would naturally become more urgent in his advances towards Russia. But the war now raging between that Power and the great Mahomedan Empire of the West will render it extremely difficult for his Highness to receive open support from the Russian Government, or enter into closer relations with the Russian authorities, in face of the religious fanaticism which the Ameer himself has done his utmost to inflame throughout Afghanistan. Meanwhile, his endeavours to organise a general jehad against the British Government appear to have completely failed.

38. The motive of this abortive attempt was not, in our opinion, a religious, but a purely political one, easily explained by the history of the Ameer's relations with the British Government during the last four years. So long as Shere Ali cherished the hope of obtaining eventually from us a personal and dynastic support, he was willing to associate his interests with our own, and even anxious for the protection of the British Government. When, however, the discouraged hope of such support with each succeeding year grew feebler, he appears to have turned his attention to such sources of strength as might, in case of need, be derived from the fanaticism of the Mahomedan populations occupying the wild tract still left between the British and the Russian outposts. For some years his influence, so far as we can judge, has been passively opposed to our own over the border tribes, and at last the apparent determination of the British Government to bring its ambiguous relations with his Highness to a definite issue, coinciding with the critical and sinister situation of the whole Eastern question, doubtless induced the Ameer to believe that the decisive moment, to which he had long been looking forward as ultimately inevitable, was then imminent. Under this impression, he attempted to place himself at once at the head of an armed movement, fanatical on the part of his dupes, but purely political so far as he himself was concerned in it. The attempt however failed. The Akhoond of Swat mistrusted the designs of the Ameer even more than he disliked the neighbourhood of the British. Old, wary, and with nothing to gain by the sword, this spiritual Potentate temporised with the secular ruler who had raised an inconvenient religious cry; but, when it came to the point, he refused to identify himself with it. The Ameer's subjects responded coldly to his call, and the neighbouring Chiefs, to whom he had appealed, availed themselves only of the favourable opportunity.

to extract money from him. So completely had the whole movement collapsed before we closed the conference at Peshawur that the first step taken by the Ameer, immediately after that event, was to send messages to the authorities and population of Candahar, informing them that the jehad project was abandoned, requesting them to do all in their power to allay the religious excitement he had till then been endeavouring to arouse, and adding that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory.

Our

39. If those relations are not as satisfactory as Shere Ali would have them supposed, we have at least every reason to believe that they involve no feelings of irritation against us which are not entirely confined to his Highness. relations with the people of Afghanistan are as friendly as they have ever been. At Candahar, where recent events in Beloochistan have brought us into contact with Afghanistan from a new side, we have every evidence of the amicable feeling of the population, and their disposition to look to us as protectors rather than as enemies. From Sibi the Chiefs and Headmen, subjects of the Ameer, recently waited on the British Agent in Khelat for the purpose of inviting his mediation in their domestic and intertribal quarrels, and his protection from their neighbours, the Murrees. Elsewhere the British officers lately at Thull, on a mission of inspection, were received by the Ameer's people beyond the border, and invited inside their frontier posts with every demonstration of cordiality and confidence. On the other hand, all our reports from Afghanistan concur in representing the Ameer's subjects as generally disaffected, on account of the heavy military burdens recently imposed on them; his army in arrears of pay, and portions of it mutinous; his treasury nearly exhausted, and his personal position precarious.

In the

40. The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with his Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes

or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to you Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour.

41. In closing this unavoidably long report upon the cause, the course, and the result of the Peshawur conference, we desire to express our entire satisfaction with the manner in which that conference was conducted by Sir Lewis Pelly. We are of opinion that, in the skilful discharge of a very delicate task, Sir Lewis has upheld with marked ability the dignity of our Government and the interests of this Empire. That opinion will, we trust, be fully shared by your Lordship, after perusal of the papers annexed to our present despatch.

There are, as we conceive, many inaccuracies in this despatch, the more material of which we will proceed to observe on.

Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 seem to give a very incorrect account of the treaties. It has been shown above (pp. 2, 3) that the Treaty of 1855 was not 'the only formal obligation still extant.' The Treaty of 1857 remained in force at least till the Peshawur conference, when, if one of the parties could annul it, it may possibly be said to have been annulled by Lord Lytton. But that was an act of violence. That treaty was not observed 'tacitly,' or for mere convenience sake, but was openly insisted on by Lord Lawrence, whose action taken upon it continued till the Peshawur conference. The formal and solemn letters of previous Viceroys were also binding on us, though Lord Lytton denies it.

The reference to Lord Canning in paragraph 3 im

plies that he was in favour of the plan of European Residents, and such, it is believed, was his opinion until he had heard from experienced officers the reasons against it. Lord Canning was not above the teachings of experienced men, and he changed his opinion. Mr. Laing, who was a member of Lord Canning's Council, wrote a letter on the subject on November 4 last, which was published in the Daily News of November 5. He says that 'Lord Canning's policy entirely coincided with that which had been advocated by Lord Lawrence in his recent letters to the Times,' and adds: 'I recollect hearing Lord Canning explain fully the reasons which led him to prefer a Native to an English Resident at Cabul, even supposing that the Ameer did not object to receive one. They were, shortly, these: that the presence of an English Resident must necessarily tend to involve us in complications with Afghan affairs, which would inevitably lead us on to further interference, and end in our having to withdraw our Envoy, after having alienated the Afghans, or to establish a Protectorate supported by an army, a result which Lord Canning considered would be ruinous to the finances and most detrimental to the true political interests of our Indian Empire.' In the last paragraph of the despatch of the Government of India, dated January 28, 1876 (p. 155), they referred to the opinion of Lord Canning, and supported their reference in a marginal note by giving the date of the Minute, February 6, 1857, in which he expressed that opinion. The marginal note has been omitted from these papers. Lord Canning's words, in that Minute, were as follows:- It would be an object to convince that' (the Afghan) Government, and the people of Afghanistan, that they have nothing to fear from us unless when injury has been done to us, that we are ready to help them whenever they are attacked from without, just as we are now helping them, and that we have no desire to send a single Englishman, armed or unarmed, into their country, except with their own good-will.'

6

The assertion in paragraph 4, that the British

officers residing in Afghanistan in 1857 met with reasonable success, is directly contrary to the opinion expressed by the Government of India in their despatch of January 28, 1876 (sup., p. 84), which opinion was founded, not only on the experience of Major Todd in 1837, but on that of Colonel Lumsden in 1857. Lord Lawrence, in the House of Lords, on June 15, 1877, gave the following account of Colonel Lumsden's position at Candahar, in 1857:-The old Ameer, Dost Mahomed, received two British officers, and allowed them to go to Candahar, where they remained so long as they could do so with safety. But the elder of them, the present Sir Harry Lumsden, assured him (Lord Lawrence) that, owing to the espionage practised on him at Candahar, less information was obtainable there than could be got without difficulty at Peshawur;' and there is no man who knows so much of the history and position of that Mission as Lord Lawrence.

It is impossible to protest too strongly against the doctrine here propounded, that a solemn assurance given in a letter from a Viceroy of India to a neighbouring Ruler is of less force than a treaty. Such a doctrine is calculated to shake titles on which many Native Potentates rely, and to make them doubt our good faith.

Paragraph 8.-The 'conviction' here spoken of was only a doubtful opinion founded on a balance of evidence, that Shere Ali or his Minister expressed the readiness here mentioned; and it was coupled with a clear opinion that under the circumstances no importance could be attached to the point (vide sup., p. 61).

Paragraphs 11, 12, 15.-In the opening words of each of these paragraphs it is represented that the Simla conference was originated by Shere Ali, and that the avowed object of that conference was that he should ask for assistance against the Russians. How completely that representation is at variance with the facts has been shown above (sup., p. 41-43). It is extraordinary that so palpable an error, and one so easily corrected by reference to the contemporary documents, should be