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have been persisted in, as much in the interests of the world at large as in those of the British Empire. The history of our relations with China constitutes a record of incapacity and wasted opportunity. Consistency in our aims has been repeatedly lacking. We have invariably hesitated to act in time of need, and when we have done anything at all, we have generally done the wrong thing. From the departure of Lord Macartney's mission from Peking in 1793 to the coup d'état of 1900, England has ever hesitated as to the course she should pursue for the protection of her interests in China, and her continued vacillations have not only endangered her position in the Far East, but have seriously lowered her prestige throughout the whole of Asia.

The earliest relations between this country and China were upon the whole favourable to ourselves. Lord Macartney was well received by Keen Lung, and the attitude of that potentate encouraged the despatch of the second embassy under Lord Amherst in 1816. There is little doubt but that the airs assumed by that nobleman on the occasion of his visit to Peking were largely responsible for his failure to obtain an audience of Kiaking, who, prompted by the mandarins, desired to humble the pride of the arrogant British envoy. Similarly the attitude of Lord Napier on his assumption of the part of superintendent of British trade, was responsible for the antagonism of the viceroy of Kwantung and the serious trouble which led to the outbreak of the war of 1839. Captain Elliot, on the occasion of his first visit to the Peiho, for the purpose of enforcing the undertakings of the Chinese, allowed himself to be persuaded to return to Canton without having effected his purpose, and thereby surrendered the strong position he had taken up, and enabled the Chinese to triumph over the English in the attempt to assert themselves in China. When our forces ultimately triumphed over the celestials and we held China at our mercy, the treaty of Nanking, under which a modus vivendi was arranged, proved utterly unsuited to the necessities of the occasion, and its terms were such

as would have been accepted by no other Power under similar circumstances.

The outbreak of disturbances and the attacks on foreigners, which broke out shortly after the conclusion of the first treaty, were suffered to continue unchecked for a considerable time. Consular officials were assaulted with impunity; Englishmen were stoned and insulted; and the British consulate at Foochow was attacked in open daylight. Governor Davis, finding remonstrances unavailing, determined to employ strong measures, and proceeded to obtain reparation for these insults. He was promptly snubbed by Lord Aberdeen for his pains! His proclamations were withdrawn; and the Chinese, strengthened in their contempt for the barbarians, rose against the English, many of whom were murdered in cold blood. Consul Alcock, who realised the character of the people he had to deal with, thereupon took matters into his own hands. He blockaded Canton, and impounded the grain junks lying in the river, pending the handing over of the malefactors by the Chinese. This action brought the celestials to their senses. It began to dawn upon them that the foreigners were less weak than they supposed. But the news of the consul's action had no sooner reached Hong Kong, than Mr. Bonham, the British plenipotentiary, sent peremptory instructions for the discontinuance of repressive action; and Mr. Alcock was forbidden ever to employ such measures without the previous instructions of the home government! And when, shortly after, Sir John Bowring insisted on the opening of Canton to British trade, he was sternly rebuked by that most incompetent of foreign secretaries, Lord Malmesbury.

The treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858, was a decided advance on that of 1842, but its most important provisions have not been carried out to the present day. The lives of Europeans continued to be unsafe in China, and despite the accordance of the right to travel and reside in the empire, it was absolutely unsafe for any Englishman to venture outside the limits of the treaty ports. On the condition of affairs being brought within

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the knowledge of Lord Elgin, that enlightened diplomatist ordered that, for the protection of life, no British subject should be permitted to go beyond the walls, thus playing into the hands of the Chinese rabble, and showing the incapacity of the British to assert themselves.

The treaty of Tientsin was agreed to by the Chinese with the object of bringing the war to a close, and without the slightest intention of abiding by its provisions. Having obtained the signature of this treaty, Lord Elgin returned to Canton, without taking any steps to obtain audience of the Emperor Hienfung, and thus sacrificed an opportunity which, had it been utilised, might have had important results. Neither did he leave a force to occupy Tientsin as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. In consequence of these omissions, the whole procedure had to be gone through a second time, when Mr. Frederick Bruce was repulsed from the mouth of the Peiho on his way to Peking, with the object of exchanging ratifications of the treaty as set out in its terms.

After the operations which were thus necessitated, the allied French and English forces penetrated to Peking. But no attempt was made to interview its ruler; and after destroying one of the lesser palaces, the forces withdrew, without having effected anything beyond the addition of a subsidiary protocol to the original terms of the treaty.

The regard in which the British were held by the Chinese at this period is shown by the constant recurrence of attacks on missionaries, whose presence in the country was especially authorised by the treaty of Tientsin. Murders were frequent, and owing to the lack of energy and strength of purpose shown by the English, the murderers, were rarely brought to justice. The assassination of Augustus Margary, a British consular official, travelling with a special pass granted by the Chinese authorities in 1875, was permitted to remain unpunished for over eighteen months, and the compensation extorted from the Chinese by the convention of Chifu was ludicrously insufficient to meet the requirements of the case.

A further example of the policy pursued by this country in regard to China is afforded by the brutal murder of Mr. Fleming, who was done to death on 4th November, 1898, which has not evoked any action on the part of the government up to the present moment.

The failure of this country to take any steps in the matter of the cession of the Liaotung peninsula to Japan, the toleration shown by us of Russian aggressions in North China, our aquiescence in Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and the tacit acceptation of the indefensible Manchurian railway agreement, have all tended, not only to tie our hands and prejudice our interests in the Far East, but to further damage our prestige in the eyes alike of Russia, China and Japan. We stand at present discredited in Eastern Asia, our weakness explained as due to our inability to counteract the action of Russia, and our power to assert ourselves has come, thanks to the repeated vacillations of our government, to be regarded as a negligible quantity. Repeated opportunities for the protection of our interests and the assertion of our strength have been neglected, and our action in regard to recent developments in the Far East has been characterised by a lack of intelligence and want of foresight rarely equalled.

Over and above the impotence displayed by the government in its Asiatic policy, its members seem to have become infected with a terror of Russia almost humorous in its manifestations. Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, Mr. Brodrick, Mr. Wyndham, practically every member of the administration, appear to be consumed by a desire to refrain from thwarting Russia, so strong, as to tempt them not only to acquiesce in her every move, but to gratuitously justify each succeeding breach of treaties or understandings attempted by that Power. They all appear to have adopted the part of apologist for Russian action; and each fresh departure on the part of that aggressive Power has been followed by an apologia in the British Parliament.

On 8th February, 1898, Lord Curzon, at that time

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under seeretary for foreign affairs, said in the House of Commons

"Up to now Russia has done nothing in respect of Port Arthur which she has not been perfectly entitled under treaty rights to do. Russia has sent ships of war to Port Arthur; and if blame is to be attached to her for so doing, her Majesty's government must be included in the accusation, for a fortnight ago we did exactly the same thing. The right to send ships of war to Port Arthur is a right which we enjoy together with other Powers under the treaty of Tientsin, and, when occasion arises, we shall do it again."

At the time that this statement was made, Russia was busy fortifying the harbour of Port Arthur, and the demand made by her for the withdrawal of our ships from that place was immediately acceded to by the British government. A few short weeks after the above announcement the formal lease for the cession of Port Arthur was signed, in which occurs the following passage

"The governments of the two countries agree that as Port Arthur is solely a naval port, only Russian and Chinese vessels are to be allowed to use it, and it is to be considered as closed as far as the war and merchant vessels of other nations are concerned." 1

The speed with which at this period one Russian undertaking was broken after another served to draw public attention to the weakness of the government; and a debate was held in both houses on the subject of our interests in China, in the course of which Lord Salisbury uttered these words

"Not only have we not surrendered one iota of our treaty rights, but we have no intention of surrendering them. . . . and I will say there is no effort which this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be destroyed."

Brave words these! Like many others uttered by politicians on the government side of the house, they were relegated to the limbo of forgetfulness as soon as they had served their purpose. Nothing has been done, of any

1 See Appendix B.