serious disturbances before long, in consequence of the irritation of the Ghilzai Sirdars. Even therefore if the Ameer's loyalty could be counted on for an indefinite period, a field would still be left for foreign intrigue, dangerous alike to the Ameer's power and to the interests of Great Britain.

8. The military operations lately undertaken by the Ameer, which appear to have been resolved upon before any information was communicated to your Governmeut, suggest that the contingency of collision between his forces and those of Russia or of the allies of Russia, must not be left out of account. Territorial boundaries in those countries are vague and illrecorded, and the Ameer has never shown any disposition to seek peace by abating a doubtful claim. He may think himself bound to assert supposed rights which may trench on the claims of Russia or of her allies; and steps may be taken which, in the judgment of the frontier commanders, may render a movement in advance necessary to the honour of Russia before your Government has had the opportunity of in-. terposing either remonstrance or restraint.

9. The chance that any of these opportunities would be offered for the establishment of a dominant Russian influence in Afghanistan would be materially diminished, if not wholly neutralised, by the presence of a British officer in that country. The evils to which I have referred would lose their formidable character if warnings could be given to your Government, or advice tendered to the Ameer, in good time. They could only grow to dangerous proportions if their first commencement were hidden from your knowledge.

10. I do not desire, by the observations which I have made, to convey to your Excellency the impression that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Government have any intention of violating the frontier of Afghanistan. The restraining force exercised from St. Petersburg may not have been altogether effectual in its results; and it may depend in the future upon fortunate circumstances, which an accident may terminate. Still, it is undoubtedly true that the recent advances in Central Asia have been rather forced upon the Government of St. Petersburg than originated by them, and that their efforts at present are sincerely directed to the prevention of any movement which may give just umbrage to the British Government. But the very fact that the measures of the frontier authorities do not always faithfully represent the ideas of the distant Government on whose behalf they act,

makes me more anxious that your Excellency should possess some channel of speedy and accurate information from the regions in which this dangerous policy is pursued. The case is quite conceivable, in which Her Majesty's Government may be able by early diplomatic action to arrest proceedings on the frontier which a few weeks, or even days, later will have passed beyond the power even of the Government of St. Petersburg to control.

11. On all these grounds Her Majesty's Government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan. I do not gather that your Excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur. If ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Ameer could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your Government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared. The Ameer has watched the steady progress of the Russian arms, scarcely impeded by such resistance as the Governments of his own -race and creed have been able to offer. He has warned the British Government that one advance would follow another, and his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true. If, in spite of all promises given, and confidence expressed to the contrary, the Russians should advance to Merv, the Ameer will conclude, until at least the contrary has been established, that no Power exists which is able to stay their progress. He will then be hardly induced to consent to an arrangement which may cause him to lose favour in the eyes of the neighbour whom he esteems to be the strongest.

12. I gather from your letter under reply, that the principal objection felt by you to an immediate effort to obtain the consent of the Ameer to a British Agency in Afghanistan is the fear that the effort would be vain. You apprehend that a refusal might lower the estimation of British power among the Afghans, and that England might be placed in an embarrassing position whenever it might hereafter be desirable to persuade the Russian Government of the existence of a real British influence at Cabul.

13. That a refusal would illustrate the feebleness of our influence with the Ameer cannot be doubted; but I apprehend little evil from this disclosure. It is not likely that either the Afghan Sirdars or the Russian Ministry are misinformed as to the true state of the case, or that any useful purpose would be served by keeping up, even if it were possible, an appearance of influence which does not correspond with the reality.

14. But I am not convinced that the Ameer's present disinclination indicates that his concurrence will be ultimately refused. He has had no opportunity of forming a more enlightened judgment. He has no assistance from any European mind in interpreting the events which have recently taken place in Central Asia. In judging of the probable course and the relative importance of the two European Powers upon whom the destiny of his country depends, he can only reason by his Asiatic experience and the counsels of a singularly prejudiced Durbar; and he is little able either to measure the gravity of the danger which threatens him, or to discern his best chance of safety. It is premature to abandon all hope of leading him to form a juster estimate of his position. Indian diplomatists, by superior intellect and force of character, have, in their intercourse with native Princes, often triumphed over more stubborn prejudices. The serious peril to which his independence is exposed, and the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions unless it can watch through the eyes of its own officers the course of events upon his frontiers, will, if these topics are enforced in personal intercourse by an Agent of competent ability, probably outweigh in the Ameer's mind any rancour surviving from the events of thirty-five years ago, or any dissatisfaction with the issue of the Seistan arbitration.

15. The first step therefore in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing will be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create. I have therefore to instruct you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul; and to press the reception of this Mission very earnestly upon the Ameer.

ཝ

The character you will give to it, and the amount of escort, if any, that it will require, I must leave entirely to your judg ment. The Envoy whom you may select will be instructed to confer with the Ameer personally upon the recent events in Central Asia; to assure him of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack; and, at the same time, to point out to him the extreme difficulty which will attend any effort on your part to ensure this end unless you are permitted to place your own officers upon the frontier to watch the course of events. In these communications he will not depart from the amicable tone in which your intercourse with the Ameer up to this time has been conducted. On the contrary, he will not forget that one of the chief objects of his Mission is to leave in the Ameer's mind an undoubting impression of the friendly feeling of Her Majesty's Government. But, maintaining this tone, it will be the Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Ameer the risk he would run if he should impede the course of action which the British Government think necessary for securing his independence.

16. I request that you will furnish me with an early report of the measures you have taken to carry out the instructions of this despatch. I have, &c.,

No. 34. No. 10 of 1876.

Government of India.-Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Fort William: January 28, 1876.

My Lord Marquis,-We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 34, dated November 19, 1875, in which, after reviewing our despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June last, and conveying to us the views of Her Majesty's Government on the important questions of policy discussed in that despatch and in previous correspondence, you instruct us, without any delay that we can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul, and to press the reception of the Mission very earnestly upon the Ameer; the object of the Mission being to

urge upon his Highness the desirability of stationing British officers upon the frontier of Afghanistan.

2. Before explaining the reasons which make it necessary for us to ask for further instructions on the subject of the proposed Mission, we desire to observe, with reference to the remarks contained in the earlier paragraphs of the despatch, that the views and opinions set forth in our despatch of the 7th of June appear to have been misapprehended in several important particulars.

3. In paragraph 2 it is stated that we appear to entertain no doubt as to the insufficiency of the information at present received from Afghanistan; that the diaries of our Agent in Cabul are bald and extremely scanty; and that it appears from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock that only such information as the Ameer approves of is contained in them. With reference to these remarks we would explain that in paragraphs 11 to 14 of our despatch of the 7th of June we stated our opinion that though there might be doubts as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given by our Agent at Cabul, the value of the information was not destroyed by such defects; that while the position of the Agent compelled him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government, we had no reason to believe that information of importance was withheld; that, on the contrary, the information supplied was fairly full and accurate, and that the diaries contained internal evidence that the intelligence reported in them was not submitted to the Ameer for his approval. The opinion which we then expressed was based upon our own experience, confirmed by the views entertained by Sir Henry Davies, Sir R. Pollock, Colonel Munro, and Nawab Foujdar Khan.

4. The information we have since obtained confirms us in these opinions. It is true that Sir R. Pollock, writing in July 1874, stated that he had at no time experienced greater difficulty in procuring reliable intelligence regarding Afghan affairs, but he now informs us that he has every reason to be satisfied with the fulness and accuracy of the intelligence at present furnished by our Agent; and a perusal of the recent diaries is sufficient in our opinion to establish the improbability of the statement (for which indeed we have never seen any evidence advanced) that the Agent withholds information in deference to the wishes of the Ameer. As a matter of fact, we are not aware that any event of importance, which it would