Political Economy of Unbalanced Development in ChinaYale University, 2002 - 390 頁 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 6 筆
第 5 頁
... implement concrete regional polices to fulfill the top leaders ' intention without sacrificing their own interests . Provincial officials have to decide what resources and strategies to use in order to influence the top leaders and ...
... implement concrete regional polices to fulfill the top leaders ' intention without sacrificing their own interests . Provincial officials have to decide what resources and strategies to use in order to influence the top leaders and ...
第 9 頁
... implementing its mandate ? With considerable fiscal and economic power at their disposal , are local officials able to challenge the authority of the central government by excessively pursuing their own interests ? How significant are ...
... implementing its mandate ? With considerable fiscal and economic power at their disposal , are local officials able to challenge the authority of the central government by excessively pursuing their own interests ? How significant are ...
第 74 頁
... implement the Maoist restoration . Prominent among the leftist factions was the clique of hard - line central planners represented by Chen Yun , former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission . While Chen , like Deng , had suffered ...
... implement the Maoist restoration . Prominent among the leftist factions was the clique of hard - line central planners represented by Chen Yun , former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission . While Chen , like Deng , had suffered ...
內容
Introduction | 1 |
The Revival of Shanghai | 43 |
The Sweeping and Unequal Decentralization | 73 |
著作權所有 | |
4 個其他區段未顯示
常見字詞
argued Author's interview Beijing billion RMB cent central bureaucrats central government central government's Chen Chen Yun China China's reform China's regional development Chinese government Chongqing Chubanshe cities coastal areas coastal provinces coastal regions competing politicians hypothesis conservatives Council debate decentralization Deng Xiaoping Diqu economic reform explaining favorable policies Fazhang fiscal Five-Year Plan foreign investors Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guangdong and Shanghai Guizhou Hong Kong important industrial inland institutionalism hypothesis interior regions investment Jiang Zemin Jiangsu Jingji leadership Li Peng ministries officials opening up program Party Secretary percent policy change policy disparities Politburo political power base preferential policies Premier priority Pudong Qinghai reform and opening reform and opening-up regional development policies regional development strategy regional disparities regional gap regional policies revenue SEZ Office SEZ policies Shanxi Shenzhen Shenzhen SEZ Shenzhen Tequbao Sichuan southern tour Special Economic Zones Tequ top leaders western provinces Yangtze River Delta Zhejiang Zhongguo Zhuhai