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But the Russian descent on the peninsula of Liaotung did far more than accord her an ice free port and provide her with a naval base six hundred miles nearer to the sphere of British interests in the Far East. It placed her in a position to dominate the Chinese at Peking, and enabled her to obtain a control over celestial actions sufficient to make her mistress of the situation.

The restraint exhibited by this country in refraining from any protest against Russia's action is one of the most remarkable instances of misdirected policy to be found in the history of our foreign relations. The methods of Russia are so well known as to leave no room for doubt as to the uses to which she would put her newly acquired position. The extent of British trade with China and Japan rendered it a prime necessity that no steps should be spared in ensuring the freedom of that trade from foreign interference; and the cession of Port Arthur to Russia not only gave her the fullest opportunity for interfering with that trade, but further gave her an undue influence, which she was not likely to allow to remain unused, over the Chinese; which might be, and which has been, utilised to the detriment of this country in the Far East.

Yet England took no steps to meet the danger by which she was threatened, and she has since begun to reap the result of her weakness. The lack of protest on our part in this matter of Port Arthur did even more than encourage Russia in her opposition to our aims. It afforded China proof, of what she had previously only suspected, that England was afraid to traverse Russian pretensions, and the timidity displayed by her in 1898 dealt the first severe blow at her prestige in the estimation of that country in which her influence had been paramount for more than two hundred years.

Nor did Russia herself fail to profit by the example shown by England to the Powers. The readiness with which Lord Salisbury's government accepted the new order of things came as a surprise even to Russian diplomatists, who had formed their estimate of our

political ability on the failure of our policy on the Afghan frontier. The supineness of 1898 so far exceeded the incompetence of 1885-6, however, as to come as a revelation to the Muscovite agents, who had expected at least a series of protests, if not an appeal to arms, as the result of their temerity. But nothing of the sort occurred. Instead of insisting on the withdrawal of Russia, and demanding a reversion to the status quo, the British government not only accepted the situation, but, through the mouthpieces of its members in parliament, justified Russia's action and defended it. The manifestation was as welcome as it was unexpected; and Russia settled herself down to develop her newly acquired base, to fortify her latest stronghold, and to devise fresh inroads into British interests.

Thus in 1897-8 did Russia at a single bound attain a commanding situation on the Gulf of Pechili, from which she to-day views the situation in the Far East with a sense of dominant security and control. It must have afforded her intense amusement to have read the vaticination of Lord Salisbury, who sought to belittle the effect of Port Arthur on her power in Asia. Speaking at the Albert Hall on 4th May, 1898, the prime minister said

"I think Russia has made a great mistake in taking Port Arthur. I do not think it is any use to her whatever."

The diplomatic correspondence which took place at this period is instructive. The object of Russia was to obviate suspicion of her real purpose in the seizure of Port Arthur, while that of England was to obtain an undertaking from Russia, which would serve to allay the uneasiness of parliament as to Russia's intention of coercing China, and prevent the loss of votes among the electors in the event of a general election taking place. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg was accordingly instructed to obtain an undertaking from Russia as to her intentions in regard to Port Arthur.

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On the 16th March, 1898, Sir Nicholas O'Connor telegraphed to Lord Salisbury—

"At his weekly reception of the foreign representatives at the Ministry this afternoon, Count Mouravieff authorised me to inform her Majesty's government that, if the Yamen grant a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan to the Russian government, foreign trade shall have free access to both these ports similarly to the other ports in the Chinese empire."

And this telegram was followed by a despatch in which the undertaking given was renewed

"I have the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 13th instant, that Count Mouravieff informed me last night that he had seen the emperor in the morning, and that his Imperial Majesty had authorised him to give me the assurance that both Port Arthur and Talienwan would be opened to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports, in the event of the Russian government obtaining a lease of those places from the Chinese government. His Excellency further said that he had also repeated to his Imperial Majesty the remarks I had made to him in regard to the supreme importance attached by her Majesty's government to the maintenance of all rights and privileges secured to Great Britain by their existing treaties with China, and that his Imperial Majesty had told him to assure me that Russia would respect those rights, and that there was no intention to infringe them or to impair the sovereignty of China."

A week later (March 30th) Sir Nicholas O'Connor wrote—

"I saw Count Muravieff this afternoon, but refrained from touching on the affairs of China, except that I expressed surprise that in the telegram which he had sent on the 27th March to the Russian representatives abroad, his Excellency had only said that Talienwan would be open to foreign commerce, and had made no mention of Port Arthur; and I called his attention to the formal assurances on this subject which I had been authorised by him to communicate to her Majesty's government on the 16th instant. The minister informed me in reply that he adhered to the assurances he had given me, but that the moment was inopportune for publicly announcing them."

These assurances attained their object in satisfying the British government, despite the fact that had they been

acted on, the gain of the cession of Port Arthur would have been neutralised to Russia. They were duly reported to parliament, and swallowed by the bulk of the members; and the subsequent announcement that Port Arthur would "for the present" remain closed to other nations came as a surprise! The incident is only one of many in which the lack of scruple on the part of Russia has been aided by the simplicity of British statesmen in conducing to the attainment of her ends.

Shortly after the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, publicity was given to an agreement between that country and China, authorising the construction of a railway in variation of the original Siberian survey, across Manchuria, in such a direction as to unite the existing Siberian line near Nerchinsk with Vladivostok, with a branch connecting Port Arthur and the same at Kirin. The agreement bears the date 4th October, 1896, and was therefore signed shortly after the exclusion of Japan from the Liaotung peninsula. This fact affords unquestionable evidence as to Russian intentions, and the true motive of that country in objecting to the Japanese occupation.

The Manchurian railway agreement is in many respects a very remarkable document.1 It is framed on the lines of an ordinary commercial contract, and is drawn up between a society spoken of as the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Chinese government. It authorises the construction of railways across Manchuria to Vladivostok and Port Arthur, accords a preferential tariff on Russian goods imported into China as compared with those of other countries, and decrees that the shares in the undertaking can only be legally held by Russian and Chinese subjects. The agreement is in short a charter authorising the Russification of Manchuria; and by the reduction of one-third duty in favour of all Russian imports conveyed into China over the line, it creates a special facility for Russian trade, and places that country in open opposition to the policy of equality of opportunity

1 See Appendix B.

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known as the "open door," which has been adopted by Great Britain and the United States.

The increased influence attained by Russia on her occupation of Port Arthur was in no wise diminished by either the German activity in Shantung, or the leasing of Wei Hai Wei by Great Britain. This last adventure tended rather to lessen than to heighten British prestige in China, for the reason that it afforded further evidence of the country's inability to continue that policy of non-interference which had been so often voiced by her statesmen. From the Chinese standpoint, the occupation of Wei Hai Wei by England showed that, finding herself unable to stem the advance of Russia in China, she had resolved to imitate her example, and despoil the country for her own benefit. The effect of this reasoning on the celestials was very marked. British prestige sunk to a lower ebb than it had ever before attained, and the weakness of her policy was openly stated to be the natural corollary of her fear of the action of Russia.

When questioned respecting the leasing of Port Arthur to Russia the members of the Tsungli Yamen had been perfectly candid with the British minister at Peking. It would, they urged, cause them the greatest satisfaction to refuse Russia's request, but they felt unable to do so, for the reason that Russia was so infinitely more powerful than China that they could not effectively resist her forcible acquisition of that which had been demanded. If, however, England would afford them the necessary support to resist Russian designs on Chinese territory, they would gladly refuse the demand made, and refuse any further concessions she might seek.

England declined to take the proffered hint. Port Arthur was ceded to Russia. And when shortly after China sought to negotiate a loan and England offered to supply the money, the Tsungli Yamen declined the offer, on the score that to borrow of Great Britain might give offence to Russia, and expressed itself anxious not to provide that country with any pretext for making a hostile move on China.