next your committee may want to strike or the censors may want to strike.

My recollection, without benefit of calendar and relying only on memory is the President came back from Key West. I met him at the airport, it must have been December 20 because I went to New York to make a speech on the 21st. I gave the President some additional data at lunch, after lunch at the Blair House on Thursday of that week-it should be the 22d, if I figured correctly; check me Senator-and at that time found out that I had lost my fight on Formosa.

The President did not disagree with the military considerations that were coming to him that day or a day or two later-I don't have the date but it is before the 23d-from the Joint Chiefs of Staff urging the sending of a military mission. I was told without quoting him directly, that he wasn't going to argue with me about the military considerations but that on political grounds he would decide with the State Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was the last word?
Chairman RUSSELL. State Department.

Mr. JOHNSON. I recall it very vividly because it is one of those things you get into, and because after that the President gave me clearance to go on and take 4 or 5 days in Florida following spending Christmas Day at home, and while I was in Florida Mr. Early I believe called me and said there was to be a Security Council on the 29th, and if anybody ever got hell in the press for not being at that hearing on the 29th, I did, but I told Mr. Early on the telephone that the matter was already decided, there was no point in my being there, and unless the President wanted me to come back for it, I would stay until the 30th or whatever day I did come back. That is what I mean by the first block that I wanted to answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you move into the second, do you care to state the nature of the political considerations

Senator WILEY. You fellows talk. Why can't we hear you back here?

Mr. JOHNSON. Don't you hear me?

Senator WILEY. You talk between yourselves. The rest of us are entitled to hear.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING FORMOSA IN DECEMBER 1949

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you move into the field of the decisions taken in June, did he care to state the nature of the political considerations which caused the overruling of his recommendation as to the mission to Formosa in December 1949.

Senator WILEY. I can hear that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. The President did not give me the nature of those. I knew about them only from my discussions with members of the State Department, and I cannot probe the President's mind as to which of the various arguments that were advanced were the persuasive ones.

Senator WILEY. Let's get the State Department

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you state the reasons that were assigned to you by the representatives of the State Department for disagreeing with your recommendations?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that would be unfair to the State Department because to me those reasons were not satisfactory; although after the President ruled, I abided by that decision.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I did not ask you your views as to the unfairness of it; I asked you if you would give us the reasons that were advanced by the State Department for disagreeing with your conclusion that a mission should be sent to Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, at the meeting on December 29 when they formally advanced their reasons I was not present. Senator WILEY. What did they say to you before?

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you discussed this recommendation that you made in December 1949 with the Secretary of State? Mr. JOHNSON. I had.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he state to you whether he approved or disapproved of your recommendation?

Mr. JOHNSON. He did not approve of them at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he give you any reason as to why he disapproved of them?

Mr. JOHNSON. He felt we would lose face with other governments in Asia whose friendship and support we needed; that it might be adversely construed in Japan itself; that he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Nationalist Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. What other governments did he mention that we would lose face with in the event your recommendations were approved? Did he mention any by name?

Mr. JOHNSON. The only one I recall at the moment was the Indian situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Indian?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure there were others mentioned. I want to be absolutely fair in that.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir; now you may go to the change in policy in June, I believe.

DISCUSSIONS ON FORMOSA IN JUNE 1950

Mr. JOHNSON. Filling in the gaps on the Blair House meeting— everyone arrived on time, but shortly before the time for dinner everyone was there except, I believe Secretary Matthews, who came in a few minutes later.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was that Sunday night the 25th, now?
Mr. JOHNSON. This is Sunday night the 25th; yes, sir.

The Secretary of State talked about the action of the United Na- V tions and discussions with other people he had had.

I then brought up Formosa; said I was still concerned about Formosa in considering the security of the United States.

I felt that Formosa entered into our security more than Korea, but I wasn't discussing at that moment the Korean situation; and that General Bradley and I had just returned, the day before, from Japan, and while there we had talked with General MacArthur about many things, and among them was the Formosa question; that General MacArthur had prepared a memorandum on Formosa which I thought was brilliant and to the point, and that I was asking General Bradley to read that memorandum.

General Bradley did read, from start to finish, that memorandum of General MacArthur on Formosa, without interruption.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you remember about when that memorandum was signed by General MacArthur, when it was prepared? Mr. JOHNSON. He had the outline of it, not in final copy, form, or shape, the first conference we had with him in Japan.

Senator WILEY. The date?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know what date the memorandum bears. It was given to me on the day I left Japan, and

Chairman RUSSELL. June 1950?

Mr. JOHNSON. In June 1950, which was a couple of days before I landed in Washington. I came nonstop.

I don't know its date. I don't have a copy. If you gentlemen don't have a copy, I am sure it is available. I furnished copies after that meeting to the White House, the Secretary of State, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three Secretaries.

Upon completion of the reading of it, the dinner, which had been. delayed a few minutes, started. Up until the time of dessert there was no discussion that had any particular bearing, as I recall, although it was serious discussion of world conditions, and so forth.

During dessert, maybe before the dessert plates were taken out, for we continued at that table all evening, the Secretary of State again brought up the Korean question; and when he had talked a little bit, I interrupted to say that before we got into that too deeply I wanted to discuss Formosa further.

The only really violent discussion Secretary Acheson and myself ever had took place for a moment. I don't recall particularly what he said. I remember my reply, that relatively the security of the United States was more affected by Formosa than Korea, and I should insist upon its being discussed. The President at that time indicated that we would take Formosa up later.

There was no further discussion in that meeting about Formosa. until the motion was made the next night.

DECISIONS OF JUNE 25, 1950

When the President took over the meeting, Secretary Acheson stated the picture as he saw it on Korea. The President then turned to me and asked the views of Defense.

I stated that before I replied, since the Joint Chiefs had no recommendations to make, I should like to call on each of the members of the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman and each of the Secretaries.

That was done. A major portion of the evening was taken in the individual, unrehearsed, and unprepared and uncoordinated statements of the several Chiefs and the Secretaries, the President asking a number of questions that showed he had a great knowledge of where our troops were and the military situation.

The President indicated we would adjourn until the morrow and I said, "There are two things I haven't discussed with the Secretaries and the Chiefs; I should like to do so and will do unless you order me not to. The first is that General Bradley and I just a few days ago had seen the fleet in the Philippines. I should like now to start the fleet moving, whether they stop at Japan or not, moving to that. part of the world. It is a several days' trip."

The President said, "That is a good idea, do it." I turned to Admiral Sherman and said, "If you will excuse yourself, you get it started right away."

I said, "Secondly, there are these little islands" and I hope the censor will strike this out-"there are these little islands back of Formosa owned by us." Someone in the meeting disagreed with me. I said, without arguing it, "There are these little islands back of Formosa owned by us, on one of which the jets can land. Regardless of whatever may be the decisions on the morrow, Mr. President, I should like, with your permission, to order the jets in that part of the world moved in on one of those islands that will land them.

The President thought that was a good idea, not prejudging the question, and I asked General Vandenberg to excuse himself, and get that started since it was 10 o'clock in the morning, comparatively, over there. That was it.

We then adjourned, without any other decisions having been made.

MEETING ON JUNE 26, 1950

There were these discussions the next day. We met on Monday night at the Blair House. At the beginning of the meeting the Secretary of State moved, reading from a prepared statement, that we send the Navy and the Air Force in, as you know.

Chairman RUSSELL. Please speak a little louder.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am trying to think this thing out.
Senator WILEY. The acoustics are not very good.

Senator BREWSTER. This may spur him on. It is the one thing that he shares with Secretary Acheson, and that is great difficulty in being heard back here.

Mr. JOHNSON. In what?

Senator BREWSTER. Great difficulty in being heard back here.
Mr. JOHNSON. I wanted to know what that was.

Reading from a prepared paper, the Secretary of State moved, in the sense of suggesting to the President, that we use the Navy and the Air Force, as you gentlemen know from the release the next day.

The military neither recommended it nor opposed it. We had on the previous evening pointed out the difficulties and the limitations, and there was further discussion of the difficulties and limitations on this Monday night.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, that was the Navy and Air Force with regard to Formosa?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. He is speaking about the use of the Air and Navy in Korea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I understood it.

Mr. JOHNSON. The President then made the decision to go into Korea with the two. I thought the decision was right then and I think so now.

Someone with the Secretary of State presented a paper for release. It was not satisfactory to the military, and anyway the President wanted to talk to the Congress. So, the staffs of the two departments worked until about 2 o'clock in the morning preparing a state

83797-51-pt. 4--2

ment for the President to be shown and discussed with the Members of Congress and for the press.

In the early morning when we got that statement-I had gone to bed-General Bradley and myself discussed the last prepared statement and found it in certain respect unsatisfactory.

I called the President, and about 8 o'clock General Bradley and myself, as I recall, maybe Mr. Early went along, I am not sure about that, saw the President to discuss this statement, and found that the President had been up a long time.

He had changed this draft I am referring to, and I believe had it recopied, and on comparison we found that the three or more suggestions that General Bradley and I thought were essential to be made had been by the President incorporated in his own draft, in the draft that the President showed to the representatives of the Congress that came down and which became public, with the President's own corrections, a partial rewrite of what the staff had worked on for the past-from 2 o'clock in the morning.

That, I think, covers both of those situations, and to the best of my ability I have done it without indulging in personalities and without violating the President's confidence.

Senator SMITH. May I make one suggestion?

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES CONSULTED ON KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. If you will pardon me for just one moment, I want to make one.

Frequent references have been made here to the conferences with members of these committees, with respect to the matters about which Colonel Johnson has testified. I do not know just what members of both committees were present, but I am advised by Senator Bridges, who is the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, according to his recollection the representatives of this committee who were then present were the then chairman of this committee, Senator Millard Tydings, of Maryland, and the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges.

I thought that the record should clear that up, and I do not know who was present from the Foreign Relations Committee. I assume the chairman, the Senator from Texas, was present, Mr. Connally, and the ranking member, the Senator from Wisconsin, or Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. The Senator from Wisconsin was in Wisconsin, I think, in connection with his election, and I think I was asked to go in his place.

Mr. JOHNSON. You were there.

Senator SMITH. As the Secretary will remember, I was there. Chairman RUSSELL. I just want the record to show which members of this committee were present at these conferences.

Mr. JOHNSON. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I created confusion. Chairman RUSSELL. There wasn't any confusion. It has been through the thread of all this testimony about these Blair House meetings, and I thought that the record should show conclusively.

Now gentlemen, I have used much more than my time, for which I apologize, and I will now call upon Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY, Mr. Chairman, I don't mind if you in your examination asked the Secretary many questions.