The Viceroy to Secretary of State, April 9

of which at present we know very little.
But, if
either of these passes (the Baroghil and the Iskoman)
be practicable for troops, it would enable an in-
vading force, with a fine base at Yarkand, to
reach our frontier (its weakest point) by a route
quicker than any other. Just before my arrival in
India, Lord Northbrook, whose attention had been.
turned to the obvious importance of clearing up the
doubt as to the character of these passes, instructed
Major Biddulph (an officer on his staff, well qualified
for such a task) to explore them. Owing to various
unforeseen circumstances, Major Biddulph was only
able to explore very imperfectly a portion of one of
them. From his report it would appear that this
pass is not practicable, and of the other we still
know next to nothing.

'Subsequently, when it became apparent that we
could no longer, rationally or safely, rest our whole
frontier policy on the fiction of an Afghan alliance
which does not exist and which we have no means
of securing, Lord Salisbury authorised me to do
what I could, quietly, to make the security of our
North-West Frontier as far as possible independent of
any such alliance. To the attainment of this object
my efforts have been directed in various directions,
and one result of them is the present more or less
confidential arrangement with the Maharaja of
Kashmir whose loyalty can, I think, be
thoroughly relied upon. If there be one thing more
than another which every Indian Prince is ambitious
of, it is extension of territory or rule.
By the
present arrangement, Kashmir is authorised to enter
into treaty relations with these neighbouring chiefs,
with a view to obtaining their recognition of his
suzerainty in return for a small subsidy. In return

for this permission, the Maharaja assents to the establishment of a British agency at Gilgit to watch the frontier at that point, and the construction, at his own expense, of a telegraph from Gilgit to British territory. The Maharaja is not to use force for the purpose of extending his authority over Chitral, Yassin, or any of the other neighbouring chiefdoms; but should he at any time hereafter be obliged to resort to it for the maintenance of rights acquired by his treaties with them, he is assured of our support and assistance, if he requires them for that purpose. This arrangement was approved some time ago by Lord Salisbury, and is now in force. One of the Mirs has already signed a treaty with Kashmir, pledging his allegiance, and has sent hostages to the Maharaja's Court. I am hopeful that his example will be followed by others in due course of time. If so, we shall have secured a vicarious but virtual control over the chiefdoms of Kafristan (which will have cost us nothing) by their absorption under the suzerainty of Kashmir, our vassal. As it is, the Baroghil and Iskoman passes (quantum valeat) are already brought within that suzerainty. But the arrangement can only bear fruit slowly; first, because Kashmir is forbidden to use force, and the diplomacy of native Courts is always slow; and, secondly, because Kashmir is a Hindu dynasty, and these Mirs and Khans are all Mohammedan. That fact will not prevent them from placing themselves under Kashmir's protection, if they find it to their interests to do so; but it would probably throw them into the hands of the Amir of Kabul (whom they now dread and mistrust), if any attempt were made by Kashmir at forcible interference with their independence. Meanwhile the

The Viceroy to Secretary of State,

April 9

of State,

To Secretary telegraphic cable from Gilgit to Srinuggur is already April 9, 1878 in course of construction, and, I believe, nearly completed. Major Biddulph, whom I selected for the new post of observation at Gilgit, arrived there not long ago; and this is how matters now stand.'

189

CHAPTER VI

FAMINE OF 1877

THE most serious anxiety which pressed upon the Famine
Government of India this year, however, was not in
connection with frontier affairs, but with the famine
in the southern provinces of India.

In October of the year 1876 signs of scarcity appeared in the neighbourhood of Bombay, owing to the failure of the food crops. These were the first symptoms of a famine, which in the following year proved to be in respect of area and population Famine Comaffected, and duration and intensity, one of the most mission grievous calamities of its kind experienced in British India since the beginning of the century. The failure of the summer rains of 1876 extended over about half of the Madras Presidency, the distress being most intense in the same tract (that lying above the Eastern Ghats) which suffered in 1853 and 1854. The scarcity was felt with great severity over the whole of Mysore (except the hilly tracts that lie along the Western Ghats), the southern half of the Hyderabad State, and all the Deccan districts of the Bombay Presidency. The area thus affected was about 200,000 square miles, containing a population of thirty-six millions.'

In the earliest stages of the famine considerable difference of opinion existed as to whether the relief measures should be mainly based on the system of

Different

systems of

employing the people on large or on small works. Small works are easily started, with little previous preparation, require little expert skill in their supervision, and offer employment to people close to their own homes; they are therefore suitable for a slight and temporary scarcity, and for the earlier stages, when it is still uncertain whether scarcity will develop into famine; but they are liable to break down when very large numbers have to be provided for, and it soon becomes impossible to apply a strict labour test to the disorganised masses collected on such works. Moreover, the character of these works (the cleaning out and digging of tanks, repairs or embankment of old roads, &c.) is such that it is hardly possible that the famine relief money laid out on them should be remuneratively employed. On the other hand, large works, carried out under experienced officers of the Public Works Department, require much previous preparation, surveys and estimates, and involve careful organisation of the staff, housing of the labourers, provision for food and water, with sanitary and medical arrangements. But when thus started they form the best means of utilising the labour for permanent and remunerative objects. Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, taking a serious view of the extent of the disaster which had befallen the country, advocated from the first the commencement of large public works. The Government of Madras, on the other hand, adopted the system of opening small and scattered works, which would not involve a large expenditure if the anticipated famine should not turn out to be very severe, and their views were at first supported by the Supreme Government.

Viceroy to
Sir R. Temple,

Writing on November 30 from Multan to Sir Nov. 30, 1876 Richard Temple, the Viceroy said: "This calamity is an