est in the affairs and future of Cuba. When this movement began to assume definite proportions, and the petition was about to be presented by the Cubans to congress, the American refiners decided to take a hand, and they boldly made a demand upon the Cubans that they present a petition for free sugar, which was accompanied by the threat that if the Cubans refused the American refiners would defeat whatever aid they might ask for, and they declared they could do it.

With the encouragement of the secretary of war and Governor-General Wocd, the Cubans acquiesced in this demand and asked for the abolition of the duty on Cuban sugar, claiming that Cuban sugar planters would be ruined if that were not conceded at once. Thus the contest over Cuban sugar was between the friends of protection to American sugar and other industries on the one side, and the advocates of free sugar for Cuba, the secretary of war, the governor-general of Cuba and the American sugar trust on the other.

As the contest advanced, the free trade forces of the country lined up stronger and stronger behind Messrs. Root, Wood and Havemeyer for the free sugar policy. American sugar manufacturers and all who support them were traduced and abused as corruptionists and parasites, plunderers of the public treasury, and everything indeed but respectable promoters of. American enterprise. As the impossibility of free sugar became more and more apparent, the demand for tariff concessions was modified little by little until it was changed from free sugar to a 20 per cent. tariff reduction. In the meantime Root and Wood had practically become the administration on this subject, and the president, under their influence, finally took sides against the protectionist party. There was really no disagreement between the protectionists in congress and the president on the question of rendering generous aid to Cuba.

It was only a difference as to the mode of doing it. The protectionists wanted it done without tinkering with the tariff. They said to reduce the tariff would be to disturb the faith of the people in the stability of protection, and frighten capital away from the beet sugar industry, which would be disastrous to its development.

If the progress that industry has made during the last two years could continue for ten or a dozen years, we would produce three-quarters or more of our entire sugar supply. This would enable an immense new industry, employing American capital and labor, to produce at home what we have been paying one hundred millions a year for to foreign countries.

Nor was there any difference between the president and protectionists as to how much should be given for the relief of Cuban planters, but as a matter of principle and stable policy protectionists opposed changing the tariff schedule and suggested two or three other ways, prominent among which was a rebate. But Messrs. Root, Wood and Havemeyer insisted that the relief must come in the form of a reduced tariff, and thus the issue was made between protectionists and nonprotectionists on this question, and unfortunately Elihu Root and Governor General Wood gradually succeeded. in committing the administration and ultimately the president to this position.

And now we have the spectacle of the administration and the protectionist element of the republican party arrayed against each other in congress. That of itself is unfortunate because it puts the president in the position of failing to lead his party. If the 20 per cent. reduction bill fails to pass, as it probably will, then the administration is in the position of being in a minority. Under the English system of government that would require the resignation of the ministry and the formation of a new cabinet, because it practically amounts to

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a vote of want of confidence in the administration by congress.

All this is unfortunate in many respects; first, because it lends encouragement to tariff agitators, whose influence is inevitably to disturb business and check the national prosperity. It is unfortunate because it is a great disappointment to the friends of clean, wholesome politics throughout the country, who hoped and expected so much from Mr. Roosevelt's uninistration. It is unfortunate because it has already greatly disturbed the confidence in the continued protection to the sugar industry, and will prevent millions of capital going into domestic sugar production, thereby inflicting an industrial injury upon several states in the union. But it is specially unfortunate in that it has developed a new form of improper political methods.

In order to accomplish their ends Mr. Root and Governor Wood have used the funds in the public treasury for political campaign purposes. Never before in the history of this country have the cabinet officers of the nation used public funds for political party propaganda. This may not be technically criminal, as Messrs. Root and Wood had arbitrary authority, but it is as dishonorable and as contrary to the letter and spirit of clean administration and democratic government as it would be if Secretary Shaw were to spend the money in the United States treasury to secure Mr. Roosevelt's renomination and election.

It now appears that Mr. Root carried this principle of imperialism still further, and spent public money to influence the election of a president in Cuba by paying large sums to General Gomez for his political influence, and we are told that Mr. Root sustained Governor Wood in all this use of public funds for party purposes by the statement that it was for the good of Cuba.

When Pitt bought the Irish parliament, to pass the

act of union, it was for the good of the kingdom. On the same principle, when the czar sends the advocates of personal freedom or constitutional government to Siberia it is for the good of the empire. As well might Secretary Carlisle have contributed a million to the campaign fund for the re-election of Cleveland, for the good of the republic.

All this is very bad business; it is in violation of every principle of high, honest administration; it is the worst form of the doctrine that the end justifies the means. Of course, it is not supposed that President Roosevelt authorized either Wood's misuse of the public funds for political purposes in this tariff war, or his purchase of General Gomez's political influence in Cuba; but the facts remain. It is for the president to say whether he will stand for that, and for the methods such acts represent, or will do the only other thing left, ask Mr. Root to resign.

COAL STRIKE AND THE PUBLIC

It is a great mistake for either party to the present coal strike to assume that the dispute is altogether a private affair. To be sure, it is a disagreement between miners and mine owners over the wages and conditions that one shall give and the other receive. But the public is seriously affected by their conduct. Besides materially interfering with public business, and abnormally raising the price of fuel, the present strike is creating great public inconvenience and injury to property by compelling the use of soft in place of hard coal.

In large cities this amounts to a disfiguration of buildings and a filthiness that reduces cities like New York to the smoky and besmeared level of London, Sheffield and Pittsburg. It is needless to say that such a condition ought not and cannot be permitted to continue. A way will be found to protect the public interest in matters of trade dispute just as in all other matters, by one method or another.

One of two things is sure, sooner or later, to come. Either the people through the government will take a hand in adjusting labor disputes, or employers and laborers must find an amicable and rational method of adjusting economic differences so as to avoid unreasonable and unnecessary disturbances of business and public convenience. If the government has to step in and more or less arbitrarily decide matters of controversy between laborers and employers, it will only be a little while before the next step will be demanded: namely, that the government own and control the industries, and in the case of the railroads this would not be difficult to accomplish.

This idea is already showing itself in a hundred forms. Almost every effort at industrial reform has more or less of this socialistic element in it. Of course,