CHAPTER VIII THE SITUATION Factors in the balance of power-Influence of force-Superiority THE political situation in the Far East is comprised in the relations between the two sets of Powers: the one moribund, lacking in energy, and conservative; and the other able, active, and ambitious. The balance between these is further complicated by the circumstance that the dominant factors, consisting of the capable and aggressive forces, are divided among themselves as to their aims and methods; and any arrangement as to a united course of action is impossible. The controlling principle in this, as in all other political questions, is that of force. But, here again, the situation is ill defined, inasmuch as the capacity for selfassertion is so evenly distributed as to render the result of an appeal to arms an open question. Any attempt to gauge the relative strength of the Powers in the Far East must be guided as much by the consideration of SUPERIORITY OF GREAT BRITAIN 151 opportunity as by that of force. For purposes of active interference in Eastern Asia, the advantage remains not with the nation which is the strongest, but with that which has the greatest available strength on the spot, and although the subsequent arrival of an army, or a fleet, may considerably modify the status quo, the gain derivable from early, immediate, and prompt action must remain evident. Any comparisons between the European Powers possessing interests in the Far East must result in the recognition of the ultimate superiority of Great Britain alike in strength and resources. No probable combination of the navies of the world would be superior to that of this country; and the wealth possessed by us is so inexhaustible as to ensure our being able to hold out long after the time when any other Power's resources would be exhausted. But a review of the handling of our power in the Far East during recent years leads to the conclusion that we have by no means made the best use either of our influence or our opportunities; and alike by the exhibition of a weakness in policy, and a lack of determination in action, we have allowed that influence which should be ours by right to revert to other hands. It is only necessary to glance at our spheres of influence in the Far East, and contrast them with those of other Powers, to arrive at an appreciation of this fact. Our defences are deficient, often antiquated, and in some cases entirely lacking; while every Russian, French and German station bristles with powerful guns, sheltered behind earthworks of the most modern kind. The reply given to these strictures is generally an appeal to the strength of the British fleet, which, it is urged, would deal with any enemy before she approaches our territory; but in order to do this it is necessary to have a superior fleet on the spot to that maintained by any other Power; and it is open to question whether we have this. A strong squadron in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean would avail us little in the event of an attack on Hong Kong; and the loss of time involved in sum moning reinforcements to our aid would probably prove a very powerful factor in the result of hostilities. For effective purposes Japan is probably the greatest Power in the Far East. Not only has she a very powerful and modern navy, but, being on the spot, her resources are all at hand, and in the event of war she would not have to maintain a line of communications extending over thousands of miles. In a less degree Russia may be said to be in the same case. With the facilities afforded by the naval harbours of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, she possesses a main base on the Pacific which would materially help her cause in any struggle in that ocean ; and when her system of railways are completed, say in five years' time, her strength will be very much greater than it is now. Great Britain has always grudged the outlay necessary to thoroughly equip her for contingencies; and at the present moment she does not posesss a dock in the Far East capable of receiving her largest vessels. The shortsightedness of this parsimony will be made evident when she finds herself at war in the Pacific, and hard things will be said by patriotic Englishmen who are too busy over other matters to attend to details of preparation now. While England's power in the Far East is thus kept at * a strength insufficient for the adequate protection of her interests, Russia maintains an active force in Eastern waters out of all proportion to the area she has to guard. As already stated, the total Russian trade with China is a negligible quantity. Excepting at Hankow, where a small colony is endeavouring to develop a trade with Moscow and Siberia, Russian interests lie exclusively to the north of Shantung. The whole of the coast line from the estuary of the Amur to Port Arthur, including the Korean seaboard, is under 1,800 miles, and her bases of Vladivostok and Port Arthur are both attainable by land. Great Britain possesses interests in every open port from Newchang to Pakhoi, along a coast line of more than 3,000 miles, besides having to protect her commerce at inland markets, involving the patrolling of some 1,500 miles of |