224 (1812.), Lord Ellenborough held it unlawful for the public stages to stop in front of Charing Cross for three quarters of an hour while waiting for passengers between trips. In Montgomerry v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118, 21 So. 452 (1896.), it was decided that the proprietor of a hotel has no more right than any other person to block an adjacent street with a hack-stand. The only Pennsylvania case in point in the present discussion is City of Lancaster v. Reisner, 14 Lancaster Law Review, 193 (1897.), where it was held that a city had no power to sell any part of its streets, even in front of a railroad station, for use as a private cab-stand.

Except the above cases no authorities have been found on this question of the power of a municipality to authorize a cab-stand in front of a building against the wishes of the owner. From an examination of these cases and the few others which have reached the appellate courts we may conclude that the general rule is that a municipal corporation may make any reasonable regulations as to hacks and hack-stands it desires without regard to abutting owners. The following recent cases will serve to illustrate this rule: Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118 (1896.); Emporia v. Shaw, 51 Pacific, 237, 6 Kan. App. 208 (1897.); Lucas v. Herbert, 148 Ind. 64, 47 N. E. 146 (1897.). From this rule the principal case of Chicago v. the R. R. Co. marks no departure in theory. The majority of the Court evidently considered the establishment of this hack-stand a reasonable regulation.

DEPRIVATION OF ATTORNEY'S LIEN.-Burpee v. Townsend (Dec., 1899), 61 N. Y. Supple. 467. The question raised in this ca-e involved some points of law upon which the courts have not been unanimous. The questions are of frequent occurrence at the present day and of much importance. The action was brought by Edward B. Burpee against Gerard B. Townsend, and was settled later by the parties, nothing being paid in settlement. A motion was made by the attorney for the plaintiff for leave to prosecute the action in aid of his lien for costs, but it was denied. The Court said: "The parties had the right to settle the action and the attorney's lien was subject to such right. The law encourages such settlements and does not permit attorneys' liens to stand in the way of them. It is said, in some decisions, that where the parties collusively settle the action so as to defraud the attorney he will, on showing that tact and that the client is worthless, be permitted to prosecute the action to judgment, in order to establish his right against the opposite party under bis lien. This is rather fanciful at best, but no such case is here presented."

The authorities on the question of attorney's lien are more or less confused and unsettled. The lien of an attorney upon property of his client in his possession has been recognized from the earliest times and never questioned. It is the right of the attorney to retain possession of such property until his claim for compensation for professional services has been satisfied, and while some question has been made as to the correctness of the term 'lien,' as so applied,

the right to it has never been denied." (3 Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 447.) The term "lien," as has just been intimated, is inaccurately used in respect to an attorney's claim for professional services. His claim bears some of the earmarks of a lien, but it is in reality only a claim or right to ask the intervention of the court in his behalf when, having obtained judgment for his client, he finds there is a probability of being deprived of his costs. The so-called attorney's lien differs from other liens in so far as there is no right of sale vested in the attorney; he merely has the right to hold the client's property until professional charges are paid, or to deduct the amount when money of the client is in his possession and pay over the balance to the owner.

There are two distinct kinds of attorney's lien, viz.: a lien on judgment and one on money, papers or other similar property of the client. The distinction between the two has given rise to the terms "charging lien" and "retaining lien." While there is nothing in the names, a failure to distinguish between the two classes has caused much of the apparent confusion in the authorities on this subject. In the case under discussion it appears that the attorney had no property of the client in his hands, and he had not obtained judg ment in the cause. He had, however, incurred costs and rendered professional services to the plaintiff, and his contention was that he had an inchoate lien on the judgment which he hoped to gain against the defendant in the case. He wished to prosecute the action to judgment notwithstanding the amicable settlement by the parties. The court properly decided against his claim.

The policy of our law is to avoid litigation as much as possible, and the fact that an attorney loses his costs should not be allowed to interfere nor stand in the way of public policy. Moreover, much injustice might be done if the courts allowed the attorney's contention. Suppose a plaintiff in an action decides, after action brought, that his claim is worthless and settles with the defendant, each agreeing to defray half the costs of court. Here the defendant would be obliged to pay the plaintiff's attorney if he wished to avoid a useless suit. Such a doctrine would undoubtedly lead to useless litigation: 65 Howard Pr. [N. Y.] 307, (1883.), 88 Kentucky 105,(1889.).

It has been held that a settlement between the parties to an action, even after judgment has been signed, will not be set aside, even though the effect of such settlement be to deprive the attorney of his costs, provided there be no fraud or collusion on the part of the litigants. 11 Jur. 455, (1847.).

Where there are cross actions and the plaintiff in each has obtained judgment, it has been held competent for the parties to make a bona fide settlement of the matter between themselves, although the consequence of such settlement may be that the attorney for one party will lose his lien for services. 2 El. and El. 17, (1865.), 10 M. & W. 18, (1855.).

In so far as this case decides that an attorney can have no such interest in a case as will enable him to prevent the parties from reaching an amicable settlement, in the absence of fraud or collusion, it is certainly in accord with the better authorities.

BOK REVIEW.

JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, ANALYZED, etc. By Bay P. RICHARDSON, Esq, of the Wisconsin Bar. San Franciscu: The Maries Press. 1899.

The proceedings of that Convention which framed the wonderful instrument under which our law Eves and has its being must always have a special interest, act only for the legal profession, but for all who are interested in this great civil government of ours. New problems have arisen, new territories have been acquired, but the Conscitation has ever proved serviceable in solving the problems and governing our newly found ecicaies. Rightly interpreted, it will always be thus, for it was framed by men who seemed to have known their fe low men and the palios pay of history so truly that they acquired an insight into the future which may fairly be termed probetie.

When we first took up this admirable little work we feared that it would add a thing to the literature on the subject. But our fears proved groundless, for it is a most complete and well-arranged summary of the Convention's work. All the plans, the rough and revised drafts, and, best of all, the interpretation are well set forth. New and original ideas are constantly to the fore, and we can conclude no better than by printing the conclusion of the author himself. The words in parenthesis are our own: "To a British statesman (Gladstone) has been attributed the saying that 'As the British Constitution is the most subtile organism which has proceeded from progressive history, so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.' But it may be submitted (this idea is not strikingly original, but plainly presents a truth which must become clear to all of us upon a moment's reflection, but is not instantly patent,) that the American Constitution, instead of being struck off at a given time, was drawn from the British Constitution and from the first American Constitution (the Articles of Confederation) in substance and in form, and however the British Constitution may preserve the equilibrium of the governments of Great Britain, the Constitution of the United States of America was designed to preserve the great principle of self-government, general and local, joint and several, for the people of America."

J. M. D.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

[Acknowledgment will be made, under this title, of all books received, and reviews will be given, as near as possible, in the order of their receipt. Those, however, marked * will not be reviewed. Books should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief, Department of Law, University of Pennsylvania, S. W. Cor. Thirty-fourth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.]

COMMENTARIES on the LAW OF PRIVAte CorporaTIONS. Vol. VII. By SEYMOUR THOMPSON, LL.D. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1899.

GREENLEAF's Treatise ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. Vol. I. Edited by JOHN HENRY WIGMORE. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1899.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW Of Trusts anD TRUSTEES. By JULIUS Ware PERRY. Fifth Edition. Edited by JOHN M. GOULD. Two Volumes. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1899.

FORMS OF PLEADING. BY AUSTIN ABBOTT. Volume II.

Compiled by

CARLOS C. ALDEN. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1899.

THE LAW OF Presumptive EvidenCE. BY JOHN D. LAWSON. Second Edition. St. Louis: Central Law Journal Co.

1899.

CASES ON CODE PLEADING. By CHARLES M. HepburN. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson & Co. 1899.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: A PLEA For Children and OTHER HELPLESS SICK. BY WILLIAM A. PURRINGTON. New York: E. B. Treat & Co. 1900.

RAILWAY CO-OPERATION. BY CHARLES S. LANGSTROTH and WILSON STILZ. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1899.

By

JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, ANALYZED. HAMILTON P. RICHARDSON. San Francisco: The Murdock Press, 1899.

A TREATISe on the LAW OF WILLS. Two Volumes. By H. C. UNDERHILL. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Co. 1900.

*THE GROWTH AND RIGHTS of AggregaTED CAPITAL. BY JOHN R. D. DOS PASSOS.

*REPORT OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF KANSAS. Clay Center, Kan.: The Times. 1899.