CHAPTER IX

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN. CHANGE OF

ENGLISH MINISTRY.

CONCLUSION

IT has been seen that at the time of the change of ministry at home military operations in Afghanistan had practically been completed. The Government of India were determined that our troops should retire from Northern Afghanistan by the autumn of the year. The objects of the war had been achieved. The murder of the British Envoy had been avenged; the disintegration of the country had been secured by the severance of Western from Northern Afghanistan, and such a position had been gained by our troops as to render the Government of India independent henceforth of the good or ill will of the Amir of Kabul. Nothing, therefore, was to be gained by a continued military occupation of a country we had decided not to annex, and much might be lost thereby in lives and money. Lord Lytton, holding this view of the situation very strongly, urged that our withdrawal should be unconditional. That having chosen a date convenient to our troops for their evacuation of Kabul, their movements should not be hindered or precipitated by any arrangements which the people of Kabul were free to make with Abdul Rahman or any other Sirdar. It has already been shown that he strongly disapproved of such language being used by our officers in command at Kabul as could lead Abdul Rahman or any other chief to suppose that we

Afghanistan

were willing to enter into treaty arrangements for Situation in the maintenance or support of any chief aspiring at the time to the throne of Kabul. The policy of establishing of the change friendly relations with the Amir, and supporting the ment integrity of his kingdom, on conditions of reciprocal goodwill had failed. We had now made ourselves independent of the alliance of any Amir, and although we desired, for the restoration of internal order, to leave the government in the hands of a capable ruler, it was otherwise a matter of indifference to us who was chosen, and we did not desire to interfere in the matter of his election. Abdul Rahman had appeared to Lord Lytton a hopeful candidate for the Amirship from the first moment he was known to have set foot in Afghan territory, but the Viceroy held most strongly that no negotiations with him should be entered into without the clearest definition of our position in the sense here stated.

man's reply

This view was accepted by those in authority at Kabul with some difference of opinion. They were anxious not to evacuate the country without leaving it in the hands of some settled government, and with this object their communications with Abdul Rahman were so worded as to encourage that Sirdar to assume the position of one able and willing to bargain. His reply to Mr. Griffin's Abdul Rahletter of April 30 was to the effect that his further to Mr. Griffin's progress towards Kabul would depend upon whether letter of he could obtain satisfactory assurances questions as (1) the retention of Kandahar, (2) the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan, and (3) the conditions we would exact with regard to his attitude towards Russia. Lord Lytton felt that the principles which should govern any reply to this letter were of vital importance and could hardly be

on such

April 30

laid down by a moribund Government.' It was a matter which must be left for the consideration of the new Viceroy. Lord Lytton could do no more than place on record in a Minute to be put before Lord Ripon and his Council, so soon as he should reach India, the course which, in his opinion, it would be best to pursue. In this Minute he advised that General Stewart should receive very definite and precise instructions respecting not only his reply to Abdul Rahman, but also his own movements. General Stewart in answer to Lord Lytton's inquiries had wired from Kabul: The force under my command is so strong that it can withdraw at any moment without serious risk. . . . A precipitate withdrawal would be impolitic, but it would not be attended with any dangerous risk, whether a friendly ruler has or has not been found.' Lord Lytton therefore considered that the instructions to General Stewart should express the desire of the Government that the evacuation of Kabul should be commenced at the earliest possible date which in the opinion of the General commanding in the field may be compatible with his military and political appreciation of the situation, for which he is responsible; that it should be carried out, not with precipitation (which must be the case if it is deferred till the last moment fixed by the Government of India, some months ago, for the complete retirement of our forces from Northern Afghanistan), but in a leisurely deliberate manner, and that every care should be taken to avoid all appearance of mystery or uncertainty in regard to the intentions of Government on this important point. Furthermore, that the evacuation of Kabul should be effected by the gradual, but early, and, if possible, immediately commenced retirement

last Minute.

of the army of Northern Afghanistan on the two Lord Lytton's commanding positions of Gundamuk and the Kurum headlands. In the meanwhile the situation in Northern Afghanistan will have greatly developed ; and during the intervening period our forces will hold military positions sufficiently commanding for their support of any political purpose which can possibly arise out of that situation.

'As regards the political instructions to General Stewart, I strongly disapprove of any ultimatum to Abdul Rahman, for an ultimatum implies terms and conditions; it is, in fact, the ordinary result of an abortive negotiation. But with Abdul Rahman we should carefully avoid all negotiation. I would instruct General Stewart to write briefly to the Sirdar in the following sense:

(a) That the Sirdar has misunderstood the object of the mission sent to him.

(b) That the Government of India does not desire to select or appoint any ruler for that portion of the Afghan provinces which it is about to unite.

(c) That in regard to any such selection it is willing to recognise the choice of the people concerned.

(d) That, though also willing to accept, and ready to reciprocate, the friendship of the ruler thus selected, it has been constrained to take steps for rendering the maintenance of its own interests practically independent of the friendship or hostility of any such ruler, experience having proved to it that no reliance can be placed upon treaty or other engagements with the Kabul Power; and all treaties concluded with the last legitimate

Lord Lytton's last Minute

and recognised rulers of Kabul having been dissolved by war.

(e) That the measures which have thus been
imposed on the Government of India, in
defence of its own interests, are-the per-
manent maintenance of the frontier positions
acquired by it under the Treaty of Gundamuk,
and which, without seeking to renew that
treaty, will certainly be retained as con-
quered territory; and also the permanent
severance of the whole province of Kandahar
from the Kabul Power.

(f) That these territorial arrangements are irrevo-
cable; that they have been made, and will
be maintained, without regard to the assent
or dissent of any Amir of Kabul; and that
any attempt on the part of such a ruler
to disturb them will involve him in open
enmity with the British Government.
(g) That the Government of India, having com-
pleted these arrangements, and beaten all its
enemies in Northern Afghanistan, is about to
evacuate the country.

(h) That our object in communicating with the
Sirdar was to give him timely information
of these decisions, in order that he might, in
his own interests, take such advantage of
them as appeared to him desirable.

(i) That we were induced to take that step, because he appeared to be one of the most capable and promising of the numerous candidates for the vacant throne.

(j) But that the Government of India is not concerned to espouse or oppose the personal cause of such candidates, so long as their