been the contracting Parties to that of Seville.The Dutch were however at length prevailed upon to accede to it.

We now began to think again that we had done great Matters, for the present we had pacified the Emperor, and prevented a War. -We obtained a Declaration from the Court of Spain, dated at Seville the 6th of June following to revoke that of the Marquis de Caftellar, of the 28th of January before mentioned: And as a Proof of our Reconciliation with the second Power, we were permitted to have the Honour, upon the 17th of October 1731, to escort the Spanish Troops into Italy, with a Squadron of fixteen British Men of War, at the Expence of 200,000 l.

But we are come at length to the final Period of the Success of thefe preventive and defenfive Measures-they could no longer hold the whole World clearly faw, to what the Politicks of the British Minifter amounted-and that he was determined to be moved neither by Indignity or Danger.

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France had carried her Point, fhe had heartily regained the Spaniards to her Interefts, fhe had deftroyed all Cordiality between the Emperor and England, fhe had detected the Weaknefs of this Nation fo far, that fhe faw he had nothing to fear, and that all other Powers had nothing to hope from Britain.She had been a contracting Party to the Treaty of Seville, and we had bound ourselves to enter into no new Engagements without her Concurrence. Yet the late Treaty with the Emperor, which was to enforce it, had been concluded without her Participation, nay without her Knowledge. She highly and loudly resented this Treatment, as a manifeft Neglect, an Instance of Contempt, and a publick Affront; and fhe had the better Handle to exclaim against us for it, because we had affected to think ourfelves fo ill used, by the like Conduct of the Emperor, with regard to the Treaty of Vienna in 1725.-From this Moment she thought of nothing but Revenge, and to avail herself of the Means we had fo manifeftly given her, to take it with Impunity.

The Spanish Troops had not been long landed in Italy, before an Alliance was formed between France, Sardinia and Spain, to attack the Emperor's Dominions in Italy.-The King of Poland's Death was foreseen, and fhe took fuch Measures as the thought had effectually fecured the Election of King Stanislaus to that Throne. With the Affiftance of that Prince fhe projected to have fallen upon the Emperor's Hereditary Countries, while she diverted his Forces upon the Rhine, and her Confederates employed him in the Defence of Italy.-Not many Months were pafs'd, before the Minister had a more fatal Caufe of Inquietude than ever---War became inevitable---his Conduct had delayed it, only to make it fall with more ruinous and irrefiftible Effect.

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The King of Poland died the 21st of January O.S. 1732-3. and in March following the King of France declared that he would fupport the Election of his Father-in-law. ---The Emperor was fenfible of what was preparing for him.--He knew that if this Election took Effect, it would be impoffible to refift the Confederacy formed against him.---He therefore took part with the Elector of Saxony, now the prefent, and Son to the lateKing of Poland.---Yet endeavouring as much as poffible not to give any Pretence to France, for attacking him upon this Score, he left it to the Ruffian Arms to fupport that Prince.---But France never wanted a Pretext, when the found herself in a Condition to profecute her Views by Arms.---Confiding in her Engagements with Sardinia and Spain, the grounded this Pretext upon the fecret Negociations the Imperial Court had carried on with Ruffia against King Stanislaus, declared War, and marched her Armies againft the Emperor----while on the other fide the 6000 Spaniards conveyed by the British Fleet into Italy not a Year before, fhewed the Ufe for which they were defigned.--They joined the Sardinian Troops, attacked the Milanefe, and in Conjunction with a Body of Auxiliaries from France, foon: made an entire Conqueft of that Dutchy.

The Emperor confiding in the Engagements we had entered into, fo immediately before, to fupport the Pragmatic Sanction, had withdrawn his Troops from Italy.---The French had attacked him in the Empire, and were endeavouring to bring the Turk upon him.---It was impoffible for him long to make Head alone against the different Attacks made and meditated upon the Empire itself, and his Hereditary Countries, and to defend his Italian Poffeffions at the fame time.---He found himself however able with great Difficulty for that Campaign to maintain his Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and to keep his Footing in the Mantuan.---In that perilous Interval he called upon Great Britain to execute her late Treaty, he shewed that it was yet in her Power to fave Naples and Sicily, at a small Expence, and by her Fleets alone; he reproached us with the Ruin we had brought upon him by engaging his Confent to the Introduction of the Spanish Troops, and urged the Points both of Honour and National Intereft, by which we were obliged fo particularly to interfere in this Quarrel, as our Support and Guaranty had been the only Condition upon which he had given that Confent.--He implored us, in the moft moving Terms, not to defert an old, a faithful, and a fincere Ally, fo ftrictly united by all the Bonds of mutual Affection and mutual Security, in a time of this imminent Diftrefs, a Diftrefs, which our own Councils, and his Acquiefcence to them, had reduced him to..

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But the Minifter, totally confounded, knew not how to act at all. He flood infenfible to the Danger both of his Allies, and of his own Country, unmoved equally with the Complaints, Reproaches and Intreaties of the Imperial Court. He fought only to cover his own Shame, by retorting the Blane upon Emperor.---He reproached him with having brought these Difficulties upon himself by Negociations with Ruffia, to prevent the Election of King Stanislaus to the Throne of Poland, and abused him for not fubmitting to that, which must have reduced him to a Condition incapable of Defence or Relief.--Thus adding the most galling Infults to the most irreparable Injuries, he endeavoured to quiet the Alarms of the People of Great Britain by his Emiffaries, who were inftructed to preach up a Dependance upon the good Faith of France, who in her Declaration of War (which the fo religiously adhered to, as we have feen) had folemnly engaged to make no Acquifition by it; thus abetting the Caufe, and proclaiming both the Juftice and Moderation of that perfidious Power.---In the mean while no Alliances were formed to fupport the Emperor. ---The Dutch, who had unwillingly been dragged by us into fome of our former Treaties, would now treat with us no more; they had been taught by fatal Experience to dread any farther Connexion with us. We neither affifted the Houfe of Auftria with Troops nor Money.---Our Squadrons, fo ready to be employed to aggrandize the Glory of a Spanish Triumph, were not to be hazarded in the Defence of our Allies.---We firft permitted the -French Fleets to fail into the Baltic unmolefted, with Troops and Supplies to fuftain the Caufe of Stanislaus in the North;---In the next Year we fuffered Spain to tranfport a Body of 20,000 Horfe and Foot, (without any Attempt to interrupt them) to join their Troops in Italy, who before the End of that Year 1734, ravifhed the Kingdoms of Sicily and Naples from the Emperor, and added two powerful Kingdoms to the Poffeffions of the Houfe of Bourbon.

Stunn'd with thefe rapid Succeffes, and almoft inanimate with the Fear of Dangers, in which that very Fear had thus involved the World; the Minifter feemed to have forgotten every thing,---during all this Time he did nothing.---But as violent Paffions, from the very Caufe of their Exiftence, which is the Weaknefs of human Nature, cannot be of long Duration, he began to revive a little, and could not refrain, as foon as he did, to attempt again to exercise his Talent of Negociation; to which the Self-opinion of his Brother, and his own Apprehenfion of Arms, had given him an obftinate, fatal, and incorrigible Turn.---He began to make Pro

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pofals, and to offer his Mediation to the Courts both of Paris and Vienna ---But the Court of Vienna feverely wounded by thefe repeated Cruelties, Indignities and Ill Ufage, in the midft of her deepeft Calamity, difdained and detefted to treat with him any more,---and France, though he had reaped so much Advantage from his Conduct, equally contemned the Man, to whom fhe owed it all. For even they, who profit by Infidelity or Weakness, abhor the Authors of it.--Nothing proves the wretched Condition to which we had reduced ourselves, and the Opinion fhe entertained both of our Councils and our Arms, better than the Anfwer made to thefe Proposals by the King of France; which was concluded in thefe Words,---I will do my utmost Endeavour in Germany to weaken my Enemies; I have already declared that I would not keep Poffeffion of any of the Places I should take.-Let England reft Jatisfied with this Promife.---She would have pleafed me in her Mediation, if he had not at the fame Time armed berfelf---But I would have her to know, that no Power in Europe fhall give Law to me. And this you may tell your Mafter.

Thus defpifed and treated as we juftly deferved by all the Powers of Europe, France herself extended more Compaffion to her greatest Enemy than we had fhewn to our best Ally.---She now thought herself fecure of laying the Foundation of fuch Debility in the House of Auftria, as would at least enable her to reduce it lower when she pleased, if she should find occafion for it.--She thought it more prudent to lie by after she had done this, till the might by the Emperor's Death, have Opportunity to break the Auftrian Succeffion, and avail herself of the Affiftance of the German Princes to undertake that then, which she had no Pretence to attempt during his Life; and which must have inevitably drawn thofe very German Powers against her, till that Event happened; much more she could not have done, without their Affiftance: She had fown, in all Appearance, a lafting Difcontent between the Empire and the Maritime Powers; fhe had it in her Power to join Lorrain to her own (already vaft) Domi-nions, and to add two Kingdoms to another Branch of the House of Bourbon: Both thefe Acquifitions required fome Time to be fettled in a Way to be usefully employed hereafter. ---By declining any farther Advantage for the prefent, fhe carried a Shew of Moderation and voluntary Abftinence, which the knew would effectually deceive the Fools, who abound and ftrengthen her Party, by their Credulity, in every State of Europe. All this induced her to conclude Peace with the Imperial Court (in which we were in no Degree confulted.) And The made her Confederates fubmit to it about October, 1736.

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By this Peace, notwithstanding all her former Affurances to the contrary, fhe made no Scruple to fecure Lorrain to herself: Which Country, with its Revenues, is able to furnish and maintain an Arm of 30,000 Men, and brought her Territores above 150 Miles more forward into Germany, than they had before extended on that Side; this enabled her at a much shorter Warning, and with a much fuperior Force, to attack the Empire, when the fhould afterwards fee occafion to do it: Compleating at the fame Time, an entire Influence over four Electors of the Empire, Palatine, Mentz, Triers and Cologne.-The Effects of which, we have vifibly feen by the Election of the prefent Emperor.-The Dominion given to the Infant Don Carlos, reduced the Forces of the Houfe of Auftria by above 40,000 Men, and added an equal Number to the oppofite Scale :-All this the Minifter of Britain brought about by his loudly felf-applauded Preventive and Defenfive Measures; and this, hampered by the Confequences of his pacifick Conduct, became, at length, out of his Power to prevent.

During the whole Period of this War, France was fo little apprehenfive of our being able to exert ourselves in Defence either of our Honour or our Intereft, that contrary to what, in fuch a Conjuncture, would have appeared a politick Part in her to act, fhe took every poffible Means to infult, to difgrace, and to triumph over our Weakness.-Dunkirk had been gradually. and privately restored, in Contravention to the most clear and pofitive Article of the Peace of Utrecht, that it fhould never be made a Port again, and the Minifter had connived at this Violation of that Treaty; though its dangerous Situation, in cafe of a future War with France, is fufficiently known and underftood.-But now France openly employed great Numbers of Men to cleanse the Harbour, and to raise Batteries upon the old Foundations of the former Works; infulted the Ships, not only of our Merchants, but of the Royal Navy of England, in very many Instances, affecting the fame Superiority at Sea, as fhe had too vifibly acquired, by our Conduct at Land; encouraged the Spaniards to continue their Depredations ; debauched and invited publickly, both them, and the Indian Nations in North America, to attempt our Settlements there; and what is even yet beyond all this, iffued an Arrêt, commanding all the British Subjects then in France, upon Pain of the Gallies, either immediately to depart the Kingdom, or to inlift in her Troops; and, in Confequence, imprisoned great Numbers, both of the English, Scotch and Irish, there.

Spain on her Part, had no fooner difmiffed our Fleet, which had convoyed her Troops to Italy upon the Expedition before

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