Mr. JOHNSON (continuing). Seen the statement which had been called to my attention, that I was personal attorney or had been personal attorney for Dr. H. H. Kung.

I stated in as positive language as I knew how to make it that I had never been and am not now. I think that was pertinent to whatever question I was asked, but I then added on my own volition, because of these very elements you talk about, that if there was a China lobby, I did not know it; and that I am not and have never been a part thereof; and the nearest I have come to Mr. Kohlberg-if that is his name, and that is correct-is to receive some of the letters and literature that he has mailed out.

I made it unequivocal, sir, and I appreciate, though, the spirit in which you bring that up. I cannot give you the page

Senator MORSE. That is all right.

Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe the chairman has his finger on it there.

Senator MORSE. I should have checked the transcript. This has been a very busy day, including a high-school commencement for a daughter this afternoon, and that is why I have been away from the hearing most of the day.

However, I made up my mind that I would give you an opportunity to make a statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to add one other thing to that, if I may. Chairman RUSSELL. You may, but Senator Morse's time has expired. Mr. JOHNSON. This is still answering his question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; you may on the committee's time. Mr. JOHNSON. I have checked with my law firm. It has never lobbied on the Hill for anybody on any subject, sir, save the exception that on two instances Louis Johnson has lobbied on the Hill. The first was as national commander of the American Legion, when the cuts were made in 1933, when I was then national commander; and I fought every way I could, and with some measure of success, in restoring to the rolls, through legislative action and by Presidential Executive order, the people who were really service-connected and who had been hurt in those blanket orders.

And the second time I lobbied on the Hill, sir, and the only other time that I recall at all, was when I lobbied for the Department of Defense. There are no other instances that I recall.

Senator MORSE. Which was your duty.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, it is now 20 minutes to 6. It is very evident that we cannot conclude with Secretary Johnson this afternoon, so we will be compelled to ask you to return in the morning, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. Are you sure they are not through?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; I have advices that there are still some questions to be propounded to you, and I think I should put you on notice when we get a witness here at 10 o'clock in the morning and the committees are fresh, he very seldom ever does get through until at least 1 o'clock, and I can't promise you we will be through by 1 tomorrow, but I sincerely hope so.

At this juncture we will take a recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon at 5:40 p. m. the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene on Friday, June 15, 1951, at 10:04 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:04 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden clerk, Verne D. Mudge, committee staff, Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.
Senator McMahon?

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS A. JOHNSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-Resumed

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, before proceeding with some questions, just appropos of your statement on the demobilization that we followed under the so-called point system-while I have no desire to say a good word for the point system, I think that it is true that the men who had served 2, 3, 4, or 5 years in World War II, having come

Mr. JOHNSON (continuing). See called to my attention, that I w personal attorney for Dr. H. H. K

I stated in as positive languaș had never been and am not now. ever question I was asked, but cause of these very elements yo lobby, I did not know it; an part thereof; and the neares is his name, and that is cor literature that he has maile

I made it unequivocal, which you bring that up Senator MORSE. That Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe Senator MORSE. I sl been a very busy day. daughter this aftern hearing most of the However, I made to make a statemen Mr. JOHNSON. I Chairman Rus Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman R Mr. JOHNS lobbied on the that on two first was as cuts were! fought eve ing to th tive orde been hu And time :'

Defe

y anxious to return to their r families, which is perfectly we have to put together in

ORLD WAR II

ault was not necessarily in the d not have a continuous replaceot given all of that time in helping d those who had the natural desire

ch as anything else accounted for some

quite right, Senator Knowland. We ous replacement system or else we should Yould have argued to the Congress had I ent position at that time.

ded by units not less than regiments. I erday, but I dug out last night, a speech I at Parkersburg, W. Va., which is typical May I read the one paragraph?

Yes, sir.

ation was not well thought out. Actually the method Quals on the plan of points overnight reduced an Army lid organization into an aggregation of individuals way home. We now know that this was not the right ga diplomatic price for it. Under that system an air ly find itself without pilots or a tropical base without or a tank corps without gunners or a regiment without

ch, which I am very glad to leave for the appendix, et to show that Russia took advantage of that comof an effective military system. It was wrong. You to the answer.

would have done it by demobilizing maybe divisions, ess, or units, and regiments, because the security of the .. from the standpoint of the military and from the the diplomacy was much more important than any one eturning home.

ANOWLAND. Of course one reason I, like you, support unice proposal is it seems to me that there are a lot of people ntry who have never given any service in the Military Esent who have an obligation of citizenship as well as getting its of citizenship, and it is far more equitable that they have been called up than the men that we did have to call up Korean situation who had already given 3, 4, 5 years of their World War II.

w, those men don't object, in the event of all-out mobilization, Ang called a second time, but it is a little rough on them, I think,

called again when they are just trying to make up for the that they lost in World War II, to be called back in the service in when there are so many young men who have given no service

all.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you 100 percent.

PLANNING FOR THE INCHON LANDING

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, yesterday you testified, Mr. Secretary, relative to this Inchon landing, the fact that some considerable doubts had been expressed by General Collins regarding the advisability of it. Did other members of the Joint Chiefs raise that same question? Mr. JOHNSON. To a much lesser extent. Admiral Sherman raised some questions. It may be that he accompanied Collins on that trip. Senator KNOWLAND. I believe he did.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is a long and tempestuous period I was over there. I am quite sure in thinking about it for a moment that he did. The censor may strike this out, but what Collins was objecting to was not so much a landing in itself as it was a landing at Inchon, on account of the mud and the tide and the height of the tides.

[Deleted.]

But General MacArthur took the position that he wanted to land behind and at Inchon.

When the history of this generation and of this war is written, there is nothing that was more brilliant in its conception and execution-with even the weather and the fates playing with us-than the Inchon landing. Beautifully done.

Senator KNOWLAND. Knowing that you

Mr. JOHNSON. The morning paper indicates that I told that story yesterday to take some credit for myself. That was farthest from my intent. I was answering the question and trying to give you facts. I seek neither to apologize nor explain nor seek credit. I just want to give you whatever other facts the question calls for.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that.

Knowing that you had been Secretary of Defense during the preliminary planning, and I have read the paraphrases of the messages that went back and forth, that was one reason, frankly, that I was surprised that you left the Department at the time you did, because while your resignation, you say, had been forwarded a few days before the Inchon landing, it did not take effect until 4 days afterward, and I have read the messages, and I know that this situation was pending for a period of a good many weeks prior to that time.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. So you and those responsible must have been fully acquainted with the preparatory moves that were under way. Mr. JOHNSON. So I was, and I had kept the President fully informed; he knew the date and all.

FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR INCHON LANDING

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I find on page 33 of the paraphrase furnished us by the Joint Chiefs, message No. 13, reading as follows: On 7 September 1950 the Joint Chiefs informed him—

that is MacArthur

that while they concurred in the desirability of passing to the offensive in Korea as early as practicable, they were concerned over the recent trend of events there. Accordingly, they requested an estimate of CINCFE as to the feasibility and chances of success of the projected amphibious effort if initiated as scheduled. This estimate was to be made in light of all the factors, including the apparent

83797-51-pt. 4-7

from a civilian economy were naturally anxious to return to their places of business or their farms and their families, which is perfectly understandable in a civilian army such as we have to put together in wartime.

DEMOBILIZATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

Would it not be fair to say that the fault was not necessarily in the point system but in the fact that we did not have a continuous replacement system so that men who had not given all of that time in helping to win the war might have replaced those who had the natural desire to come home?

I had thought that that as much as anything else accounted for some of the troubles we ran into.

Mr. JOHNSON. You may be quite right, Senator Knowland. We ought to have had the continuous replacement system or else we should have done what I think I would have argued to the Congress had I been in responsible Government position at that time.

I

We ought to have disbanded by units not less than regiments. did not have with me yesterday, but I dug out last night, a speech I made on April 14, 1946, at Parkersburg, W. Va., which is typical of what I said that time. May I read the one paragraph?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. I said:

The system of demobilization was not well thought out. Actually the method of demobilizing by individuals on the plan of points overnight reduced an Army which had been a splendid organization into an aggregation of individuals looking for the quickest way home. We now know that this was not the right system and we are paying a diplomatic price for it. Under that system an air squadron would suddenly find itself without pilots or a tropical base without malaria-control officers, or a tank corps without gunners or a regiment without officers.

And in this speech, which I am very glad to leave for the appendix, I elaborate in part to show that Russia took advantage of that complete wrecking of an effective military system. It was wrong. You may be right as to the answer.

I for my part would have done it by demobilizing maybe divisions, certainly not less, or units, and regiments, because the security of the United States from the standpoint of the military and from the standpoint of the diplomacy was much more important than any one individual returning home.

Senator KNOWLAND. Of course one reason I, like you, support universal-service proposal is it seems to me that there are a lot of people in our country who have never given any service in the Military Establishment who have an obligation of citizenship as well as getting the benefits of citizenship, and it is far more equitable that they should have been called up than the men that we did have to call up in this Korean situation who had already given 3, 4, 5 years of their life in World War II.

Now, those men don't object, in the event of all-out mobilization, to being called a second time, but it is a little rough on them, I think, to be called again when they are just trying to make up for the time that they lost in World War II, to be called back in the service again when there are so many young men who have given no service at all.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you 100 percent.