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CHAPTER XIV.

SUMMARY.

AND now the die is cast. Our irresistible military force is put in motion to overrun Afghanistan, and the Ameer, protesting to the last that he has done us no wrong, and that he does not entertain any hostile feelings, and will not evince any hostility to us, but knowing that he is doomed, commits all his affairs to the merciful God, upon whose will and intention all matters depend. He alone suffices for us, and He is the best Vakeel.'

Those who have attentively followed this necessarily long exposition of the affairs treated of in the Afghanistan Papers will have had no difficulty in seeing that, while war was the almost certain consequence of the high-handed course resolved on in 1875 and pursued in 1876, the tactics have been twice suddenly changed. The rupture of March 30, 1877, as explained by the despatch of May 10, 1877, is totally inconsistent with the course taken during the preceding month. The Ultimatum and the declaration of war are totally inconsistent with the ground taken in the despatch of May 1877. In that despatch and the enclosed one of March 15, 1877, the British Government was represented as a model of dignity and moderation. We were hurt at the perversity of Shere Ali in rejecting the measures we designed for his good; but in our paramount strength we confidently awaited the development of Afghan politics. We assured the Afghans (sup., p. 125) that so long as they are not incited to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the

British Government no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited. We assured the Ameer (ibid.) that the British Government would scrupulously continue to respect his independence and authority throughout the territories up to that time recognised as in his lawful possession, and would duly abstain from interference so long as the Ameer on his part no less scrupulously abstained from interference with tribes or territories not his own. Alas! there comes a rumour of a Russian Embassy which touches us like the spear of Ithuriel. All the assumed confidence and dignity falls off in a moment, and we prepare for aggression. We make a demand beyond our existing rights—a demand which any man who could reason from antecedent events must have known would be refused-give notice that the refusal of it will be taken as an act of hostility, and on the refusal declare war. The Afghans have abstained from all aggression, yet British soldiers have entered their country uninvited, and are slaying its inhabitants and destroying their property, because they resist. The Ameer has not interfered with any tribes or territories not his own, yet we have overthrown his independence and authority by force. For all this violence the only formal plea put forward is, that the Ameer has had with another nation an intercourse from which they, and not he, had promised to abstain; an intercourse not invited by him, to all appearance reluctantly accepted by him, and from which, except by our own rashness, no evil consequences need result. The substantial plea, underlying our professions, and now openly advanced by the apologists who are always found for a warlike policy, is, that we have a right to provide against danger, by taking an innocent neighbour's land, and liberty, and life. To such melancholy inconsistencies all statesmen are liable who are really bent on ambitious ends, while they strive for a time to use the language of justice and moderation. But to those of our countrymen-we hope the greater part-who desire justice and peace, who wish

to keep oaths sworn to our neighbours, though it be to our own hindrance; who think that there are rules of right and wrong even between strong nations and weak ones; who believe that this world is so governed that the sins of nations as well of individuals find them out at last; to all such it is indeed a bitter humiliation that our statesmen should have led us into an unhallowed enterprise which no military success can purify. We do not here discuss the question whether our safety is increased in any appreciable degree by taking our neighbours' territory, though we firmly believe that by so doing we are not avoiding any danger, but are incurring great danger, and are wasting the resources of our Indian subjects in ruinous conquests. What we have endeavoured to point out is, that our Ministers have, against the best advice, embarked us on a policy at direct variance with that of their predecessors for many years; that they have forced it on in defiance of natural rights and of express treaties; that they have departed from truth in their words as well as from justice in their acts; and that, while plunging us into a war of ambition and aggression, they have with unexampled craft concealed what they were doing from the nation they serve.

PART II.

QUETTA.

QUETTA, otherwise called Shal-Kot, chief town of the province of Shal, now belonging to the dominions of the Khan of Khelat, is a fortified place containing about 1,200 houses, in N. lat. 30° 11', E. long. 66° 40′. Situated about 5,500 feet above the level of the sea, at the head of the Bolan Pass, Quetta commands the valley of Peshin and the road to Candahar, a large and important city, the original capital of the Durrani kingdom.

The provinces of Shal, Mastung, and Shorawak formed part of the Afghan State founded by Ahmed Shah Durrani. They were subsequently made over to the Khan of Khelat, in return for his allegiance and the maintenance of a contingent of troops for the service of the Afghan king. In 1839, when Shah Shuja was carried by a British army to the Throne of Cabul, it was considered an essential point in our policy to enforce the subordination of the Khan of Khelat to the Afghan sovereign. In the operations of that year the fortress of Khelat was stormed by a force under Sir Thomas Willshire; the Khan was killed in the assault, and his son, Meer Nusseer Khan, compelled by a treaty dated October 6, 1841, to give up the town of Quetta and the province of Shal to the Afghan kingdom, and to acknowledge himself and his descendants the vassals of the King of Cabul, in like manner as his ancestors were formerly the vassals of his Majesty's ancestors.' Two other tracts of country,' Kutchee and Mastung, 're

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sumed on the death of Meer Mihrab Khan,' were restored to Meer Nusseer Khan and his descendants, through the kindness of his Majesty Shah Shuja-ulMulk.

The Khan of Khelat also bound himself by this treaty not to hold any political communication with foreign Powers without the consent of the British Government and of his Majesty Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with the Governments of British India and of the Shah.'1

Subsequently to the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of the Ameer Dost Mahomed, the province of Shal and town of Quetta were again placed in possession of the Khan of Khelat, who, without any new engagement, subsided into the position of a feudatary and protected Prince under the Government of India. The above-mentioned treaty of 1841 was not, however, 'annulled' until the year 1854, when a new treaty was made between Meer Nusseer Khan and the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, in which the Khan of Khelat agreed to 'act in subordinate co-operation' with the British Government, and to allow British troops to occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities,' in any part of the territory of Khelat.' 2

Historically, ethnologically, and geographically the town of Quetta, with the provinces of Shal and Mastung, are included in Afghanistan. 'On entering the Bolan Pass you are in Khorassan '-i.e., Afghanistan.3

The provinces of Shal and Mastung, formerly subject to Cabul, contain a large Afghan population.'

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94

Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., of the Bengal Staff Corps, says that these districts,' Shal and Mastung, with Shorawak, 'are still considered by the Afghans as por

1 Treaties with Native States of India since 1834 (House of Commons, No. 341 of 1856), pp. 35, 36,

2 Treaties with Native States (341 of 1856), pp. 36, 37.

Hough's Operations of the Army of the Indus (Allen, 1841), p. 49. • Pottinger's Beloochistan (Longman, 1816), p. 316.

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