Political Economy of Unbalanced Development in ChinaYale University, 2002 - 390 頁 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 70 筆
第 5 頁
... leaders ' intention without sacrificing their own interests . Provincial officials have to decide what resources and strategies to use in order to influence the top leaders and central bureaucrats and win favors from them without ...
... leaders ' intention without sacrificing their own interests . Provincial officials have to decide what resources and strategies to use in order to influence the top leaders and central bureaucrats and win favors from them without ...
第 9 頁
... leaders use in appointing , removing and promoting provincial leaders naturally becomes one of the most important institutions shaping local officials ' incentives and behavior . In the era of reform and decentralization , the economic ...
... leaders use in appointing , removing and promoting provincial leaders naturally becomes one of the most important institutions shaping local officials ' incentives and behavior . In the era of reform and decentralization , the economic ...
第 157 頁
... provinces in economic growth rate since 1992 and the mounting pressure the provincial leaders in the interior regions put on the younger top leadership with its fragile power base . Before 1993 , China was controlled by the elder ...
... provinces in economic growth rate since 1992 and the mounting pressure the provincial leaders in the interior regions put on the younger top leadership with its fragile power base . Before 1993 , China was controlled by the elder ...
內容
Introduction | 1 |
The Revival of Shanghai | 43 |
The Sweeping and Unequal Decentralization | 73 |
著作權所有 | |
4 個其他區段未顯示
常見字詞
argued Author's interview Beijing billion RMB cent central bureaucrats central government central government's Chen Chen Yun China China's reform China's regional development Chinese government Chongqing Chubanshe cities coastal areas coastal provinces coastal regions competing politicians hypothesis conservatives Council debate decentralization Deng Xiaoping Diqu economic reform explaining favorable policies Fazhang fiscal Five-Year Plan foreign investors Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guangdong and Shanghai Guizhou Hong Kong important industrial inland institutionalism hypothesis interior regions investment Jiang Zemin Jiangsu Jingji leadership Li Peng ministries officials opening up program Party Secretary percent policy change policy disparities Politburo political power base preferential policies Premier priority Pudong Qinghai reform and opening reform and opening-up regional development policies regional development strategy regional disparities regional gap regional policies revenue SEZ Office SEZ policies Shanxi Shenzhen Shenzhen SEZ Shenzhen Tequbao Sichuan southern tour Special Economic Zones Tequ top leaders western provinces Yangtze River Delta Zhejiang Zhongguo Zhuhai