Political Economy of Unbalanced Development in ChinaYale University, 2002 - 390 頁 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 66 筆
第 5 頁
... top leaders . On the one hand , as the major intermediary between top leaders and provinces and the organs administering specific regional development policies , central bureaucrats have to follow top leaders ' instructions and execute ...
... top leaders . On the one hand , as the major intermediary between top leaders and provinces and the organs administering specific regional development policies , central bureaucrats have to follow top leaders ' instructions and execute ...
第 6 頁
... top leaders , central bureaucrats , and provincial officials . Top Leaders Although they do not deal with popular electoral pressure , top leaders at China's central government face two kinds of pressure : one is the survival of the ...
... top leaders , central bureaucrats , and provincial officials . Top Leaders Although they do not deal with popular electoral pressure , top leaders at China's central government face two kinds of pressure : one is the survival of the ...
第 177 頁
... top leaders ' opinions prevail in the Politburo , those regions following the top leaders closely might get the support of these top leaders for preferential treatment and gain priority in national development plans . Arranged by ...
... top leaders ' opinions prevail in the Politburo , those regions following the top leaders closely might get the support of these top leaders for preferential treatment and gain priority in national development plans . Arranged by ...
內容
Introduction | 1 |
The Revival of Shanghai | 43 |
The Sweeping and Unequal Decentralization | 73 |
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4 個其他區段未顯示
常見字詞
argued Author's interview Beijing billion RMB cent central bureaucrats central government central government's Chen Chen Yun China China's reform China's regional development Chinese government Chongqing Chubanshe cities coastal areas coastal provinces coastal regions competing politicians hypothesis conservatives Council debate decentralization Deng Xiaoping Diqu economic reform explaining favorable policies Fazhang fiscal Five-Year Plan foreign investors Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guangdong and Shanghai Guizhou Hong Kong important industrial inland institutionalism hypothesis interior regions investment Jiang Zemin Jiangsu Jingji leadership Li Peng ministries officials opening up program Party Secretary percent policy change policy disparities Politburo political power base preferential policies Premier priority Pudong Qinghai reform and opening reform and opening-up regional development policies regional development strategy regional disparities regional gap regional policies revenue SEZ Office SEZ policies Shanxi Shenzhen Shenzhen SEZ Shenzhen Tequbao Sichuan southern tour Special Economic Zones Tequ top leaders western provinces Yangtze River Delta Zhejiang Zhongguo Zhuhai