which has been pursued since 1869 in the consolidation of the Ameer's power and the establishment of a strong Government on our frontier. The Ameer's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs, and the difficulties of his position as described in our despatch1 of the 7th of June last, combined perhaps with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers. We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Ameer on a satisfactory footing; and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch. We have, &c., H. W. NORMAN. W. MUIR. E. C. BAYLEY. A. J. ARBUTHNOT. On these despatches it is to be observed that the despatch of Lord Salisbury is on the face of it imperfect, having the word 'Extract' attached to it. It may be that this imperfection affects the 15th paragraph, on which observations have been made by many persons. Taking the paragraph as it stands, it is impossible not to contrast unfavourably the tortuous course here enjoined with the manly and open one advised by the Government of India in the 7th paragraph of their reply, or to refrain from regret that measures aimed at nothing but to make the Ameer more dependent on the British Government, should be ushered in by professions of regard for his independence. 1 Paragraphs 24 to 26 and 33 to 36. CHAPTER VII. THE NEW FOLICY ENFORCED BY A NEW VICEROY. WITH the despatches last quoted the discussions between the Home Government and the Government of India came to an end, and action was taken on the new principles, which by easy, consistent, almost inevitable steps, have led to war. It should here be mentioned that in the early part of the year 1875 Sir Henry Rawlinson, being a member of the Secretary of State's Council, published a book which appeared to advocate a seizure of Candahar and Herat. We say 'appeared,' because Sir H. Rawlinson denies that he did actually recommend such a step. But the book certainly gave that impression both in England and India, and there were those who said at once that trouble would come of it. It cannot be doubted that a recommendation to seize Afghan territory, coming from an eminent member of the Secretary of State's Council, was calculated to alarm Shere Ali. At what time he learned about it is not certain, but Lord Salisbury tells us (A., p. 157) that it is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly translated for the information of the Ameer, and carefully studied by his Highness.' It is extremely improbable that the new portent should not have come under his eye by the year 1876, and his goodwill could not be enhanced by it. In the month of April 1876, Lord Northbrook quitted India, and Lord Lytton succeeded him as Viceroy. On February 20, 1876, before Lord Lytton quitted 4 England, Lord Salisbury furnished him with instructions (vide A., pp. 156–9), in which he directed the immediate execution of the plan of sending a temporary Mission to the Ameer, with the view of establishing a permanent European Mission in his dominions. This was done in the Secret Department, and the instructions are not given entire in the Blue-book, as appears by the word 'Extract' being appended to the document. So much as is given of it we subjoin :— Enclosure in No. 35. (Extract.) India Office: February 28, 1876. My Lord,-The tranquillity of the British power in India is so far dependent on its relations with the trans-frontier States, that Her Majesty's Government cannot view without anxiety the present unsatisfactory condition of those relations. The increasing weakness and uncertainty of British influence in Afghanistan constitutes a prospective peril to British interests; the deplorable interruption of it in Khelat inflicts upon them an immediate inconvenience by involving the cessation of all effective control over the turbulent and predatory habits of the Trans-Indus tribes. 2. In view of these considerations, Her Majesty's Government have commended to the consideration of the GovernorGeneral of India in Council, arrangements for promoting unity of purpose and consistency of conduct in the administration of the Sind frontier. They have also instructed the Viceroy to find an early occasion for sending to Cabul a temporary Mission, furnished with such instructions as may perhaps enable it to overcome the Ameer's apparent reluctance to the establishment of permanent British agencies in Afghanistan, by convincing his Highness that the Government of India is not coldly indifferent to the fears he has so frequently urged upon its attention; that it is willing to afford him material support in the defence of his territories from any actual and unprovoked external aggression, but that it cannot practically avert or provide for such a contingency without timely and unrestricted permission to place its own Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they may best watch the course of events. 3. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the present moment is favourable for the execution of this last-mentioned instruction. The Queen's assumption of the Imperial title in relation to Her Majesty's Indian subjects, feudataries, and allies will now for the first time conspicuously transfer to her Indian dominion, in form as well as in fact, the supreme authority of the Indian Empire. It will therefore be one of your earliest duties to notify to the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Khan of Khelat your assumption of the Viceregal office under these new conditions. 4. A special Mission, having for this purpose a twofold destination, might perhaps be advantageously despatched from Jacobabad, up the Bolan Pass, to Quetta, where the Khan could be invited to meet and receive it. After delivering your letter to the Khan, the Mission might proceed to Candahar, and thence, under an escort furnished by the Ameer, continue its journey to Cabul. From Cabul it would return to India, either through the Koorum Valley or the Khyber Pass, according to circumstances. 5. Her Majesty's Government however only suggest this plan to your consideration, with due reference to the circumstances of the moment as they arise. You may possibly find it advisable, on your arrival at Calcutta, to communicate indirectly with the Ameer through your Commissioner at Peshawur. This officer might privately inform Shere Ali of your intention to send a complimentary letter to him, as well as to the Khan of Khelat, and ascertain the route by which it would be most agreeable to his Highness that the Mission charged with the delivery of that letter should approach his capital. If the Ameer expresses any preference for the northern route, the Mission could proceed directly to Cabul by the Khyber Pass, returning to India through Candahar and Khelat. 6. To invite the confidence of the Ameer will be the primary purpose of your Agent. To secure that confidence must be the ultimate object of your Government. But to invite confidence is to authorise the frank utterance of hopes which it may be impossible to satisfy, and fears which it may be dangerous to confirm. Whether these hopes and fears be reasonable or the reverse, their open avowal is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, preferable to their concealment. 7. The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly Power has at all times been the object of British policy. The attainment of this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian arms in Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India. Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character of an Oriental chief whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of two great military Empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive, whilst the other apologises and continues to move forward. 8. It is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly translated for the information of the Ameer, and carefully studied by his Highness. Sentiments of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression through the English press, in language which, if taken by Shere Ali for a revelation of the mind of the English Government, must have long been accumulating in his mind impressions unfavourable to his confidence in British power. Whether the passivity of that power, in presence of a situation thus unofficially discussed with disquietude, be attributed by the Ameer to connivance with the political designs, or fear of the military force, of his Russian neighbours, the inference, although erroneous, is in either case prejudicial to our influence in Afghanistan. 9. The Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James has been officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are 1st. To secure that State against aggression.' 2nd. To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by giving such moral and material support to the Ameer, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable Her Majesty's Government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the Meers of the different provinces.' 10. Her Majesty's Government would not therefore view with indifference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British influence in Afghanistan; nor could the Ameer's reception of a British Agent (whatever be the official rank or function of that Agent) in any part of the dominions belonging to his Highness afford for his subsequent reception of a Russian Agent similarly accredited any pretext to which the |