owns interests in alignment with those of Japan, and which failing England, will as likely as not be one day approached with a view to the formation of that alliance for the protection of joint interests which this country does not appear disposed to conclude. For her deliberation at the ' beginning of the present crisis in China, Japan cannot be reasonably blamed. After her experience in 1895, it is only reasonable that she should hold out for some guarantee that after pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the Powers, she should not be dismissed without the opportunity of achieving any return, and the deliberation she displayed in despatching troops for the quelling of the "Boxer" rebellion can only tend to gain her the respect of other nations.

The great problem in the future of Japan is her ability to obtain the extended territory she needs for the colonisation of her surplus population. The simplest remedy for her present position would without question be the acquisition of Korea, a course which should not give rise to any great trouble on the part of the Koreans. Russia would, however, undoubtedly protest against such a course, and, unless satisfied as to her own ability to absorb Northern China, she would most probably take the risk of war rather than forgo her own ambitions in that quarter. And it is further probable that other Powers would take exception to the presence of Japan on the continent of Asia, for fear that, by means of her growing armaments and resources, she might utilise her position as a base from which to spread herself over the Pacific border.

Often as the possibility of a Chinese overrunning of Asia has been discussed, I cannot call to mind any consideration of the possibility of a similar descent by Japan. And yet the Japanese possess attributes far more like those of a conquering race than do the celestials.

The

probability of such an event, so long at least as Russia retains her power is not great, but it is possible, and its outcome might be fraught with serious consequences to the prosperity of the world.

METHOD IN WAR

189

For the present, however, Japan's hands are full. With the future of Korea to watch, with Russia to checkmate, and with a disunited China to contend with, Japan is not likely for very many years to set out on a scheme of farreaching conquest; and the interest for the moment centres rather in the question whether or no Japan has reached a stage at which it is justifiable to regard her as one of the Powers, rather than as a nebulous oriental empire.

In one respect Japan evokes the sympathy of the observer. It seems as though she was destined to be misunderstood. Her action in regard to the sinking of the Kowshing in 1894, her massacre of the Chinese at Port Arthur shortly after, and her recent hesitation in despatching troops to Peking, have been seized upon as examples of the survival of her barbaric instincts. It seems to me that such criticism is manifestly unjust. The sinking of the Kowshing was a mere act of war, bereft of that misplaced humanitarianism which prolongs our own struggles with our enemies, and, by the restraint it places on the action of our forces, lessens their capacity for subduing the enemy, and in the end entails far greater suffering and loss of life than would be necessitated by the prompt adoption of severe measures. This has been especially noticeable in the South African campaign, where the exhibition of a firm hand, and the prompt shooting of all rebels caught looting or destroying property, would have saved hundreds of lives, and prevented the destruction of a vast amount of property. The loss of life in the China-Japanese war was, notwithstanding the massacre at Port Arthur, and the large number of troops engaged in Korea, very much smaller than would have been the case had the campaign been conducted on British principles. In such a case the war would have been indefinitely prolonged, and the loss of life infinitely greater. The best and certainly the most humane course to follow in a repressive war is to strike hard, and seek at one blow to implant such a moral lesson on the enemy as will impress him with the futility

of further resistance. In the case of the existing trouble in China, this principle might be followed with advantage. To defeat the rebels in Pechili and enter into negotiations for the constitution of a fresh government may restore peace and order for a time but future outbreaks are certain to occur, and a final understanding of the superiority of the foreigner will only be implanted in the celestials after some years of increased intercourse. The employment of drastic measures in dealing with the present crisis would, on the other hand, serve to demonstrate the hopelessness of opposing foreign intercourse. The destruction of Peking, and laying waste of the various palaces which form an appanage of that capital, would serve for all time as a lesson to the Chinese, and such a course would end for ever opposition to Western intercourse with the country. It was this principle which the Japanese followed in 1894-1895; and the result fully justified the course adopted.

The future of Japan is a problem which cannot be solved until that country again makes an appeal to the god of war. The irreconcilability of her interests with those of Russia render it impossible for her to arive at an amicable understanding with that country likely to settle the differences between them. There is not room for two first-class Powers in the sea of Japan; and it remains to be seen whether the Northern Colossus or the Britain of the East is destined to dominate the situation. The time is scarcely ripe for the struggle, for neither of the combatants is as yet prepared. But the contest is one which must come, and ere long; and the result can scarcely remain in doubt. Of the future destiny of Japan to rule the Eastern seas there can be no two opinions. The struggle will not be between two nations alike keen on obtaining a victory. It will rest between one united nation, keen, patriotic and resolved to venture its last drop of blood in the contest; and an overwhelming officialism, lacking all finer qualities than persistency, and a greed for expansion at the expense of its neighbours. Every Japanese is a patriot at heart.

WHY RUSSIANS FIGHT

191

Your Russian fights, not for his country, but because he cannot help himself. He fights well, but he lacks that inspiriting incentive which renders nations like Japan, the United States, and our own, indomitable foes, whose onslaught will brook no repulse, whose destiny is victory, and whose mission the repression of brute force, in the interests of peace, civilisation and humanity.

CHAPTER X

THE DUTY OF BRITAIN

The failure of British policy in the Far East-Evidence thereof— Authorities quoted-Governmental vacillation and the " open door" -Growth of anti-foreign feeling in China-Its causes- -Neglect of precautions-The only course of action-Polic, of Great BritainProspects of an understanding among the Powers-Superiority of Russian diplomacy-Necessity for strong action-The stupid party -Neglect of Asiatic peoples-Missionaries-Necessity for a strong minister at Peking-Interests of the Powers-Russian aggressiveness-Impossibility of an understanding-Russian treatment of Asiatics Necessary steps to restore British influence-Spheres of influence-England's policy.

AN unprejudiced survey of the relations which have existed between Great Britain and the countries of the Far East results in the exposure of a record not altogether creditable to this country. The action of England in regard to China has indeed been such as to provide amusement rather than edification, in regard to its lack of purpose and exhibition of incapacity; and while successive governments have meddled and muddled in the policy they have followed in their dealings with the celestial empire, Lord Salisbury and his colleagues have achieved a record which in sheer infatuation leaves the follies of their predecessors far behind.

Scathing as the conclusion drawn may be regarded, its justice is open to demonstration beyond question. And excuse for it is the less easy, for the reason that the interests and the aims of this country in the Far East have alike been such as to warrant the adoption of a strong and consistent policy which might with advantage