(with some show of reason) are already saying he is "talking by instruction." They are saying that it is evident his Cincinnati speech was made to order, that it lacked the spontaneity and vigor of his New England speeches; in short, that, on the tariff matter, he was evidently not speaking his own mind, but that of the party leaders. Be that as it may, it is unfortunate, because the influence of the administration in this whole matter has been to create in the republican party a division on the tariff question and build up a faction exactly as was done in 1884 and 1892, that thinks it respectable and progressive to demand tariff revision, which always means tariff reduction.

Nothing is clearer in the history of politics in this country than that to surrender the doctrine of protection means defeat for the republican party. On the matter of foreign policy and certain other questions, it is not more in line with modern thought and American tradition than the democratic party, and not so near to the popular heart. If the republican party compromises or abandons protection, it will surrender the conditions of business prosperity and ought to lose the support of the industrial classes, and there is no risk in predicting it will lose the support of the laboring class. It has no real claim upon their confidence and support on any other ground than protection. Abandon that, and the wage-workers have every reason, both in popular sentiment and practical policy, to abandon the republican party.

Protection, sound money and a non-colonial policy are the three essential features of political endurance for the republican party. It has abandoned one by adopting a colonial or quasi-imperialistic policy. It is only higgling with the banking and money question, and its last and only impregnable stronghold is its fidelity to protection. Unless the present administration warms up and talks consistent protection as a vital issue, as the bulwark of party reliance and national policy, there will be a split in its ranks, with revisionists and non-revisionists playing the part over again of mugwumps and stalwarts, and it will be of little consequence who gets the nomination in

1904. For, if the administration and the party leaders so trifle with the subject as to give the protective policy only half-hearted support, a considerable section lending itself to tariff agitation, with disturbance of business and slackening of prosperity, a political Waterloo for the republican party may be confidently looked for.

It is of no special concern who gets the republican nomination for president in 1904. There are plenty of men who would creditably fill the office of president. It is of vital importance, however, to the nation and to the progress of civilization everywhere that an industrial depression be not precipitated.

It is significant to know that there are not a few of the strongest business men, of practical experience and patriotic devotion, who see the danger signal in this quarter, and are willing, nay determined, rather than support a faltering, compromising, insincere attitude on the tariff question merely in the mistaken notion that it will give political popularity, to desert the party or raise the standard of protection in a new camp. Such a movement, while it would have a vitalizing effect in sustaining the principle of political integrity and fidelity to the protective principle in public policy, would make defeat of the republican party sure. It would make the republican nomination in 1904 worthless to whomsoever might get it. It is important, therefore, no less to the success of the republican party than to the permanence of industrial prosperity in this country, that the doctrine of protection be made, if possible, more and not less conspicuously the doctrine of the party. For the administration to desert that doctrine now would be to lend itself to the same influences which gave us Cleveland in 1893, with the resulting era of industrial disaster.

CONDITIONS WHICH AFFECT BEEF PRICES

HENRY W. WILBUR

GUNTON'S MAGAZINE for July contained an article by the editor, showing that there were conditions existing in our country which tended to increase the cost of beef, in spite of any action on the part of the so-called beef trust to advance and maintain prices to the consumer. It was claimed that these conditions were due to natural causes, were not spasmodic or artificial, but were the product of conditions extending over a period of years.

It is nearly three months since the article in GUNTON'S was written, and now we find that practically every claim made in it is confirmed by official figures, published by the Labor Bureau, at Washington. In the Labor Bulletin for July is an article by Fred. C. Croxton on beef prices. It contains elaborate statistics covering prices, commodities and the available food supplies, which are exceedingly suggestive. The statements and prices in Mr. Croxton's article, he tells us, were "secured from the files of trade journals, published reports of stock-yard companies and boards of trade, government departments, etc." The prices of sides of beef are from the quotations in the Boston market, for "the reason that the trade papers of that city were the only available ones which quoted prices of western dressed beef for the whole period from 1890 to 1902."

From the figures given in the number of the Labor Bulletin mentioned, we compile the following table, all the prices and stock receipts being such as obtained on the first day of June, for each and every year indicated.

It will be noted in the table that more than one condition existed in 1902 to make the price of beef mount upward. First, there was a falling off in the number of beef cattle received at the commercial centers where stock of this kind seeks a market: second, there was an increase in the price of hay and corn, upon which the cattle to sup

ply the market must be fed and fattened. A bushel of corn cost eighteen cents more on June 1st, 1902, than it did on June 1st, 1901; and hay was $1.50 a ton higher.

The various tables by Mr. Croxton show that the price of beef, both on the hoof and dressed, in Boston, gradually rose from January to June of this year, while no such condition existed in the corresponding period of 1901. Looking at the price of corn, we find that it maintained a fairly even rate for the six months included in the investigation. It started at 63 11-16 cents in January, and ended at 61 5-16 cents in June, while the price of hay gradually rose from $13 in January to $13.75 in June. In the corresponding months, in 1901, corn rose from 36 1-16 cents a bushel to 43 13-16 cents, while hay brought $12.50 in January and $12.25 in June. The receipts of cattle in the four cities. mentioned in the table, for the first six months in 1902, were as follows: January, 554,912; February, 458,381; March, 458,426; April, 440,774; May, 379,232; June, 462,292. This is simply another evidence of the reduced supply and increased cost of fattening beef cattle.

Suggestive as these figures are, they do not tell the

whole story. Not only was the number of beef cattle received in Chicago 20,620 less on June 1st, 1902, than for the same time in the previous year, but the gross weight of the cattle was 27,993,268 pounds less than that of those received in 1901. It is also shown that the average weight of the cattle has been reduced since March. In that month the average weight was 1,005 pounds; April, 940; May 957, June 964.

Had the average weight of cattle prevailing June 1st, 1890 (which was 1,057 pounds), held good in 1902, it would have added 19,047,609 pounds to the supply of beef placed on the Chicago market in a single day. The gross weight of the beef cattle received at Chicago June 1st, 1890, was 300,227,109 pounds, or 102,787,377 pounds more than on the corresponding day in 1902.

The case may be stated a little differently. By consulting the foregoing table, it will be seen that the four great centers for the receipt and distribution of beef cattle received 51,445 fewer on June 1st, 1902, than June Ist, 1890. The population of the United States in 1900 was 62,622,250, while in 1902 it is not less than 77,000,000. In other words, on June 1st, 1902, the people of the country were obliged to look for a market supply of beef considerably less than what was available for a population fifteen millions smaller twelve years ago than it is to-day.

Another illustration will show how a combination of conditions is necessary to raise the price of commodities: On June 1st, 1899, the number of cattle that found their way to the great receiving points was less than in 1902, but the average weight and gross weight were more than for the latter period. What is more, the price of corn was 28 cents a bushel cheaper in 1899 than in 1902, and hay was $3.50 a ton cheaper.

There is a certain amount of interest in considering the margin between the price of cattle per hundred pounds, on the hoof, and the price of dressed beef for the same quantity. In 1899, the margin was $3.322; in 1902, $2.90. While the margin was 90 cents more in 1902 than in 1901, this cannot be claimed as the reason for the increased price