all our Hiftories fhews, the utmoft Care of the most numerous Squadrons infufficient to fecure us againft being infulted, nay, even actually invaded; -and that fuch Invafions have never Failed to put us to great Expence, and have always given us great Alarms, and fometimes proved fuccefsful ;-that we have rarely wanted a Faction, at any time, to back and to abett Attempts of this Nature; nor that, from the Nature of our Government, we ever fhall, and that when they were thus backed, and thus abetted, they hardly ever failed of their Defign.-The very Government, and Monarchy and Conftitution of this Country, owe their Origin to these Invafions ;-not to speak of the Romans, whofe Conquefts are very remote, the Saxons conquered this Ifland, from the Britons, by their Fleets; the Empire of the Saxons, who, in Proportion to those Times, had very confiderable Naval Forces, was, for a while, entirely overthrown by the Danes; and fcarce had the Saxons recovered their Ground, but that the Norman Invafion compleated all, and made an entire Conqueft of this Nation.-From thence forward is it forgot how we have suffered by Descents from France; how the Contentions for private Title were perpetually carried on by foreign Aids, to the Perturbation of our State; how frequently every Party fucceeded in their Turn; how near the Spaniards, as I have before obferved, came to make a Province of this Ifland; how the Revolution, in the Memory of those now living, fucceeded, in fpight of all the Vigilance of Government; how Ireland was upon the very Point of being loft; how the French invaded, and retreated thence with Impunity; how, fince that Time, many Descents have taken Effect; when our Navy was in its Zenith, and those of other Powers at their loweft Ebb;-how vaft a Number of our Ships have been found infufficient to answer all our feveral Purposes of Defence, of Trade, the Annoyance of our Enemies, and Protection of our own Coaft, against one inconfiderable Enemy, and one hollow Friend?-If we have not forgot all this, we must be mad, to think, that, at any Time, or in any Situation, this Nation can, with Security, alone confide in their Naval Force, much lefs when the rest of Europe shall be reduced to the dread of, or to a provincial Dependance upon a great Empire, within three Hours fail of fome Part of our Dominions, and within ten of our Capital itself.

Will this Nation, however careful of its Liberty at Home, out of a remote and, honestly speaking, little to be dreaded Danger of the Influence of a fmall Military Force, expose itself to those Infults, which must destroy all Peace and Quiet, interrupt

all Commerce, and may, upon every Turn, ruin the publick Credit of this Country, which gives Life to every Thing, in which we find either Profit or Security at home:- But much more shall this Nation, from these imaginary Dangers, be diftracted enough to disband her Armies in the Time of actual War, and run headlong into the manifeft, immediate and certain Dangers of a Foreign Yoke ?-Are we to put ourselves to immediate Death for fear of dying hereafter?-What Folly is it, (out of a magnified Misreprefentation of Diftreffes, imaginary, and falfely pretended, Decay of Trade, or Suggestions of Poverty in the midft of immenfe Opulency, greater than either we or any other State in Europe ever yet enjoyed,) to refufe Succour to thofe Allies, whofe Standing Armies awe that Power, which, when once unreftrained by them, can never poffibly be refifted, but by fuch Standing Armies at home, as would indeed be ruinous both to Trade and Liberty. By thefe occafional and tem porary Expences, we fecure the future and conftant Affiftance, and avail ourselves of the Benefit of Standing Armies of numerous and potent Nations, which anfwer, upon any Emergency abroad, that Want, which we otherwife fhould have of them at home, and without which our Country would infallibly, fooner or later, be the Seat of War,-without which our Inhabitants, inftead of Manufacturers, muft univerfally become Soldiers,-and our Battles be fought within our own Bowels, and by our own Countrymen, inftead of being fought in the Countries of our Enemies, and to the Depopulation of other Nations.- No Expence can be too great to fecure us thefe Advantages, or to preserve us from thefe Evils, and to pretend, that the Benefits of our Situa tion are to be carried further than this, or to be fecured by any other Means in the prefent State and Politicks of all the Powers on the Continent, is a Prefumption upon the Goodness and Felicity permitted us by Providence, and a Nonfenfe that will deftroy it all.

However evident this Reasoning may be, yet it's contrary met with Advocates, and enlarged their Bottom; but, broad as they affected to call it, and broad, as it really became, by the Folly and Paffion, and the Ferment of the Time, the Foundation, upon which it was built, was too bad to admit it to ftand without it was yet much broader, to which End they employed their Sophiftry, upon the Head of our Troops in Flanders, ftill much farther. This they urged in the Debate of that Day; but afterwards, according to their Cuftom, retailed among the People, in a Pamphlet, intitled, The Question ftated with regard to our Army in Flanders. At the Clofe of which, they fummed up all their Argument, corrected by the Debate, inlarged by the

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Collection of the various Reafonings of their Orators, and reduced by Leifure, into the Method beft adapted to impose upon the Publick.

Thefe Reasonings were drawn into the Form of Questions moft falfely and fallaciously compofed, and as falfely and fallacioufly anfwered by themselves, which I fhall take the Liberty to answer in a different Manner.

The firft Queftion was in these Words; it, Why, with one War upon your Hands, will you draw yourfelves into another? 2dly, Why will you make yourselves Principals in a War, in which you ought only to be Auxiliaries?

3dly, Why do you run yourselves into Expences you can't bear, into Difficulties you will find it so hard, if not impoffible to get out of, into Inconveniencies you fee no End of, Pursuits where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles in which you have fo much to lofe?

4thly, Why, if the Queen of Hungary is to be farther affifted, do you, inftead of fending her Money, which might affift her, expend treble the Money fhe would be thankful for in raifing Forces that can't affift her?

5thly, Why did you diffuade the Queen of Hungary from liftening to all Offers of Accommodation the last Summer, and particularly at the Siege of Prague? Why did you endeavour to prevent her accepting the Terms propofed of reciprocal Evacu→ ation of Bohemia and Bavaria, leaving other Claims and Pretenfions to future Negotiations and civil Decifion, which is the End they must come to, unless these Squabbles laft for ever?

6thly, Why did you embarque in this Measure, without the Junction, Confent, Approbation, or even Participation of Holland?

7thly, Why have you alone taken upon you the Hazards, Burthens and Expences of a Scheme, which all the Powers of Europe combined, would not perhaps be able to execute, and which no Power in Europe will affift you in?

Thefe Queftions are, by the Confeffion of the Author, who was known to be a capital Writer, the Substance of all they had to offer upon this Head, -and we fhall now come to fhew their flimfy Texture; they are intended to pafs as fo many folid Facts, attended with fo many irrefragable Reafons, how much they differ, from either Fact or Reason, appear by the following Reflections.

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As to the first Queftion, we entered into the fecond War, because we were bound by the ftrongeft Ties of Treaty and publick Faith to do it ; because the firft War could never have been brought to a happy Conclufion without it; because the fecond Enemy fupported the firft; because the fecond Power,

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without entering avowedly into that War, fupplied, encouraged, and fomented the Difference between us and the first; and because there is more Safety in an open Enemy, than in a false Friend: because the Views of the first and second Enemy coincided with each other;-and because we were certain, that the fecond Enemy would have joined the firft, with her whole and an irrefiftible Force, when fhe had finished her Work in Germany, and that then we fhould have had to deal with both thefe Powers, without any one Ally in the World, --- whereas, by joining against the fecond, at the Time we did it, we were able to act in Conjunction with fome of the greatest Powers in Europe, and a reasonable Expectation of the Aid of more ;---because the rafh Attempts of the firft Power, partly to gratify her own wild Ambition, and partly to affift the Plan of the fecond, had afforded us the Means, if we engaged against the second, of ruining the Armies of the firft, of confining her Fleets from any Poffibility of doing us any Harm, and in fine, of difappointing her most favourite Views, of exhaufting her Revenues, and of throwing her Government into Confufion in one Campaign, more than by any other way of waging War with her to the End of the World.---All this could be only done, when we had the one War upon our Hands, by engaging in the other.

As to the fecond Question, it will fcarce admit of any Answer, because the Affertion it implies is abfolutely and notorioufly falfe in Fact, for we have hitherto not been Principals in this War in any Sense whatever: We have acted only as Auxiliaries to the House of Auftria. And this it seems I need not take the Pains to juftify, fince in acting as Auxiliaries, we are by Confeffion of this Author only what we ought to be.

The third Queftion contains a complicated Charge, to which I fhall diftinctly anfwer: 1ft, It is as happily as it is palpably untrue, that the Expences into which we are involved, are fuch as we cannot bear. For to the heavy Difappointment of the Enemies of this Country, the great Supplies of the laft Year have been raised upon Terms as low, notwithstanding all the Arts of monied Men, and all the Terrors scattered by the Faction, as they ever were in Times of the moft profound Peace, while the Enemy, we are engaged with, cannot raise the Sums he wants, at twice the Rate of Intereft we pay: Nor are they likely to reap any greater Satisfaction, with refpect to the Supplies in the next Seffion. 2. As to the Difficulties, which are foretold to be fo bard and impoffible to get out of, it is now vifible that by the Steadiness of this Parliament, and the Bleffing of God upon our Arms, we have already proved the Faction to be lying Prophets, and what has already happened, fufficiently promifes us a full Detection

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of the Falfity of every one of their Predictions. 3. As to the Inconveniencies we fee no End of, it is undoubtedly true, that no human Reason can prescribe an exact Period to any War, the Inconveniencies of which muft laft till fuch War is determined; but if this be an Objection, it is such a one, as must make against engaging in any War, however juft or neceffary, in any Country or Conjuncture whatsoever. 4. We are charged with Purfuits, where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles, in which we have fo much to lofe.---But can thefe Men pafs for Patriots upon the Publick, who fay, we have nothing to gain, by reftoring that faithful Ally, which is alone able to ftem the Ambition of the French Monarch, the implacable and ever dangerous Enemy of this Country? or can they be thought to have either Common Senfe or Honefty, who contend, that we should lie by in time of fuch Danger?---When are Men to struggle, but when they have fo much to lofe, as the Trade, the Independency, the Religion, and the Freedom of their Country?

The fourth Question demands, why we did not affift the Queen of Hungary with Money only? I cannot but obferve, that this Queftion, confidering the Tendency of their former Infinuations, is a little unneceffary, unless they doubted of the Weight they might have upon the Publick ;---for the general Turn of their Difcourfe has been, that it is vain to affift her, either with Men or Money. ---In good Truth, if the Subject were not of too serious a Nature, it would be impoffible not to laugh at the miferable Shifts they have been put upon to defend their wretched Caufe. Whenever any Man of Senfe and Knowledge kept them close in Argument, and urged the Faith of Treaties, the Danger of France, the Ruin of the Ballance, the Cafe of the Earl of Orford (cenfured by themselves for neglecting these Confiderations,) they confeffed all this, and denied, that they opposed it; they said, that they agreed in the Neceffity of affifting the House of Auftria, and that they differed only in the Means; yet, if ever they could fasten upon any weak, ignorant, or ill-difpofed Perfon in private Converfation, it was their whole Labour to convince him of the Danger, Impracticability, and Inutility of doing it at all. This was the Topick upon which their Tools and Emiflaries were inftructed conftantly to entertain the People,-nay, they came at laft to talk publickly in Parliament in the fame difingenuous manner, and with the fame Inconfiftency. It will not be foon forgot, in what Manner, or how in the Debate of this very Point, their moft eminent Directors argued, fome grounding their Harangues upon this Pofition,

That the late Succefs of the Houfe of Auftria had reduced "France fo low, that he could not carry on the War with

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