role Bulgarian leader undertake some steps for regulation of the situation in Todor Živkov played in the suppression of the "Prague Czechoslovakia." Consequently, it was decided to Spring." The documents kept in the former BCP Central convene a meeting of Soviet, East German, Polish, and Committee (CC) archive clarify this matter unambiguously Hungarian representatives with the Czechoslovak and definitely discredit the statements made by Živkov in leadership in Dresden (on 23 March 1968). At Živkov's his memoirs thirty years later, claiming that he had
explicit insistence, a Bulgarian delegation was invited to opposed the August 1968 Soviet invasion and had been take part in the meeting, too.” Expressions such as the sympathetic to the reform efforts. We now also have at following are typical of those delivered to the BCP CC our disposal clear evidence of the Bulgarian leadership's Politburo regarding the Dresden discussions: “The attitude toward the Polish crisis of 1980/1981, which was attention of the Czechoslovak comrades has been drawn to presented at the Jachranka conference on “Poland 1980- the necessity of looking more closely at their people, at 82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” (in
those whose heads are not quite in order... so that the November 1997). Less information is available, however, incipient counter-revolution will be cut down..." Should concerning the Bulgarian society's reaction to the political the Czechoslovak leadership fail to undertake the crises in the two East-European countries as well as to necessary measures for “smashing counterrevolutionary Bulgarian military participation in the Warsaw Pact acts," the remaining Warsaw Pact countries would not be “Danube ‘68" operation against Czechoslovakia.
able to remain indifferent since they have bonds of unity In February 1968, on the occasion of the 20th
with Czechoslovakia as well as common interests, and anniversary of the February 1948 Communist takeover in they cannot permit a counterrevolution in the heart of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact leaders met in Prague. In Europe." At a special BCP CC Plenum on 29 March the speeches delivered by the attending heads-of-state 1968, CC Secretary Stanko Todorov, delivered a detailed there was no hint whatsoever of any discord. The
report (55 pages) on the Dresden meeting which lasted for Bulgarian leader, Zhivkov, declared "full unity" with the 11 hours.? "expert and wise" leadership of the Czechoslovak
The line marked out in BCP CC Politburo's decision Communist Party (CPCz) and stated: “Between us there gives a perfectly clear idea of the direction which the have never been and there are not any matters of
reports of the Bulgarian Embassy in Prague were to follow difference."4 A session of the Warsaw Pact Political
and the way in which the Bulgarian mass media portrayed Consultative Committee took place ten days later, on 6-7 the Czechoslovak events. While previous reports of Rayko March 1968, in Sofia. The official communiqué regarding Nikolov, Political Counselor at the Bulgarian Embassy, the “open exchange of opinions” did not even mention attempted to analyze the “interesting processes" taking Czechoslovakia. Nor did it appear in the text of the
place in Czechoslovakia, the reports of Ambassador declaration made at the joint session of the BCP CC and Stoyan Nedelchev after March 1968 put forward the idea the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) Council of of a "creeping counterrevolution" which was in full Ministers which heard a report by first Deputy Prime harmony with Sofia's views. On June 30, Nedelchev sent a Minister Živko about the PCC session in Sofia. In another, report couched in dark terms stating that the internal confidential report however, Živkov said: “During the political crisis in Czechoslovakia could develop into an session of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the irrevocable process which would bring about important Warsaw Pact we decided to share with the Soviet comrades consequences unfavorable to “socialism" if “sound our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia... We forces” in the CPCz did not immediately intervene. categorically declared to Comrade (Leonid I.Brezhnev and Todor Živkov headed the Bulgarian delegation at the Comrade (Alexei] Kosygin that we had to be prepared to meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Bulgaria, East
Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-15 July 1968 in Warsaw. Several influential BCP Politburo membersStanko Todorov, Boris Velchev, and Pencho Kubadinsky —also attended. In the letter to the CPCz CC adopted by the five parties at the meeting, the Brezhnev Doctrine's postulates of "limited sovereignty" of members of the Socialist Commonwealth were outlined.
After the Bulgarian delegation returned from Warsaw the BCP CC Politburo discussed the situation on July 16.9 At a special Party Plenum, Stanko Todorov delivered a detailed informational report on the results of the Warsaw meeting. Its content completely undermines later claims made in the West that Bulgaria took a special position against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. In compliance with the plenum's resolutions the Bulgarian press opened a "campaign of clarification" of the situation in Czechoslovakia in the spirit of the five Warsaw Pact Parties' letter. This activity provoked an official protest on the Czechoslovak side, expressed at the meeting of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiři Hájek with the Bulgarian Ambassador Nedelchev on 27 July 1968."
At 1 a.m. on August 21 the armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact countries taking part in Operation “Danube '68" entered Czechoslovak territory. Bulgarian participation consisted of military formations of two regiments of the Third Army numbering 2,164 troops. (The size of the Bulgarian contingent, compared with that of other Warsaw Pact forces sent into Czechoslovakia, shows that Bulgarian participation in the operation was mainly symbolic.) As early as mid-July the Bulgarian forces that were to take part in the Warsaw Pact military action were installed in field camps and started intensive military and psychological preparation. They trained in strict isolation from the civil population in order to preserve military secrecy. After a written battle order for "participation in a military exercise" on Soviet territory, on July 21 the formations of 12th “Elhovsky” regiment under the command of Col. Alexander Genchev were transported to USSR by sea, where, according to the order, they came under the command of the Commander-inChief of the Odessa Military District. From there, they were transferred in mid-August to a location near Uzhgorod, close to the Soviet-Slovak border. On August 21 in accelerated battle march, the Elhovo regiment formations reached (via Košice) their assigned regions of Slovakia (Banska Bistrica, Zvolen, Brezno). Formations of the 22nd Harmanli regiment under the command of Col. Ivan Chavdarov were transported by air to Prague, in order to guard Czechoslovakia's primary airport, Ruzině.
During their stay in Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian military units did not participate directly in any military actions. The entire time they were on Czechoslovak territory (August 21-October 23) they were under direct Soviet command. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian soldiers also felt the hostility of Czechoslovak citizens who opposed the foreign military intervention on their territory. The field diaries of the Bulgarian military formations reported a
number of incidents during their two-month stay on Czechoslovak territory. In the only existing Bulgarian study on this matter, Maj. Gen. Dimiter Naidenov mentioned some of the armed incidents: “On August 22nd at 01.55 A.M. positions of two of our formations were fired on. Around 02.40 A.M. two shots were (fired) over the company of Captain Gochkov, and around 02.44 A.M. there was shooting at the battle row of Captain Valkov's company originating from nearby buildings. On August 24th by 01.07 A.M. an intensive round of firing from automatic guns towards Officer Sabi Dimitrov's formation was noted." At the end of August the Bulgarian newspapers published an account entitled, “A sentry at Ruzině," in which it was stated: “On the night of August 26th to 27th shots were fired toward the position of Warrant-Officer Vassilev from the near-by houses...."?12
There is no information on the participation of Bulgarian soldiers in military actions against Czechoslovak citizens, and Bulgarian military units in Czechoslovakia suffered only one casuality. On the evening of 9 September 1968, in a Prague suburb, JuniorSergeant Nikolay Nikolov was kidnapped and shot with three bullets from a 7.65 mm gun.
During the “Prague Spring" and after the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, there were isolated acts of protest among Bulgarian intellectuals. Three History Department students at the University of Sofia were arrested and sentenced to varying prison terms; several of their professors were expelled from the Communist Party.3 The State Security services carefully observed any reactions among Czechoslovak youth vacationing in the Bulgarian Black Sea resorts at the time of the invasion.
The Bulgarian Embassy in Prague and General Consulate in Bratislava documented numerous protests of different strata of Czechoslovak society against the armed intervention. In the various reports from Czechoslovakia, opinions were quoted regarding the “great mistake” made by the Warsaw Pact countries, who with their action, had "hurt the feelings of national dignity of Czechs and Slovaks.” Prior to the invasion, Gen. Koday, Commandant of the East Czechoslovak Military District, had supported a hard-line position, often stating that more decisive actions were required against the “anti-socialist forces.” Yet, early in November 1968, Gen. Koday admitted to Stefan Velikov, Bulgarian General Consul in Bratislava: “The shock was too great." He told about the offense he suffered on the night of August 21s: “He was nearly arrested, his headquarters were surrounded and machinegunners rushed into his office.” The Czechoslovak military leader underlined several times during the confidential talks there had been no need to send Warsaw Pact regiments. The Commander of the Bratislava Garrison backed this opinion, saying that “our countries have lost a lot with the invasion.”]4
The Bulgarian authorities, however, were explicit and unanimous in their statements concerning the necessity of
their actions which had saved the Czechoslovak people hostile environment and we have to admit that our enemies from a "counterrevolution" and had prevented an
won certain points. Your case, one could say, is a link in the inevitable Western intervention. They firmly maintained chain of the total imperialistic offensive against us...' this position in front of representatives of Western
Soon after the meeting, Živkov prepared a special memo on Communist Parties who had opposed the military action in the matter, and the Polish situation was discussed at two Czechoslovakia as well. During the extremely controversial Politburo sessions, on October 21 and 25. Živkov also and long discussions with the head of the International maintained the hard line of an “offensive against the antiDepartment of the Italian Communist Party, Carlo Galuzi, on socialist forces” at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact 16 September 1968, the BCP leaders repeated many times: leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow. Following "We do not consider that our interference was a mistake. instructions, the State Security structures became more We believe that by our intervention undertaken in a timely active in their "preventive" measures and in their periodic manner, we terminated the dangerous process of
analyses of the Polish crisis which laid particular stress on counterrevolution which could have only ended with a its influence in Bulgaria. victory of the counterrevolution and in no other way...
In the first half of 1981, nearly all information coming That could have been a dreadful flaw in the defense of the from the Bulgarian Embassy in Warsaw referred to the Socialist camp in Europe...."!5 Five years later Zhivkov development of the political crisis. In a memo regarding maintained the same view in his talks with Italian CP leader bilateral Bulgarian-Polish relations in May 1981, Mariy Enrico Berlinguer.
Ivanov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated to
the BCP CC: “In the last ten months relations between the The position of the Bulgarian Party and State leadership mass trade unions, youth, women's and other public regarding the 1980-81 Polish Crisis
organizations (in both countries] have practically been cut Until the beginning of August 1980 no particular off..."* In a report to the Foreign Ministry, the Bulgarian concern with the Polish crisis was shown in Bulgaria, ambassador in Poland, Ivan Nedev, related the reaction of a though reports of public discontent and incipient upheaval high ranking Polish army officer: “[We will put up with) had begun circulating. On the eve of Bulgarian Prime anything rather than Soviet-style socialism!"19 Minister Stanko Todorov's visit to Poland in July 1980 the The review of the political and diplomatic documents usual memos and references were prepared, one of which on the Polish crisis, compared to other important archival stated: “The dissidents are now in fact an insignificant sources as well, prompts the following conclusions: group of people isolated from society, they have lost their Though publicly not as active as his Czechoslovak public influence, are people disunited from inward
and East German colleagues Gustáv Husák and Erich struggles... The people are in a state of sound moral and Honecker, the Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov was another political unity... Poland is a strong socialist unit....” After firm supporter of the hard line of “decisive struggle” his official visit on July 14-15, Todorov, in a report to the against the "counterrevolution" and the "anti-socialist BCP CC Politburo, declared: “I believe that the Party and forces" in Poland. In the spirit of the times, the expert State leadership in Poland, with regard to their current evaluation and the diplomatic analyses usually accorded economic problems, are approaching the complicated with Živkov's and his entourage's attitudes. The position problems with a sense of realism and are taking active of Foreign Minister Peter Mladenov, who often backed steps to overcome them, taking into consideration the Živkov's opinions, did not stray much. The Bulgarian working people's feelings."16 One would hardly assume leadership's reaction demonstrated the unwillingness and that in such confidential documents propaganda clichés incapability of the administration to draw even most would be deliberately used in place of a real evaluation. general conclusions from the Polish events and to Obviously, at the time Bulgarian ruling circles did not undertake political reforms even to the slightest degree. realize the real social and political situation in Poland. In
As in previous decades, the development of the latest August - September 1980, however, the Embassy in
internal political crisis in the East European countries failed Warsaw sent several informational reports on the changes to provoke Bulgarian leaders to reconsider prevailing in the situation and the formation of the political
conceptions and attitudes, a rethinking which might have opposition to the Communist regime. No doubt, such news contributed to a transformation and modernization of the should have reached Sofia from Moscow as well.
existing political regime. On the contrary, those crises On 15 September 1980, Todor Živkov received
induced a "hardening" of the Kremlin and East European Politburo member Kazimierz Barcikowski who was sent to rulers' positions. Just as in the case of the 1956 and 1968 Sofia to inform the Bulgarian leaders of the situation in his events, after those in Poland in 1980-1981 led to increased country. During that conversation, Živkov said: "We do bitterness in Bulgarian party politics, resulting, e.g. in the not dramatize the events in Poland but they require all the dismissal of well-known figures in political and cultural socialist countries to draw certain conclusions for
circles, such as Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. This line of behavior fit themselves, too." He added that the Bulgarian leadership very well with the general pattern of confrontation between would “follow the development of the matters in Poland” Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s. At the same and concluded: “We, the Socialist countries, work in a time, however it exposed an important feature of the
Bulgarian regime: its lack of adaptive mechanisms for
Record of the Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party overcoming the contradictions and crisis in the political Central Communist, Sofia, 29 March 1968 (excerpt) elite under existing circumstances of a dictatorial personal rule. That, together with the no less important outside
TODOR ŽIVKOV:' [...] The discussions have shown
situation in Czechoslovakia made by the fraternal
comes to worst we will use our armies.
ŽIVKO ŽIVKOV:3 It is in state of ineffectiveness.
TODOR ŽIVKOV: The situation is extremely difficult.
What is the state of Politburo? The forces backing the
Soviet Union and our policy are all now nearly driven out the same archive, for their assistance in getting access to some
of the Politburo. You have the (Oldřich] Černík's statement. confidential records. I would like to stress in particular that for
He is behind all this. Now, he is supposed to become the the first time diplomatic and State Security confidential
next prime minister. Other vacillating persons have been documents of the period are declassified especially for the admitted to the leadership as well. [Alexander] Dubček CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.
himself has neither the experience nor the intellectual 2 Mark Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion
capacity and willpower to take the leadership of the party of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretations (part 2),” CWIHP
into his own hands. One can only hope that there will be Bulletin No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 4-6. 3 T. Zhivkov, Memoirs (Sofia 1997) (in Bulgarian).
forces in the Presidium and the Central Committee capable * Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.
of moving things ahead firmly. The situation there is much Documents, vol. II (Sofia, 1971), p. 422 (in Bulgarian).
more difficult than the one we had to face after the April S R. Pichoya, “Czechoslovakia 1968: Vzgliad iz Moskvi. Po Plenary Session here. Here, too, the situation could have dokumentam CC CPSU,” Novaja I noveishaja istorija No. 6 turned very difficult but we immediately thought and found (1994), p. 11.
the support of our party members, our working class, of the • Central State Archive (CDA), Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. sound forces within our intellectual circles. In our country E. (File] 127, List 6-13.
the blow aimed at the army's leadership. It was repeated at 7 CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 58, A. E. 4, 1. 2-57.
the meeting of the Central Committee that those were Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DA
(Stepan) Chervenkov's people, the DC (State Security] MVNR), Sofia, Opis 24-P, A. E. 2988.
institutions were attacked. What did we do? We gave CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. E. 255, 1. 1-2. 10 RFE Report, Open Society Archives, Budapest, Fond 300,
credit to the leaderships of the Army and the DC, we Subfond 20, Folder 1, Box 89.
mobilized the Party's resources and the situation was 11 DA MVNR, Opis 24-P, A. E. 3020, 1. 202-203. Hájek saved. That is the thing they ought to do now in delivered also a letter from Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik Czechoslovakia. Let us hope that inner strength can be to Zhivkov regarding the additional measures taken with respect to found there to carry this out. If this is not done, the the protection of the State border with West Germany.
situation will get even more complicated. We should 12 Main Political Department of Bulgarian People's Army.
openly inform our party that there is a Classified. For official use only. Major-General D. Naidenov,
counterrevolutionary situation there. They are not yet out Internationalism in action: Socio-political and military-historic
in the streets with arms but who can guarantee they will analysis on the struggle against the counterrevolution in CSSR1968 (Sofia 1979), pp. 102, 117 (In Bulgarian).
not do that tomorrow? It is quite possible that the Homo Bohemicus No. 3, (1994). One of the mentioned counterrevolution could take a temporary hold and stabilize students, Valentin Radev, was a friend of mine. He was in jail for 18 gradually. They have drawn their conclusions from the months and later worked at the National History Museum in Sofia. events in Hungary. He died from a heart attack at age 48 in 1995.
What does the present leadership have under its 14 DA MVNR. Opis 24-P, A. E. 2987, 1. 58-64.
control? Nothing. It has no control over the army; it is 15 CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 11, 1. 1-39.
demoralized, ineffective. They keep calling sessions, 16 DA MVNR, Opis 36, A. E. 2308, 1. 37-40.
meetings, vote on resolutions to oust this or that person 17 CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 272, 1. 1-20. 18 DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2137, 1. 7.
from his post in the army. The trade unions, the organized 19 DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2192, 1. 2-4.
force of the working class, are crushed. Their official