markets to the poorer nations is simply to let them drag us down. Progress demands that we should lift them up, and the only way to help lift Cuba and other countries to our own level is to give them the benefit of the superior devices and discoveries resulting from our own experimentation and progress. In the numerous lines in which we have excelled sufficiently to be able to sell products cheaper abroad than they can be produced there with their own cheap labor, we have made discoveries that foreigners can and will adopt, and in doing so they will get an everlasting benefit which will be worth far more to them than the permission to sell in our market and thereby prevent the develment of these superior methods, thus perpetuating their own relatively crude and clumsy devices.

The true American policy is the simple straightforward policy: Protect the American market with all its opportunities for the American people; give no special privileges to any foreigners to sell in this country; let all enter on the same plane, namely, by being able to compete on American conditions, which always must involve the payment of the full equivalent of American wages. And let our foreign trade be a natural, wholesome, economic growth, by which American producers shall compete on the sound economic basis of being able to undersell, not by any special privilege but by the superiority of American methods and skill. Such a policy is good ethics, good economics and sound statesmanship.

THE NEW DEPARTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLO

MACY

W. MAITLAND ABELL, LL.M.

A new epoch in the history of our American diplomacy was initiated by the Hay note to the Concert of Europe, on the deplorable condition of the Rumanian Jews. But important as this new departure is in itself, other reasons unite with it to awaken widespread interest in our Secretary's protest. Among these the plea, in the name of humanity, for the oppressed in Balkan Europe is chief. Struggles for political and civil liberty in that part of the continent have always excited sympathetic interest in the United States.

When the thrilling verse of Lord Byron on the "departed worth" of Greece was transforming the classical sentiment of England into that diplomatic activity destined to "long accustom'd bondage uncreate," our own Daniel Webster became the champion in America of the Turkoppressed Greeks. And the United States sent a special agent to Greece to discover when conditions should be ripe for official recognition of Greek independence from Ottoman rule.

And later the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49 awakened the liveliest sympathy in America. To our hospitable shores the United States officially invited and received Louis Kossuth, the exiled advocate of independence and civil liberty for the Magyar people, who with hearts full of gratitude have but recently celebrated the centenary of that patriot's birth.

On the other side of the Carpathians, during 1848, that year of general revolution in Europe, the Danubian principalities revolted against Russian oppression. And scarcely had the treaty of Paris of 1856 placed them under the suzerainty of the Porte when they sought to sever this vassalage. Contrary to the public will of

Europe and against the protest of their suzerain, Moldavia and Wallachia were united under one native prince, Couza, and given the name Rumania; then, as the next step, Couza was forced to abdicate and Charles I, a scion of the house of Hohenzollern, was elected to the Rumanian throne, in the hope that his family connections might link the ambitious principality with central and western Europe and thus magnify its political importance.

Finally, the very opportunity through which Rumanian independence of Turkey was realized was developed largely as the result of an American's interest in Balkan affairs. It was the personal though unofficial investigation of Eugene Schuyler, then a United States consul in Turkey, into the real situation in Bulgaria, and his letters to Gladstone on the "Bulgarian atrocities" that fomented the public sentiment of Europe to such a degree against Turkish oppression in the Balkan peninsula that Russia was allowed to intervene in 1877. And it was this armed intervention of the czar and his victory over the Porte, with the aid of his Muldo-Wallachian allies, that made possible Rumanian independence.

This long moral support to the cause of freedom in the Balkan region would seem to have earned for us the right to protest, now that Rumania, forgetful of her own past struggles against oppression, has violated the individual rights of its Jewish population to our detriment. But the anti-Semitic press of the continent unkindly termed our protest a "foreign intervention" and an effort to concern ourselves "with a matter which is strictly European and more particularly the internal business of an independent kingdom." And our Monroe doctrine was mockingly flaunted in our face as a bar to such active diplomatic meddling in the concerns of Europe. But this retaliative use of our national policy ignores the real principle of its origin, which was democratic resistance to the old continental régime.

To the treaty of the Holy Alliance in 1815, the emperors of Russia and Austria and the kings of Prussia and

France affixed their own sovereign signatures. As such a convention is usually concluded through the agency of ministers, a special significance was implied in that sovereign act: it was an emphatic revival of the old jure divino theory. Napoleon had thrown himself athwart the historic course of monarchic systems and redistributed the territory on the continent by conquest, while the congress of Vienna, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, restored the deposed monarchs and sought to swing the political régime back to its historic trend. The Holy Alliance, formed but a few months later, aimed to emphasize and ensure the success of this reactionary policy. It proclaimed to the world that the signatory sovereigns had been "delegated by Providence to govern" their respective subjects. Though professing a benevolent paternalism, the real principle of the Holy Alliance was the divine right of kings as opposed to the rights of the people. Its real purpose was to resist the spread of democratic tendencies. And in 1822 these allies signed the secret treaty of Verona, in which they engaged mutually "to put an end to the system of representative government" in Europe and to adopt measures to destroy the "liberty of the press." And, during the next year, in fulfillment of a secret understanding, France intervened to suppress the new constitutional government in Spain and restored there the absolute monarchy of Ferdinand VII.

While this autocratic and reactionary policy was being enforced in Spain, Great Britain learned that the allies were about to call a congress to devise means to put down the Spanish revolt in America. Whereupon George Canning, then British minister for foreign affairs, suggested to Richard Rush, the United States minister at London, a joint intervention to thwart this attempt to re-establish the Spanish monarchic system in the belligerent dependencies. "Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work," wrote Canning in a recently discovered private and confidential letter to Rush, August 20th, 1823; and he added: "I am persuaded there has sel

dom, in the history of the world, occurred an opportunity when so small an effort of two friendly governments might produce so unequivocal a good and prevent such extensive calamities."

But a joint declaration was not made by the British and the Americans, because both Mr. Rush and Mr. Adams, our Secretary of State, maintained that we could act jointly with England only on the basis of the acknowledged independence of the Spanish-American states. As British interest in these new American republics was chiefly commercial and not political, as with us, England, through fear of an open breach with the continental allies, deemed it inexpedient to follow the lead of the United States and recognize their independence. Conscquently the declaration was made by the United States alone. It appears in the 48th and 49th paragraphs of President Monroe's message to congress, December 2nd, 1823, and declares that we should consider any attempt of the allied powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

There is, to be sure, another declaration from which the Monroe doctrine is also derived in the 7th paragraph of this same message. But this was directed against Russian aggression on our western coast and announced the principle that the American continents were no longer subjects for "future colonization" by European powers. And these terms have since been warped from their original import. Hence the present official as well as the popular conception of this phase of the doctrine diverges from the idea of Monroe and Adams.

The original Monroe doctrine was the diplomatic effort of democracy to keep from this hemisphere the old monarchic régime of the continent, while the recent Hay note was the effort of that same democracy to keep from these shores the people pauperized by that same oppressive system. The only distinction is between the system itself and the results of the system; for the Rumanian Jews have fallen prey to the lingering residue of that old oppressive