IX.

CHAP. no less than six millions and a half in gold and silver!* Nor had Alberoni been wholly engrossed with what 1718. is useful; objects of taste and elegance had also a part of his care. A traveller at this time might have seen a stately palace arising in the romantic wilds of Guadarramat, and new ornaments embellish the delicious island-garden of Aranjuez. Struck with these great works, and greater designs, Stanhope publicly observed, "If Spain goes on "at this rate, and has the same success in the "other establishments she has in view, there is no "power will be able to resist her!" § The Spaniards on their part, roused by their own successes, might be pardoned for assuming a prouder tone, and displaying their high national spirit; they might speak more slightingly than ever of all foreign nations, and forget at the moment that they had a Frenchman for their King, an Italian for their Minister, and a Fleming for their General!

From negotiations at Madrid, let us now turn

Boyer's Polit. State, 1718, vol. ii. p. 167.

The palace of San Ildefonso, begun during Alberoni's administration, was completed in 1723. (San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 303.)

These gardens seem familiar to us, from Mr. Southey'sbeautiful description. (Penins. War. vol. iv. p. 60.) They have been embellished by almost every successive sovereign of Spain, since Charles V. Even in the sixteenth century the place was proverbial for its fountains, and the name is humorously applied by Cervantes to issues in the leg! (Don Quixote, part 2. ch. 50. vol. vii. p. 28. ed. Paris, 1814.)

This is a testimony to which Alberoni referred with pride after his fall. See his Apology, Hist. Register, 1722, p. 208.

IX.

1718.

to warfare in Sicily. The Piedmontese had become CHA P. very unpopular in the island; many towns and districts rose in insurrection against them; and in one, Caltanisetta*, forty of their soldiers were butchered by the savage peasantry. The only places that could offer any resistance were Syracuse, Trapani, Melazzo, and Messina; in the first of which Maffei, the Viceroy, had taken refuge; but it was against the latter that De Lede directed his arms, leaving only a small detachment to the westward for the blockade of Trapani. To march along the Sicilian coast is by no means an easy task, from the great number of FIUMARAS, which have never any bridges to cross them †, and which, according to the season, display either swollen and impetuous torrents, or dry and rugged beds of huge stones. The Spanish infantry was, accordingly, transported to Messina by sea; while only the cavalry proceeded along the shore, its vanguard commanded by the Marquis de Villadarias, the old and gallant adversary of the English in the Bay of Cadiz, and on the field of Almenara.

The city of Messina gladly opened its gates to

* This is, I presume, the Cantanieta of San Phelipe. The Spanish writers are often careless as to names. One of their strangest blunders relates to Syracuse, which, from a resemblance of sounds, they sometimes confound with the capital of Aragon, and call Zaragoza de Sicilia.

+ There is a proverbial saying in Sicily, that the island contains only un monte, un fonte, e un ponte; meaning Etna, Arethusa, and a bridge over the Salso near Alicata. (Capt. Smyth's Sicily, p. 199.

HH

IX.

CHAP. the invaders; but the citadel, which had a garrison of 2500 Piedmontese, required a regular siege; 1718. and trenches were opened against it on the 31st of July. Its safety was an object of the deepest solicitude to the Austrians in the kingdom of Naples, foreseeing that they themselves would infallibly be the next object of attack. Their Viceroy, Count Daun, was a brave and skilful officer; but the troops under his orders were few*, and it is certain that, had he been left only to his German soldiers (the Neapolitan are scarcely worth reckoning), he would, so far from assisting Maffei, have speedily shared his fate.

But the mighty arm of England was already outstretched for his succour. On the very day after the investment of Messina, the fleet of Sir George Byng anchored in the Bay of Naples. The possibility of an attack upon Sicily had not been overlooked in the Admiral's instructions: he was directed, in that case," with all his power to hin"der and obstruct the same;" and he, therefore, immediately landed, to concert measures with Count Daun. He was informed that the last letters from Vienna gave hopes of the King of Sicily's speedy accession to the Quadruple Alli

* According to St. Simon there were only 6000 foot and 1500 horse in the kingdom. (Mém. vol. xvi. p. 279. ed. 1829.) Tindal speaks of eight or twelve thousand. (Hist. vol. vii. p. 214.) Considering how long a Spanish invasion of Naples had been expected by the Emperor, even the highest of these numbers appears incredibly small.

IX.

1718.

ance, his Majesty having already requested the aid CHAP. of the Imperial troops, and consented to admit them into the Sicilian fortresses. Under these circumstances, it was resolved that Daun should despatch, and Byng convoy, a detachment of 2000 German infantry to the garrison of Messina. These men being embarked in TARTANAS, the Admiral bore away for the straits of the Faro; but still hoping to prevent hostilities, he sent his first captain to the Marquis de Lede with a conciliatory letter, proposing a suspension of arms for two months. This overture being civilly declined, he put the Germans, for safety, into Reggio, and sailed through the Faro in search of the Spanish fleet.

The Spanish Admirals, meanwhile, were benumbed by that indecision which, in military matters, is perhaps still more pernicious than error. Castañeta does not appear to have been guided by any positive orders from his Government; but was directed, in all difficulties, to apply to Patiño, the INTENDENTE, as he was called, of the whole expedition, who, having been eighteen years a Jesuit, may be presumed to have had somewhat less of naval than of religious or political knowledge. From fear of responsibility, or ignorance of details, Patiño gave only a very vague answer, amounting to little more than that the Spanish fleet should provide for its safety. A council of officers, convened thereupon, and comprising, besides Castañeta, the Rear-Admirals Mari, Chacon, and

IX.

1718.

CHAP. Cammock, could scarcely be said to deliberate; it only wavered. Much loose conversation passed; no useful resolution was taken. The only sensible scheme was that of Cammock, an Irishman in the Pretender's interest and the Spaniards' service, who proposed that they should remain at anchor in the road of Messina, ranging their ships in line of battle, with their broadsides to the sea, by which means they might not only have been supported by the batteries and troops on shore, but, from the variety and force of the currents, would have rendered a regular attack upon them extremely difficult, if not impracticable. This proposal being over-ruled, the Admirals put out to sea, without any fixed determination either to fight or to retreat; but continued lingering and hovering, first off Cape Spartivento, and then off Cape Passaro, until in the morning of the 11th of August, they saw Byng and his squadron close upon them. The British fleet was superior in force as well as in discipline; for, though the Spaniards had most ships, several of these were only brigs or armed merchantmen, whilst none of the British

The station of the Spanish fleet was at a beautiful bay called Il Paradiso, about two miles north of Messina. About a century after the action, it was viewed by a very experienced and intelligent naval officer (Capt. Smyth), who observes, that "had the fleet remained at anchor there (as Cammock proposed), "it would have been very difficult to annoy it." (Sicily and its Islands, p. 112.) Among the Stuart Papers I have found "His Majesty's private instructions to Admiral George Cam"mock."