a distance from our own territories; to the financial outlay which any strategic advance beyond our own border, or even the formation of a Native Contingent, would certainly entail; and to the probable effects of such measures on the feelings and wishes of those classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India itself whom it is our object to attach to us by just and kind treatment, or, if necessary, to control by salutary awe. These considerations deserve fully as much attention as the gradual advance of Russia in Central Asia, and her military occupation of the cities and territories of Samarcand and Bokhara, on which many writers have been led too exclusively to dwell.

5. We venture to sum up the policy which is recommended or supported in various language and by various arguments in our Minutes, somewhat as follows:-We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract in that country beyond our own frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure would, under present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power either for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier, and met her half way in a difficult country, and possibly in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

6. Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then,

we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal Chiefs and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.

7. We think it necessary to dwell strongly on this part of the policy of the Government of India, because the subject has lately been revived in the public prints, and because some writers possibly imagine that a change in the Head of the administration may be a fit occasion for a change in our foreign or domestic policy.

8. It is not difficult for public writers, who are often wanting in detailed and accurate information, and who may write without a full sense of political or financial responsibility, to advocate or suggest measures which for a moment may delude or influence the public.

9. The following are the only fresh measures which we could bring ourselves to recommend :—We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. We are aware that this subject was pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote in the despatches from us, which were all reviewed by him in his letter of December 26, 1867, No. 15, but without any result. The subject however is of such paramount importance, that we think ourselves justified in again pressing it on Her Majesty's Government. The truth appears to us to be, that the advances of Russia, coupled with the constant

allusions made in the newspapers to her progress as compared with what is called the inaction of the British Government, have produced, in the minds of Europeans and Natives, what we believe to be an exaggerated opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good understanding between the two Powers, though difficult of attainment, would enable us to take means to counteract unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary alarms.

10. Then, we think that our relations with the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India; and that we should be empowered to give to any de facto Ruler of Cabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal offensive or defensive alliance. We have already authorised the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to give Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, and we shall further be prepared to supply him with some thousand stand of arms. We should be glad therefore, if a discretion were given us at once to act on any emergency on the above principles, without any special reference to Her Majesty's Government at home.

11. In the event of Ameer Shere Ali proving successful in the struggle now going on between him and his nephew, Sirdar Abdul Rahman, should his Highness desire to meet the Governor-General, we think it would be politic that his request should be complied with. If any such arrangement were inconvenient for the Governor-General, his place could be supplied by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The meeting might with most advantage take place at Peshawur, which is easier of access than more remote parts of the border, and where there is a large force to represent British power and influence. On this occasion the Ameer could explain fully his views, his hopes, and his desires, and thus place us in possession of a great deal of valuable information which it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in any other way. If, however, as is now very unlikely, Abdul Rahman Khan or any other chief prove victorious, we must wait and see whether he can consolidate his possession of the supreme power in the country.

12. With these remarks we would suggest further that opportunity be taken by Her Majesty's Government to lay down. a course of action which will avoid the perpetual recurrence to these exciting topics, and which will strengthen the hands of

those who have to conduct the affairs of India on the spot, by, as we hope, endorsing views which in the best interests of all parties we have carefully considered, and to which we respectfully and firmly adhere.

The weight of the names signed to this despatch is very great. It will be remembered that the Punjab is the province which borders on Afghanistan, and that its officers are responsible for the safety of that frontier. Lord Lawrence and Sir Richard Temple were veteran Punjab officers of the highest rank, and thoroughly knew Afghan politics. Sir William Mansfield, afterwards Lord Sandhurst, had, as Commander-in-Chief, the responsibility for the military defence of India, and besides that, was a soldier and statesman of the highest ability and accomplishments.

We have intimated above that the new policy of our Government was adopted without proper advice; and it will perhaps be well, while on the subject of opinions, to step out of the order of events for the purpose of showing how heavily the balance of opinion among skilled men, and men speaking under the responsibility of office in the localities affected, inclines against the policy of extending our Asiatic dominions to the westward.

Sir Henry Rawlinson served at Candahar, and marched through Afghanistan, during our first war, and doubtless acquired much knowledge of the country. He has since served in other parts of Asia, but when he wrote his Memorandum in the year 1868 he must have left India for a quarter of a century. Sir Bartle Frere, whose Memorandum is not in the Blue-book, but has been mentioned above, never had any connection with Afghanistan. Both these gentlemen became

members of the Secretary of State's Council, and Sir Bartle Frere was for about two years in Calcutta as a member of the Government of India. There is one other opinion given in the Blue-book-viz., that of Lord Napier of Magdala (vide A., p. 225). He is indeed a weighty authority on such a subject, not only on account of his great personal qualities and vast experience in Asiatic politics and warfare, but because during periods amounting to about sixteen years he held offices involving direct responsibility for the safety of India. He was Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, then Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, then Commander-in-Chief of India, with a seat in the Viceroy's Council. If during that time he had urged an advance, either political or military, direct or indirect, on the North-West Frontier, it would have been a very important circumstance. But this he did not do, because his opinion was then against an advance of any kind. On May 30, 1878, two years after quitting India, and in the crisis of our recent political struggle with the Russians, he wrote the opinion which is now very much relied upon by the advocates of the Forward Policy. And this opinion is favourable only to that advance to Quetta which was effected in the autumn of 1876, and which is the subject of a separate narrative in this volume. That, he says, is a thing which we were entitled by treaty to do; there was, he now thinks, sufficient reason for it; and, having done it, we ought not to recede from it. But of Afghanistan he says (vide A., p. 225) :-'I am not in any way an advocate for advancing into Afghanistan contrary to the wish of the Ameer Shere Ali, but we have a right by treaty to go to Quetta,' &c. And again (p. 226):—' Afghanistan is closed to us, but the one post of Quetta that we can hold by right of treaty should be made secure.' In both passages he justly draws the broadest distinction between what we have a right to do and what we have no right to do, and does not even discuss the expediency of the latter.