unforeseen and serious embarrassment. As the first 1876 intimation of it only reached me on the eve of my departure from Simla, and my reasons for visiting the frontier were urgent, I have left the conduct of all correspondence with the local Governments on this subject entirely to Norman and my colleagues, whose experience of such matters is, of course, much greater than my own. We are all of us agreed, however, firstly, not to sanction the commencement, for purely relief purposes, of large, long, and costly undertakings unless the public works of that kind proposed by the local Governments have been previously approved by the Supreme Government, as advantageous or necessary in themselves and compatible with the present state of our finances; and, secondly, not to sanction, except on very clearly proved necessity, any interference with the natural course of trade. I am afraid that these principles are not in favour with either of the two Governments chiefly concerned in carrying them out; and, indeed, Madras has, without any reference to us, bought large quantities of grain at what seem to me high prices, and without any adequate cause.'

Lord Lytton, however, soon perceived that tentative measures were unsuitable when the certainty of having to deal with a great and widespread famine became established, and he disapproved of sending instructions to the Bombay Government to confine its operations.

This was how matters stood when the Viceroy himself reached Bombay, and his interviews with the Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, and the other local authorities sufficed to satisfy him that the Bombay Government was dealing with the difficulty on sound principles, and with great discretion as well as energy.

Bombay system finally adopted

To Sir Louis
Mallet,

The Bombay system became, before the year was out, the universally accepted plan of dealing with labour on relief works.

After acknowledging, in a private letter, this change of opinion as to the justification of the management of the Bombay Government, the Viceroy adds:

In answering the various addresses I received Jan. 11, 1877 at Bombay, I thought it only fair to give public expression to this opinion.' He went on to explain that, considering the gravity of the case, he had thought it desirable to invite the two Governments of Bombay and Madras to meet him at Delhi, and discuss the condition of affairs and the future policy in a personal conference. This, I think, has been quite satisfactory. We had a long conference attended by the two Governors, and I think it has effectually removed all misunderstanding between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India; my colleagues having agreed to modify their last despatch in a sense acceptable to the Bombay Government.' Writing to Lord George Hamilton 1 on January 22, he said: 'I think you can truly affirm, I certainly assert it myself, that as regards the famine difficulties the Imperial assemblage has been a godsend. Had it not enabled me to bring the two Governors into personal conference with my own Council, I really believe that we should at this moment have found ourselves in an inextricable mess. The opportunity thus afforded furnished me with the only possible means of removing what threatened to be a serious misunderstanding between the Government of India and the Bombay Government on questions of vital importance.' The presence of the

1 Lord George Hamilton was then Under-Secretary of State for India.

Duke of Buckingham at Delhi revealed a state of things at Madras which excited the gravest apprehensions in the mind of the Viceroy. The notion of dealing with the scarcity in that Presidency was apparently to keep down prices artificially by huge purchases of grain, not perceiving,' writes the Viceroy, that the high prices, by stimulating import and limiting consumption, were the natural saviours. of the situation. The result is that the Madras Mistaken Government has not only shaken the confidence of Madras policy in a trade already shy enough, but has also created a pauper population, whose numbers are no test of the actual scarcity and whom it will be very difficult to get rid of.

We were unanimous that this must be stopped at once, and we have come to the conclusion that our best course is to send Sir Richard Temple 1 in the character of our Commissioner, and with adequate power, to Madras. He will go there via Bombay, in order to strengthen his hands in dealing with the Madras Council by having first inspected some of the Bombay districts where similar phenomena are being successfully treated in accordance with the policy we have laid down. In the meanwhile we have forbidden the Madras Government to buy more grain as a trader, whilst authorising it in cases of necessity to purchase grain for grain wages, just as any Commissioner might do.'

At the earliest stage there was some excuse to be made for the policy of the Madras Government. They pleaded that the precedent of the famine in 1874, the management of which (entrusted to Sir Richard Temple) had not at that time been officially overruled, justified the purchase of grain, and they also

1 On account of his experience in the Behar famine of 1874.

Famine Commission

argued on the merits of the case, that the knowledge of the fact that Government possessed stores of grain which they could throw on the market or lay down at places out of the way of trade would prevent the absolute withholding of stocks or prohibitive prices, and so tend to avoid panics, one of the greatest dangers in the early days of famine. They did not appreciate the fact that Lord Northbrook and Sir Richard Temple had for the most part to deal with an isolated area badly connected with the trade centres, and that in that area the Government undertook practically to supersede private trade, and did so, but at an expense which, if applied to the area over which the famine of 1877 extended, would have brought speedy bankruptcy.

In the instructions given to Sir Richard Temple by the Government of India the principle was reaffirmed that the Government would spare no efforts to save the population of the distressed districts. from starvation or from an extremity of suffering dangerous to life; but they would not attempt the task of preventing all suffering and of giving general relief to the poorer classes of the community. Everyone, it was said, admits the evils of indiscriminate private charity, but the indiscriminate charity of a Government is far worse. The Government held that the task of saving life irrespective of the cost was one which it was beyond their power to undertake, but from the history of past famines rules of action might be learned which would enable them in the future to provide efficient assistance for the suffering people without incurring disastrous expenditure.

In the opinion of the Viceroy, Sir Richard Temple carried out his instructions at Madras with admirable

tact, judgment, and energy, and for the time being exerted a much-needed check on the expenditure of the Madras Government. He found that vast numbers were in receipt of relief who, for a time at any rate, could support themselves. Under his influence the wage rate was lowered and the supervision of relief labour was increased.

Unfortunately there was a relapse to the original condition of excessive extravagance soon after Sir Richard Temple's departure.

The grain transactions of the Madras Government continued so to alarm the Government of India that they finally gave vent to their anxiety in a despatch on the subject, the publication of which caused the Duke of Buckingham some annoyance. The Viceroy thus defended it in a letter to Lord Salisbury: The whole action of the Calcutta grain Viceroy to trade was on the point of being paralysed by the Secretary of conduct of the Madras Government and its pertina- May 17, 1877 cious reticence on matters demanding the utmost and most prompt publicity. Complaints and expostulations from the trade were pouring in to us daily.

The greatest distrust and uncertainty prevailed where it was of essential importance to establish confidence. All our representations to Madras on this subject had been ignored and disregarded. All the principal mercantile houses in Calcutta concurred in assuring us that so great was the mistrust that unless this impression were promptly removed all shipments of grain from Bengal would immediately cease. That would have landed us in a huge disaster, which neither we nor the local Government could cope with. . . .

'The case was extremely urgent, and had we not instantly made the publication of which the Duke

State,