Minutes and Sandeman's November, 1875 6 From this time forward matters grew worse and worse. Outrage followed outrage, and no satisfaction could be obtained by the British Government.' A daring inroad was made by some Brahooe tribes on British territory; it remained unredressed. The Khan's subsidy was stopped and our agent withdrew from his Court, bringing with him the exminister Wullee Mahomed. Sir William Merewether then recommended an armed intervention in Khelat and deposition of the present Khan. This proposal was not looked upon with favour first mission, by the British Government, and it was decided to send Captain Sandeman into the Murree Hills for the settlement of some of our disputes with the tribes in that district. He started on November 22, 1875. Lord Lytton remarks that in reading through the official papers on the subject of our relations with Khelat he has often found cause to appreciate the wisdom of a maxim attributed to the King of Burmah. "There is to everything,' says His Majesty, 'a beginning, a middle, and an end. You should never go beyond the beginning until you are sure of the middle; when you get to the middle, you should never forget the beginning; and neither at the beginning nor the middle should you ever lose sight of the end.' 'It appears to me,' he adds, that in the middle of our relations with Khelat we have sometimes forgotten the beginning; at least between our policy at one time and our policy at another there seems to be a complete solution of continuity, and I greatly fear that at the present moment we are in some danger of being hurried, or beguiled, towards an end not clearly foreseen or deliberately desired.' The general results of Major Sandeman's first mission were, that after hearing the complaints of the Notes, 1876 chiefs he had ascertained from them that they would Minutes and welcome British mediation, and that they were willing to become peaceable subjects of the Khan on certain conditions, that moreover they had been induced to make a conditional submission to the Khan. Further, that the Khan himself was willing to submit to British mediation, and was prepared to submit his case directly to the Government. The Government of India, on receipt of Major Sandeman's report (of February 1876), decided in accordance with the advice given it by Colonel Munro and the Punjab Government, that it was worth while to take advantage of the opening thus offered and allow Major Sandeman to make another attempt at mediation; with the advantage, this time, of enlarged instructions and a recognised position. The instructions,' however, were again of a vague character, and, much to Lord Lytton's surprise, they were not conveyed in writing. man's second April 4 Major Sandeman started on this second mission Major Sandethree days before Lord Lytton himself landed in mission, India. The news was conveyed to Lord Lytton at Bombay, and entirely upset his original intentionapproved by the Government at home-of sending a confidential mission first of all to Khelat, and thence, after the satisfactory settlement of our relations with the Khan, to Kabul vid Kandahar. The character of Major Sandeman's mission was so much at variance with the principle which Lord Lytton desired to adopt as the basis of his foreign policy-viz. 'that of treating all frontier questions as parts of a whole question, and not as separate questions having no relation to each other'-that he telegraphed and wrote to Lord Northbrook on his way to Calcutta, urging him to suspend the mission of Major 6 H Minutes and Sandeman, who had not then entered Khelat territory,' until his assumption of office, which took place a few days later, in order that he might have an opportunity of reconsidering, and if necessary revising, Major Sandeman's instructions in connection with the views and plans' he had already formed with regard to his whole frontier policy, and of associating his mission, if possible, more directly with the attainment of the object he had in view. This suggestion, however, was not accepted by Lord Northbrook, who was ignorant of the grounds on which it had been urged, and Lord Lytton was forced, therefore, to recast the arrangements he had contemplated in a form, he thought, less favourable to their success. Major Sandeman in the meanwhile received at first answers both from the chiefs and from the Khan that were not encouraging. On June 5, however, he was able to telegraph that the Khan, after receiving the Viceroy's (Lord Northbrook's) letter, was willing to consent to the mediation of the British Government, that he had overcome his objections to leaving Khelat, and that he consented to meet his chiefs and Major Sandeman at Mastung. On June 16 Major Sandeman further telegraphed the terms of settlement proposed by the Khan and acceptable to the Sirdars. These terms as they were first drawn up did not meet with the Viceroy's approval. They were, he thought, too humiliating to the dignity of the Khan and too favourable to the rebellious chiefs. The effect of such a treaty would, he believed, greatly impede his negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan. Although it subsequently became inevitable to dissociate our policy in Beloochistan from that adopted towards Afghanistan, the Viceroy at this time was anxious not to deal with the one frontier State without carefully considering how his action would affect the other, and he felt that the importance of all frontier questions was enhanced by the struggle which might be pending between ourselves and Russia, on our side for the maintenance, on theirs for the acquisition, of imperial power and influence in the East. The Viceroy in a long letter to Major Sandeman indicated the objects which should be borne in mind in drafting the new Treaty with the Khan. 1. The maintenance of a commanding influence in Khelat. 2. The support of a strong and settled Government there. 3. The freedom and security of the Bolan Pass, 4. The pacification of Kutchee, and the speedy The Viceroy's military secretary, Colonel Colley, was dispatched to Major Sandeman with full powers to explain to that officer the views of the Government, and bearing letters from the Viceroy to Major Sandeman and the Khan. In this letter the Viceroy proposed to come himself to Jacobabad for the signature of the new Treaty, and invited the The Viceroy starts for Jacobabad Queen, Khan to follow him afterwards to Delhi on the occasion of the proclamation of the Queen as Empress. Colonel Colley reached Khelat on October 14, and on the 18th, at a grand Durbar, presented to the Khan the Viceroy's letter and invitation. The invitation was accepted, and the Khan at once made arrangements for meeting the Viceroy at the time and place appointed. Early in November the Viceroy, accompanied by Lady Lytton and suite, commenced his march from Simla towards the frontier. On November 15 he writes Letter to the from Camp Dalhousie to the Queen: I must now ask your Majesty's permission to say a few words on the subject of our frontier relations, which derive special importance from the present critical condition of the Eastern Question. To begin with Khelat. Through the territories of this State your Majesty's Indian Empire is most open to attack, either from the Russian army of the Caspian, or from Afghanistan if the Amir of Kabul were to enter into any alliance hostile to us. The assured co-operation or allegiance of this State in case of war is therefore essential to our means of defence or aggression. Six months ago Khelat was seething with civil war; the conduct of the Khan had been so unsatisfactory that we had broken off relations with His Highness, and no power remained in the State strong enough, or friendly enough, to control the predatory border tribes, who had rendered all the trade routes impassable, and were with impunity incessantly devastating our own territory and plundering our own subjects. Some of the most experienced political officers of your Majesty's Indian Government advised the Government to depose the Khan and take forcible possession |