her diftreffed and faithful Subjects, in the defperate Condition to which they were reduced; it was therefore paft all doubt, that if thefe Measures were not purfued, fhe mult immediately accommodate with France upon any Terms; and that France, having broken the only Power, which could give her any Diverfion in an Attempt upon Great Britain, would have been immediately at Liberty to have joined her whole Power with that of Spain, and to have given Law to us :-This approaching Situation of our Affairs was but too vifible; nor was it at all extravagant, or very remote to forefee, that it would become much worfe; that fome of the Northern Powers might be induced to enter into her Views, and that even the Dutch might, at length, be obliged to act as Inftruments to the long premeditated Defign of that dangerous People, to destroy the Religion, Laws, Liberties and Commerce of this Nation.-This was plainly not to be averted by any other Means than these, and yet were thefe opposed, though at first in so aukward a Manner, that it was vifible they were afraid the People would be shocked at this fudden Turn, and detect their fhameful Inconfiftency, which juft Effect indeed it had with fome; yet with so many it fucceeded beyond their Expectations, that it encouraged them to a Conduct of the fame kind, fo extravagant, in the next Seffions of Parliament, as will hardly obtain Belief in future Ages.-But the Order of Time, which is neceffary to obferve in this Narration, prevents my giving a farther Deduction of it in this Place. I shall take the Liberty however to follow them in fome other Branches of their Conduct, as far as they went for the Remainder of that Seffions, during which they acted conftantly with due Regard to one or other of the Rules of that Plan before mention. The Lords having thrown out a Bill which the Commons had paffed, and which was by them thought neceffary to be carried at that Time, they made a daring Attempt against that Body, -they appointed a Committee to infpect their Journals, and grounded upon their Report a Vote of Cenfure upon that Branch of the Legiflature, they fortunately, mifcarried in that Attempt, in which, if they had fucceeded, the utmoft Confufion muft have enfued, and Confufion must have been their only View, for what elfe could be intended, when under the Notion of obliging the Lords to follow their Opinion, without which they pretended the Nation could not be fafe in future, they openly made an Attempt for an immediate Diffolution of a The Bill for indemnifying the Evidence against the Earl of Org ford. the Conftitution. Is the Conftitution now fo little understood, or has Popular Fury fo deftroyed all Traces of it, that it should be neceffary to explain its Principles at this Day?-Is it not founded upon this, which is the Corner-Stone of the whole Buildding, that the King, the Lords, and the Commons, fhould have an abfolute Negative upon the Proceedings of each other?-With what Face then can they, who pretend to ftruggle in favour of the Conftitution, by endeavouring to make the House of Commons more independant than it is, at the fame Time attack the Houfe of Lords, to deprive them totally of the fame Independancy, to which no man can deny that they have an equal Right; fuppofing that they were ever fo juftly founded, and entitled to procure further Securities for the Houfe of Commons, it is an incontrovertible Fact, that by this avowed Attempt, and indeed by all the Doctrines of late inftilled into. the Minds of the People, they aim at the Deftruction of the Conftitution in another Part, which is equally Effential,-the beft Pretenfions they therefore have, are only thefe; that they build with one Hand, and pull down with another; and that while they ftop one Breach against the Influence of the Crown, they open a wider, to the Democratical Spirit of the People, -the Conftitution may, nay, it has, fuffered equally from both --but what renders it doubly ridiculous, is, that the Crown will equally be able to enter in at the one Breach as at the other,and every thinking Man may eafily foretel, that by what Steps foever this Conftitution comes to be deftroyed, an absolute Power in a fingle Perfon, must be the final Confequence, -this Conduct therefore plainly opens to us, how false their Pretences to the Conftitution were, equally falfe with every other they have made. -For however, at times, both the King, the Lords, and the Commons, in their Turn, may have obftructed what was for the publick Good by this negative Power. -Yet this is no more than what muft, and ever will be, the Confequence of a Divifion of Power in this Constitution. --And if, whenever Power is in any degree abufed, it is immediately to be deftroyed.-No Government can ftand, for no Power can be given, but that it is liable to be fometimes exerted ill; yet furely no Man will venture to deny, that it is better to fubmit to fome unavoidable Events of Society, than to revert into a State of Nature; but this the People were too much heated to confider. It was inculcated, that all Power ought to lie in the People, which, if it be righty understood, implies, the People, including all its Magiftrates and Members, of which both the King and the Lords are undoubtedly a part. But if it be taken in the confined Senfe of Fac - tion, imports a Republican Propofition, wholly contradictory to the Genius, and the Principles of this Government; nay, if the People confidered this as they ought to do, so far from being incensed either with the Lords or with the Crown, for oppofing the Popular Points, which they have sometimes obftructed, they would not think themfelves intitled fo much as to repine at it, they would confider, that as they have a Title by the Laws of this Country, to fuch Powers in the State as they now enjoy, they are under no fort of Obligation to part with them to the third Eftate,-that this impetuofity to force them to it, is not only the ftrongest Provocation, but also no infufficient Reason to keep the Ground they have, that naturally speaking, by their permanent Intereft in the Legislature, their impoffibility of ever becoming Mafiers of the State, and their evident Intereft to keep both the Crown and the People from too great an Afcendancy; the Lords are the Part of the Conftitution, who are most likely to be fincere in its Prefervation, either from Tyranny or Faction, and therefore the moft proper to hold the Balance.-The Intereft of the Lords is undoubtedly to watch and carefully attend to both, for both may in fome Conjunctures, be fufpected to defire to engross the whole Power; -and whenever they throw themselves into either the one or the other Scale, a rational Man would sooner judge by their Conduct, how the State of the Conftitution ftands, than by any other Circumstance.-It was intended, they should do this, and be at full Liberty to do it; though fuch must be (and it ever was) their Fate, that which-ever Party they efpouse, whether that of the Crown, or of the People, the Heat and Paffion of the other will infallibly find fome Pretences of Partiality or private Intereft to charge them with, as their Inducements to that Conduct.-But they are made to ftand to all this, and they muft ftand this, and be fupported in it, or else our Conftitution cannot ftand. This defperate Measure however paffed upon the People, like the reft of their Conduct, as a generous attempt for Liberty, and answered the Purpose of Popularity, which, next to the View of Confufion, was their fecond Expectation from it. We now come to the popular Bills, with which the People have been fo much inflamed; of these I shall take the less Notice in this Place, because I have reserved my self to fay something farther in the Conclufion with regard to them.-But, tho' I fhall not here enter much into the Merits of these Bills, I muft speak a little of the Conduct of the Faction, with regard to them which cannot be paffed over, because their Impofition upon the People was extremely grofs, and their Dishonesty in imputing the Failure of them, (fo far as they have failed) to those who are far far more innocent in this Refpect than themfelves: They are chiefly comprehended in a Law for the better Regulation of Elections, another to prevent Members from fitting in the Houfe of Commons, who have Penfions from the Crown, in the Repeal of the Septennial Act, and a Law to exclude a certain Number of Placemen from fitting in the Houfe of Commons. -Now, as to the first of thefe, it is notorious to the whole Houfe of Commons, that it was a Bill, as much laboured by the Gentlemen of the new Administration, and many of thofe, who now fupport the Meafures of the Government, as it could poffibly be;-and that they were fincere, is evident, by what has been fince done with regard to the Scotch Elections in the laf. Seffions;-the true Reafon therefore that a general Bill did not pafs at that Time, was one which equally affected all Parties, and which will everlastingly prevent an effectual Bill of this kind; and this is the different Rights of Election, which are so numerous, that they distract and confound the different Interefts of Gentlemen, which, to fpeak fairly on all Sides, induces them, by one plaufible Pretence or other, for their private Regard, to oppofe, or to propofe, so many different Claufes, that fuch Bills at length become impracticable and impalatable to all-the Burgage Tenures too, which Gentlemen will neither part with, nor can tell how to regulate, are another invincible Obftruction; and the Powers and the Penalties create further Difficulties, which no Human Wisdom has yet been able to furmount.-For this Reason therefore, to impute the Failure of this Bill to any Set of Men, is notoriously unjuft, unless it were by laying it in fome Measure more feverely upon fome particular Gentlemen of the Faction itself, who contributed more eminently than others to confound that Part of it, which related to certain Counties, where they laboured to encrease the overgrown and almost unconstitutional Intereft they have already.-As to the Penfion Bill, it is a Bill allowed in private by all Parties to be impoffible to take Effect, because the giving and taking of Gratuities of this kind are Tranfactions of fo private a Nature, that Men muft be downright Fools, and both Partiesunite to make a Difcovery against themselves, or the Law could take no effect.—Even in the Cafe, that Perjury muft attend the Acceptance of a Penfion, it might induce fome profligate Men to double their Crime; - but it is not to be fuppofed, that he who would fell his Country, would hefitate to violate his Oath. However, this was the only poffible Provifion, and upon this Footing, an honourable Gentleman now in the Adminiftration, often prefented it to the Houfe ;-but the great Care of the prefent Patriots would not truft it any more in his Hands, after he was taken into Employment, and a wife and bufy H 2 Man 劃 Man among them took it upon himself, who being a true Tory, and therefore of a refined Confcience, and naturally prejudiced to Oaths, purged it of its deteftable Whig Claufe, which reduced it to a mere nothing, a Law without a Penalty, so that the Bill became a Jeft with all Parties, and many in that light voted for it then, who had always oppofed it before. -The Bill therefore fell into contempt, and was no longer regarded by any one, but him who had garbled it in this judicious manner.-Having thus related the fecret Hiftory of this popular Bill, I have only to add, that it is for the Intereft of the Publick it should never pafs into a Law, and was never defired by any Man of Senfe that it fhould ;-and yet that it is for the Intereft of the Publick, that it fhould be frequently propofed in the House of Commons, which double Confideration may render it very confiftent for the fame Man, to vote for it at one time, and to vote against it at another, this may feem a Paradox ; but it is eafily explained-for by frequently bringing it into debate, the Deteftation and Scandal of fo bafe a Practice, is maintained in its full Vigour, which is in reality the only Guard against it.— Whereas, if the Bill were once paffed, the great Nothing, which is defired, being effected, there would be no farther Discourse upon the Subject; thofe Opportunities of expofing the Meannefs and the Danger of the Thing, thofe animating anniversary Speeches against it would be loft; and with them in a great degree, the Remorfe and Shame, that now attend the Crime.We come in the next place to confider, the Behaviour of these Gentlemen with regard to the Repeal of the Septennial Law, in which they have deluded the People fcandaloufly: It is true, that they moved for this Repeal, and that fome of the Gentlemen in the Administration oppofed it; but they did it upon a Confideration, which ought to have, and will have the greatest Weight with every thinking Man; they took juft Notice of the tempestuous Temper of the People at that Time, and the yet unfettled Condition of our Affairs; they then observed, that the Repeal of this Law muft caufe a new general Election before it could be poffible that these Disorders fhould fubfide, and before they could make any folid Judgment of the effects of the late Change; that as every new Election hazarded, at least, the Syftem of the Time; foreign Nations would not exert themfelves in this Conjuncture; from a Dependance on the Principles of Men, who might probably be changed, and confequently new Politicks prevail, almoft as foon as they had been embarked with us ; -That as the like Confiderations had juftified the Measures of the Septennial Law at the Time it was made, fo the Conjuncture of this Time might prevail, at least so far, as to |