IMPOUNDING OF CERTAIN FUNDS FROM AIR FORCE

Senator JOHNSON. Were you consulted about the decision that was reached to impound certain funds appropriated to the Air Force?

Mr. JOHNSON. I was not, and that is one I want to amplify. I gave Secretary Symington-and I am not sure whether it was General Vandenberg or Norstad, but one of them-clearance to go to the White House and to the Budget the minute that thing came through on the Hill.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you remember how much that was?

Mr. JOHNSON. I know it was enough to bring it up to 70 groups. You have the figures. You were one of the leaders in that thing. Senator JOHNSON. I don't have that exact figure; that is why I asked you.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it was two-hundred-and-some million dollars. Have you got it there? I would recognize it if you used it.

Senator JOHNSON. I asked General Mudge for the figure, and he says, "McNeil is checking for any subsequent amounts impounded in subsequent budgets."

He said about $822 million, but I think that was, of course, during the period when Secretary Forrestal was Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSON. I authorized them to go. Then it seems the deadlock-maybe one oughtn't talk about this-but the deadlock between House and Senate had been pretty deep, and I think the deadlocks were resolved with a full knowledge and appreciation the President was going to impound; and to none of that was I a party, nor was it ever discussed with me by Budget or by the President or by Senators.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Might I again ask the chairman our plans for the afternoon? Are we going to adjourn after this inquiry?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if I understand this unanimous-consent agreement, if all of the time is consumed, there can't be a vote until 4 or 5 o'clock.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Two o'clock and two-thirty, I think, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. That may be what it means, but I wasn't on the floor. I do have the unanimous-consent agreement before me. It says:

Ordered, That when the Senate reconvenes on the calendar day of Thursday, June 14, 1951, Mr. Neely have the floor; and his time to discuss his motion to recommit the bill be limited to 1 hour, that the time thereafter be limited to 1 hour and 30 minutes on the side.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, most respectfully and subject to error, there is a question by Senator Wherry that the vote on the recommital will be at 2 o'clock and the vote on the bill will be at 2:30. I read the Congressional Record this morning. I don't want to assert myself incorrectly, but I think that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has the advantage of me, if he read the Record, because I did not.

According to the unanimous-consent request, after Senator Neely has spoken for an hour, the time thereafter will be limited to 1 hour and 30 minutes on the side.

Senator STENNIS. One hour, with thirty minutes to each side, was the agreement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it is very apparent that the Members who were more diligent in their attendance at the Senate yesterday than I, are of the opinion that there will be a vote by 2 o'clock.

In that event, Senator Smith, after you have concluded your questions, we will take a recess until tomorrow morning.

Senator JOHNSON. Tomorrow morning?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I thank the chairman for the information. Chaiman RUSSELL. If they vote at 2 o'clock, is there any reason why we could not have an afternoon session at 2:30?

Senator BREWSTER. Unless you want to hear Senator McCarthy. Chairman RUSSELL. I will have an afternoon session. I would not like to deny any member of the committee that privilege, and he may return for his round of questions.

Senator GREEN. The latest at 2:30, I think.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will then recess after Senator Smith concludes his period of questioning, until 2: 30, or within 5 minutes after the conclusion of the vote, whichever is earlier.

You may proceed, Senator Smith.

DISCUSSION OF USING GROUND TROOPS IN KOREA AT BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS,

JUNE 1950

Senator SMITH. Secretary Johnson, I want to take this occasion to thank you sincerely for the cooperation you gave me, when I was trying to get some light on these subjects, in assisting me to go to the Far East in the fall of 1949.

I want to ask you, first of all, one or two questions about the Blair House meetings of June 27 and June 30 in order to get my own thinking straight on that.

Let me ask you if you can identify the statement made by the President of the United States to a group, of which I was a member, on the 27th of June in this little book published for the use of the committees entitled "Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East"?

Ön page 11 there appears to be the statement of June 27, 1950. I just want to identify that in passing, and call your attention to one expression there.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no reason to question the accuracy of that

statement.

Senator SMITH. Now, in that statement of the President's, he says, in the first paragraph:

In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

As I recollect that meeting at which I was present and, of course, you were present, there was no question of ground troops at that time. Mr. JOHNSON. On the contrary, you were told there at that meeting that ground troops were not planned to be used.

Senator SMITH. That is my recollection.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Secretary, on page 15 of this same document we have the statement by the President of the United States of July 3, 1950, 3 days later, on further military action in Korea. Mr. JOHNSON. What page?

Senator SMITH. Page 14, F, statement F there in the compilation. That was the statement that was released, was read to the group that I was a member of, again, on that day, and you will note in that statement at the very end it says, "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units."

Mr. JOHNSON. That was the purpose of the meeting, to tell you
Senator SMITH. That is what I understood.

that.

Should we have understood at that time that in addition to supporting ground units, which I think we were told were to help the evacuation of our people and also to protect the beachhead at Pusan, we were going to add additional ground units without further conference with Members of the Congress?

As I recall it, we were advised that certain of the troops that MacArthur had in Japan would be sent over for the purpose of maintaining that beachhead and assisting in the evacuation of our nationals and give them such aid as we needed for the progress of the campaign.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, sir, that there was some discussion of that, and I took the position that we had reached the stage in this operation where when MacArthur was asking additional troops and we were moving them in from all parts of the world, that we ought to quit talking about what we were sending in there because it was undoubtedly of aid to the enemy, so there was no further discussion of it. I don't think there had been any discussion of that point prior to the issuance of this item F.

Senator SMITH. Well, do you recall whether at that time so far as the Department of Defense was concerned, it was your expectation that from then on in we would try to send in such ground troops as might be needed to carry on an aggressive campaign and to clear up the Korean situation?

Mr. JOHNSON. We expected to do that. This is June the 30th, you see, and we have asked MacArthur for his recommendations. You will have the file and I won't, that the final recommendations of MacArthur were not in on June 30.

Senator SMITH. Those recommendations came later?
Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

IN JUNE 1950

Senator SMITH. Now, do you recall as this whole situation was developing that we contemplated the possibility of the Chinese Communist troops and also of Russian troops coming in before the Korean situation was cleaned up, or did you anticipate that we could clean up the North Koreans and that is all that would have to be done?

Mr. JOHNSON. Some of you brought that up at the first White House meeting after the Korean business. It was discussed at Blair House on Sunday night, some questions asked about it on Monday night.

It was the thing that was always in the background, but the decision to do what we did was in the light of the possibility of those things, as I answered Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SMITH. And we took what might be called a calculated risk at that time?

Mr. JOHNSON. Very definitely.

Senator SMITH. That the Chinese Communists might come in, as they ultimately did come in?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now you stated earlier today in your opening statement that the Defense Department did not anticipate the attack on South Korea from North Korea. You did not expect that that would happen.

[Deleted.]

DISCUSSION OF THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA DURING KOREAN AID

Senator SMITH. Well, now I just want to call your attention to the fact that in July of 1949 our committee-that is before I went out there myself and had my own first-hand observation of the situation-at that time was contemplating aid to Korea prior to the ECA aid.

In our report at that time we used this language. This is on page 5 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2319, "A bill to promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providign aid to the Republic of Korea." This document is dated July 22, 1949. In that document we said-I don't recall whether you appeared before our committee or not. I think the State Department was advocating this aid, but we said in that document:

Communists constitute an unsleeping menace to the independence and the economic recovery of the South Korean Republic. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China lie close by and on the northern border a Communist Korean organization is ready to seize control of the Republic if the opportunity ever presents itself. I am wondering why if that was brought to our attention and it was embodied in our report, the Defense Department did not have the same view, or did they have the same view at that time?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the Defense Department was pretty much in agreement with a number of people on the Hill who were right about this thing all the way through. You didn't wobble, the Joint Chiefs didn't wobble too much when we got the political separated from the military.

Senator SMITH. Well, now we have another instance. I am reading now from the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3304

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't have that.

Senator SMITH. "A bill to amend the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which is the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950." This is dated March 24, 1950.

I don't think this came before your Department at all. I think this is work we were doing with the State Department.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't remember that bill at all.

Senator SMITH. On economic assistance. In that we said this, on page 29 of that report of our committee:

Since 1945 when our troops occupied South Korea the United States has extended various types of assistance to the Korean people. Through this aid we

hope to strengthen the Republic of Korea so that it may successfully withstand the constant threat of Communist expansion from the north and serve as a possible nucleus for the eventual unification of the country on a democratic basis. And on page 33 in the same report we said:

South Korea has a new and untried government; it confronts a refugee problem of serious dimensions; it is under constant threat from the north and must maintain a large internal police force.

Now in light of those conditions and in light of the fact that we were giving I think $150,000,000 of appropriations for economic assistance there, we all felt that we were in danger of this invasion from the north and this military threat. I am not quite clear what you meant by your statement earlier today that the Defense Department did not anticipate the possibility of this attack on South Korea. Why did we withdraw our troops and why was our policy what it was at that time?

DIVIDED COMMAND BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

Before you answer that, let me say this: When I arrived in Tokyo, General MacArthur pointed out to me something that amazed me. He said:

You know, the commands out here are divided. I have the responsibility for the island areas from Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific. As far as the mainland of China is concerned, that is not in my jurisdiction. That is in the hands of the Navy. As far as Korea is concerned, it is in the hands of the State Department.

He said:

Undoubtedly if we have some trouble out here, I will be asked as the commander of our forces in the entire Far East to take the responsibility, but I don't have the policy making in these areas or any voice in it.

Now does that explain why we do not seem to have been prepared for this Korea attack?

Mr. JOHNSON. The best answer I can give, that we then did not have the two departments functioning as they should and the answers coming up, but the decision to come out of Korea was long before my time.

Senator SMITH. I realize that-I realize that, and it disturbed me when I was there.

I was rather talked into the idea that I was justified in recommending $150 million in economic aid to Korea; but I realized, also, when I was in Korea, that while they had an army there, the army wasn't adequately equipped, or supplied, and really wasn't prepared for the attack that came later.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know whether you recall it, but after you returned, you came down and met with me and some of the rest of the establishment, and you were most helpful

it.

Senator SMITH. I do recall it.

Mr. JOHNSON. In your analysis of the picture, and we appreciated

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

But, I was just wondering whether the Korean situation fell into a sort of unclassified area, because of the differences of jurisdiction, and the fact you stated a minute ago, the Departments were not properly coordinated in that field.