Rahman's own story not go? If you fail it does not matter much, you can Abdul return to us and your present allowances. You will not again get such an opportunity; if you wish to go, go now. You surely will be able to drive out General Ghulam Haidar, and establish yourself in Turkestan.' 'I represented that I had no arms, horses, trappings, or money. It was finally arranged, after communication by wire with General Kaufmann, that I should be supplied with 200 breech-loading rifles and 100 rounds of ball ammunition per rifle, trappings and accoutrements for 100 foot and 100 mounted men. When leaving I was presented with 5,000 Bokhara tillas. This sum and the money I originally had, together with what I had managed to save out of my allowance, is all that I started with. The Russians pressed me most strongly to leave. They said I could not leave soon enough. I have entered into no written or secret engagement with the Russians. I am bound to them by no oath or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude, and consequently I should never like to be obliged to fight them. I have eaten their salt and was for twelve years dependent on their hospitality, and during that time, though often annoyed, I never misconducted myself or forgot my duty to them. The assistance given to me in arms, animals, money, &c., has been considered as a loan, which I will have to repay. The rifles have been valued at twenty-five roubles each. If I am fortunate enough to be made Amir, I will desire nothing better than to be allowed to pass the remainder of my days in peace. I left Tashkend with 100 followers, and travelled via Oratippa, Karategin, Hissar, Kolab, and crossed the Oxus at Rustack.'1 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. Suggestion that Abdul Rahman should be made Amir 6 The earliest rumours of Abdul Rahman's arrival in Afghanistan came to the British authorities in the first days of March 1880; and almost simultaneously it was found that his mother, then living at Kandahar, had received letters indicating that he might not be unfavourably disposed towards negotiations with the English Government. The project of treating with Abdul Rahman for the restoration of government in North Afghanistan is understood to have originated with Major St. John, who was at the moment in India with the Viceroy; and Lord Lytton, perceiving its advantages, immediately acted upon the suggestion. On March 6 he wrote to Mr. Griffin at Kabul, referring to the letters received by the Sirdar's family at Kandahar, saying, This communication indicates possibilities, and in any case suggests considerations which may, I think, have the most important practical bearing on the early solution of the very difficult problem you are about to deal with in North Afghanistan.' He proceeded to point out that Abdul Rahman fulfilled all the conditions required in a chief to whom might be transferred the rulership of the country, from which it was eminently desirable that our troops should speedily withdraw, and he accordingly decided that conciliatory messages should be sent to the Sirdar, both from Kabul and from Kandahar, as soon as it should be certain that he was in Afghan territory. These instructions were sanctioned by the Home Government, although not without some hesitation and misgivings as to the advisability of treating with a chief who had been so long connected with Russia, and accordingly on April 1 a letter from Kabul was addressed to the Sirdar and sent by a confidential messenger. Before his arrival several documents addressed by Abdul Rahman to different persons came into the hands of the British authorities at Kabul. One of these, addressed to the principal chiefs of Kohistan, took very high ground. It appealed to the honour and glory of Islam and the dignity of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, and stated that the Sirdar had arrived to save it from the misery and degradation into which it had fallen, and was ready with this object to head a religious war and march on Kabul, although he was content to be at peace with the English if only they would accede to his representations. The Afghan troops generally rose in favour of the new comer, and Lord Lytton began to fear that the time might slip by when we were in a position to dictate terms to him, rather than to listen to his requests backed up by a strong national party. Writing to the Secretary of State on April 12 he said: 6 of State, April 12 • You will remember that more than a month ago To Secretary I urged the expediency of sending to (Abdul Rahman), while his strength was still weak and his position still uncertain, a public deputation from the Kabul Sirdars to offer him, with the open connivance of the British Government, the throne of Kabul, which we were then in a position to assign to him upon our own terms. The situation has within the last three weeks changed very considerably in favour of Abdul Rahman, and my present fear is that the wrecks and refuse of the Ghuzni faction will ere long rally to his standard, placing him in a position to appear suddenly before Kabul at the head of a united nation, and dictate terms to us, instead of accepting them from us.' Sir Donald Stewart and his force left Kandahar Sir Donald Stewart's victories before Ghuzni To Lord on April 1, and occupied Ghuzni on the 21st, after a severe action on the 19th with the tribesmen, a large body of whom charged the British troops with great gallantry, but without success. The division only remained three days at Ghuzni, leaving Sirdar Mahomed Alam Khan, the uncle of Musa Khan, in charge of a provisional Government. A force was sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar force, the main body of which under General Ross encountered no serious opposition. A small contingent, however, under Colonel Jenkins was attacked, but unsuccessfully, by a formidable gathering at Charasiab. The Kabul and Kandahar forces joined on April 28, and Sir Donald Stewart arrived at Kabul on May 2, and as senior officer assumed from Sir F. Roberts the chief command, as well as political control. 'Stewart,' wrote Lord Lytton, 'has gained two victories before Ghuzni, one of them a very brilliant and decisive one, and Jenkins has had a most successful engagement at Charasiab. These military successes leave us masters of the political position, if we do not hastily throw away our advantages.' On April 21 our messenger to Abdul Rahman returned to Kabul with a letter from that Sirdar which the Viceroy characterised as very friendly and very clever. Writing to Lord Cranbrook on April 27 he says: We have found in Abdul Rahman a ram caught in the thicket.' His letter, obviously dictated by Russian advisers, professed warm friendship with us, provided we did not impose on him conditions which he could not accept without apparent ingratitude to Russia, whose salt he had eaten,' and proposed that Afghanistan should be neutralised and placed under the joint protectorate of the British and Russian Empires.' Lord Lytton 6 Cranbrook, April 27 comments upon this, I feel sure that Abdul Rahman's To Lord letter was composed for him in the belief that we should, according to our invariable custom, reply to it by indicating conditions which, if contested, would furnish matter for lengthened negotiation, and that we should haggle and barter about the terms of our future relations with him. This would have ended in his dictating his own terms and remaining master of the situation. Our position would have been that of gamblers sitting down at 10 o'clock to break the bank with the knowledge that, whether they win or lose, they must leave off playing at 12 o'clock.' Lord Lytton, therefore, was in favour of immediately informing Abdul Rahman that whilst, if he would not share the fate of Sher Ali, he must put out of his head both the acquisition of Kandahar, which we would never restore, and the Anglo-Russian protectorate, which we would never tolerate in a country acknowledged by Russia to be beyond the legitimate sphere of her action; on the other hand, we were ready to hand over to him at once, without any provisions at all, Kabul and all the rest of the country if he would come and receive it from us. But that our troops would in any case be withdrawn not later than October,' when Kabul would probably be 'jumped' by the leader of the Ghuzni party if he were not previously on the spot to secure the reversion of it with our assistance. 6 The These views were communicated to Mr. Griffin in a letter from Mr. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, dated April 27. single object,' this letter stated, 'to which the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited is the security of the NorthWestern Frontier of India.' The intrusion of any Letter from Mr. Lyall to Mr. Griffin, April 27 |