all know what I mean, but somebody might think that it was an apology. I am making no apology. The record is all right.

"Apologia" means to me an explanation of the history of a thing within the circumstances surrounding it, and in no sense an apology, and I appreciate, Senator George, your asking that question, because the things that have been asked of me today indicate that up until this time pretty largely there were just weeds in this garden; and I go back to my high-school days when a very distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Hoar, at the turn of the century, told a

story.

He said in these lawns which he wanted to protect that he put up "No trespass" signs; it did not do any good. He put up "Keep off the grass" signs and it didn't do any good, and then at the suggestion of some of the ladies in the family, he put up a sign "Please don't trample on the flowers," and that worked. Senator George, there are some flowers in this whole situation.

Senator GEORGE. I thought that the facts that you brought out should be in this record.

Mr. JOHNSON. I thank you very much, sir; I deeply appreciate it and am deeply grateful because the story has never been told.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire those other matters to be printed in the appendix?

Mr. JOHNSON. I gave the speech to the reporter.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is the third speech that he has; I gave him all of that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you wish that which you did not read printed in the appendix, Colonel?

if

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it should be.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will repeat, it will be printed in the appendix. Senator Johnson?

MANNER OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say you, you had been a member of the Cabinet when the decision was made to remove General MacArthur you would have advocated other methods being employed in the removal?

Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe I should not have said it the way I did.
What it was intended to be was this-

Senator WILEY. You are talking that way, now.

Mr. JOHNSON. The stature of MacArthur is so great, his military record is so superb, and his desire to serve the country, and what he believes are the country's interests are so controlling that if I had been one of those with whom the President conferred about ousting him, I would have asked that it be done a little differently, whether he let me do it, or somebody else.

Senator JOHNSON. That is what I understood.

Mr. JOHNSON. And I believe that my past relations with the President on such matters was such that I had a conviction that, with his desire not to hurt anybody unnecessarily, he would have permitted me, or somebody else, to do just that.

That is one time that I was sorry I was not in the Cabinet.

JUSTIFICATION FOR MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator JOHNSON. Now you are speaking about the methods to be employed in notifying a man he is out, and my question is-I want tọ know, in the light of the situation that existed, would you have favored his recall?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Johnson, I would like to answer that, but all I know about the situation that existed is what, in the press, has been said about it, in Secretary Acheson's testimony before this committee, because I have read no other testimony and that I have only read in the New York Times.

I have had access to no other records.

Senator JOHNSON. So you don't care to express an opinion as to whether or not his recall was justified?

Mr. JOHNSON. Without all the facts, it could only muddy up the

water.

If the President had lost confidence in him, and I think someone else said that before, as I read in the newspapers, there should have been a change made because he is the Commander in Chief, I will go that far with you; but what the facts were, I don't know.

I wouldn't buck the President's decision, if he had lost confidence in the general.

I would only argue on the matter and manner of his going.

Senator JOHNSON. So you would have disapproved heartily and vigorously the method employed in removing him, but that doesn't mean that you would not have favored the recall?

Mr. JOHNSON. If, knowing all the facts, I had reached that conclusion.

COMMENTS ON MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Have you read the recommendations General MacArthur made to the Congress, on the program that he should like to put into effect?

Mr. JOHNSON. As carried in the newspapers, I have.

I heard that on television.

Senator JOHNSON. On page 198 of the Senate document-I am quoting from that document-General MacArthur saysChairman RUSSELL. What was that page?

Senator JOHNSON. Page 198, at the bottom of the page:

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:

First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Was that at the bottom of page 198?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I am inclined to agree with that.
Senator JOHNSON. Second:

The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

Do you favor that recommendation?

Mr. JOHNSON. I discussed that when I was in the Defense Department with Admiral Sherman, asked that some research be made on the definition under international law of what constitutes an act of

war and what does not. As long as you are talking about the China coast, my instinct would be to blockade the China coast. As I read the newspapers you were talking about blockading the Russian ports above. I don't go along with that.

Senator JOHNSON. The third recommendation is:

Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Can you give us your opinion on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I have been out of there since last September 18, and I am just a civilian armchair strategist.

Upon the basis of the information I had then, I realized that in the absence of the North Koreans quitting, we couldn't go along with the Russian policy of bleeding us dry in Korea forever; that the time had come when the things you are here discussing would be things that we would have to do. And on that, if I had the confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I had when I left the Defense Department, I would have followed their judgment.

Senator JOHNSON. And fourth:

Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.

I would appreciate your comments on that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, somebody said, I saw somewhere, that I had been counsel for Dr. Soong. I saw that somewhere in the press. I am not and never have been.

Senator BREWSTER. Just a little confidential now.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not and never have been.

And the Chinese lobby, I have never been a part of it and don't know who they are, except I see Kohlberg's literature quite frequently in the mail.

I want to clear that atmosphere in the light of all the continuing questions.

If mine were the deciding voice on doing that, I would have been furnishing equipment if the group I wanted to send over to study this situation thought they could handle equipment and could train the people. I wanted to get first-hand facts from our own military people. That I have never seen.

But so far as lifting the restrictions and letting them drag us into war over there at the present time, I would not.

PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF WITNESS

Senator JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to ask any embarrassing questions, and I am totally unfamiliar with the matter that you are talking about. We have had the recommendations of General MacArthur and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in whom I know you have great confidence, and I just wanted to have in the record any recommendations that you cared to make on two principal points.

Mr. JOHNSON. I really don't have any. I don't want to be an armchair strategist. I was doing my best by not talking. You know I haven't talked. You tried to get me to answer questions one night and I didn't do it—just an ordinary casual inquiry about it. I try to

be a good American and now where I don't know on things that happened before and which I don't have the information afterwardI don't mean to be cagey but I don't want to get into something without it and argue against the Joint Chiefs or somebody over there who has all the information, and the President, when I don't have it.

Senator JOHNSON. So you would not make a recommendation one way or the other on our providing logistical support to Chiang's troops?

Mr. JOHNSON. I said from what I know I would and if the military mission recommended it, I would. We do things like that in other places in the world where our Government doesn't trust the leaders, I imagine, any more than some people trust Chiang. We take the tools where we find them and use them. I can make-as I said at Blair House that night, I can make right violent speeches against some of the people we play with in the world, but with me it is the security of the United States, and I firmly believe that Formosa in the hands of an unfriendly people, the Communists, is inimical to the security of the United States, because you can reach from there, among other things, places you can't reach from the mainland of China.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you care to express an opinion on the advisability of bombing Manchuria?

[Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSON. Would you also follow their recommendations on the other points I have enumerated?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you had all the Joint Chiefs in agreement, the answer is yes-and the Chairman.

WISDOM OF $13 BILLION DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL 1951

Senator JOHNSON. The $13 billion budget figure that you referred to in reply to Senator George's question was not your figure; it was the figure given you by the Director of the Budget and by the President.

Mr. JOHNSON. Not only wasn't given to me-I never heard it until it was thrown out to all of us gathered there in the room, and that after Mr. Forrestal had spent 2 months and I spent all this time with Eisenhower on the fourteen-billion-six figure. No, sir.

I then went back and got $500,000,000 back. But we did, on cutting out this fat, we did get enough money, as far as the Air Force, more than we would have gotten on the fourteen billion six.

Senator JOHNSON. As you look back on it, do you think that $13,000,000,000 figure was a mistake?

Mr. JOHNSON. If a Republican had asked that question, I would understand it.

Senator WILEY. You would be suspicious, wouldn't you?

Chairman RUSSELL. We are trying to conduct a nonpartisan inquiry here as far as we can.

Mr. JOHNSON. There is certainly proof of it there.

Chairman RUSSELL. We don't always do it, but we have tried.

Senator JOHNSON. I have tried never to operate as Republican or Democrat on questions of fairness.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will you answer it as a Republican or Democrat?

Mr. JOHNSON. The climate on the Hill, the climate of the President's economists and all the rest of the economists, the climate of the world at that moment-the airlift having been successful-the climate was, there was going to be peace.

It was on that basis that the 13 billion was a figure that everybody accepted, as I have tried to demonstrate here today.

Senator JOHNSON. I am familiar with what happened.

Mr. JOHNSON. It was not my figure. I protested the figure: I tried to get it raised, but all I was seeking was back to the fourteen six. If it isn't clear, I am not sorry I didn't resign, but I did the best I

could with it.

Senator JOHNSON. I want your opinion today, not then. I wanted you to tell us as you look back on it, whether you think it was a serious mistake we made, without referring to who made the decision or who is responsible for it. I want your opinion on whether you thought it was a serious mistake.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are going to get a surprising answer. If before the budget was applied you had given 30 billion, or 40 or 60 or 70 billion to the Military Establishment before you cut out the waste and the extravagance and put them away from desks out in the field. and made the ships get ready to go instead of floating around dangerously without control-if you had furnished this money before that was done, that would have gone down a rat hole.

That is an exaggeration to make the point.

Therefore, I think somebody from above guided this economy thing to the extent we got a base established that we can successfully build on and you can operate in Korea.

I believe, therefore, the $13 billion was good.

Senator JOHNSON. Don't search my mind for what answer I expect. Very frankly, I didn't know what kind of answer I would get, and I don't know yet what your answer has been. I asked you the question: Do you think that $13 billion figure was a mistake? And I gather from what you just said that you don't think it was.

Mr. JOHNSON. The amount it would buy, it was a mistake, but it would have been a mistake to have given the services-any one of the three-any more money at that time until you got them in shape that they could use money.

Senator JOHNSON. Were the services, any of them, appropriated more money than was actually used?

Mr. JOHNSON. On the contrary, speaking in generalities, I guess the Navy is the best illustration, I found out sometime afterward, when we got people in there and were checking it, that the Navy spending, they had probably $3 or $4 billion that you didn't know about on the Hill that they had been spending during the 2 or 3 years before I went over there, out of fat, taking the money and using it for the things they had to spend money, but they had all this other stuff.

The Air Force was in the worst shape on this. The Army was in about as good shape as the Navy.

Therefore, when they were hit with $13 billion, they weren't cut from $14.4, that everybody thought they were, but they had all this fat they had piled up in previous years they were really living on. So the blow was really worse. They had to begin to live within the budget. They didn't have much more of this fat left.