MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1951 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:09 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding. Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Brewster, Johnson (Texas), Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, and Cain. Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order. Gentlemen of the committees, our witness today is Vice Adm. Oscar Charles Badger, who is now the commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier. Admiral Badger is a distinguished naval officer who has served in two major wars. During World War II, he was one of the ranking naval commanders in the Pacific. He was one of the men who led America's attack directly on the heartland of Japan. Admiral Badger has had extensive experience in the Far East, the theater which is under study by our committees. He should be well qualified to advise with us on many of the matters that are under consideration. Admiral Badger, the committees have directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. Will you please rise and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give to these committees upon the issues pending, shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Admiral BADGER. I do. TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. OSCAR CHARLES BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER, EASTERN SEA FRONTIER; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COMDR. JAMES J. LYONS, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, will you give us the dates, and the nature of your most recent service in the Pacific, prior to your present assignment; or, do you have any statement you desire to make, any prepared statement? Admiral BADGER. I have no prepared statement, unless you wish one; but I want to remind the committees that on March 14, 1951, I was called before the National War College, and made a statement entitled "The Far Eastern World Strategy." In that, I covered the Far East as well as I could, in a period of about 30 or 35 minutes. Senator WILEY. What date was that? Admiral BADGER. That was March 14. Now, that statement included certain recommended action. It covers the Far East, and something of the background which relates directly to the present situation, and has been well received. Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be helpfulall we are seeking here is knowledge and background-if the admiral could read the statement into the record. Chairman RUSSELL. You are certainly at liberty to do that if you desire, Admiral. Admiral BADGER. I believe it is not directly bearing on what I understand the purpose of these committees' investigation is, but as far as I am concerned, it gives me an opportunity to present to you some of the things that are most important to understand about the Far East and also the best I can do in the way of what we should do from now on. Chairman RUSSELL. I think we would be interested in hearing that if you desire, Admiral. We would be glad to have you read it. Admiral BADGER. I would like to have the committees know that this talk was made before the relief of General MacArthur and I am willing to present this without any modification because I haven't seeu any reason to change my mind. Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, sir. WITNESS' EXPERIENCE IN THE FAR EAST Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the admiral how long he was in the Far East, how long his experience was there? Admiral BADGER. I have been in the Far East a total of over 3 years, with another 3 years of going there every 6 or 7 weeks on various missions. At the end of the war you remember, Mr. Senator, I was closing up the Pacific, had charge of the demobilization and closing up of the bases and had to go to China frequently in connection with the shipping and the disposition of that surplus material sent out to the islands. After that, why I came back for a brief period in the United States and then went out as commander of the forces in the western Pacific which I think should be clear to you gentlemen that that constituted the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Far East exclusive of the MacArthur area of command which was occupied Japan and Korea. Chairman RUSSELL. What were the dates, Admiral? Admiral BADGER. I went out there in December of 1947 and came back in October, I think, of 1949. STATEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, MARCH 14, 1951 Chairman RUSSELL. We would be glad to have you proceed with your statement if you desire. Admiral BADGER. I think it would lay a foundation here. I really do. The subject is the Far East and world strategy. It is an extremely wide subject involving a great many factors, points of view, and, of course, differences of opinion. Our major strategic objective is to create and maintain world conditions so that Russia will deem it unwise to undertake world war III. Secondarily, we should initiate promptly and undertake those political, economic, humanitarian, and military objectives which, in case of war with Soviet Russia, would permit us to engaged under the most favorable terms. I would like to divert for a minute to say that everything that is in this paper has to do with the basis of any war plan, which is the assumptions of the war plan. In other words, the state of the world at the time of the beginning of war is the basis on which the war plan must be set up. Therefore, if there is reference to political, economic, humanitarian, as well as military objectives, I remind you that they all have to do with what I consider important control of certain parts of the world in connection with communications and other things. Conflict between Communist and western influences already exists to an intensified degree throughout Asia. In some areas it is by nature political, in others economic, and in others military. The problems are serious and extremely varied. The best that 1 can hope to do in the time available is to present sufficient facts and ideas to assist you in your studies and estimates of the situation. In terms of broad strategy a glance at the map of Asia is sufficient to indicate the great advances that Communist forces have made in a comparatively short period of time. Southeast Asia looks pretty small compared to the area of the rest of Asia under dominating Soviet influences. MAJOR DIVISIONS IN ASIA Existing situations automatically divide the entire area into three major classifications: First, the area including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and, possibly, North China, which is generally deemed to be securely under Communist control and definitely subservient to Moscow. Secondly, the area of China to the southward of such definite control in which there is still a chance of revolutionary repercussion against Communist tyranny and imperialism. And third, the areas south of the border of China which are still outside of the iron or bamboo curtain, the vast majority of whose people stand strongly against Communist aggression and also against any form of colonialism, in favor of their own complete independence. ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONTIER IN ASIA It would be a waste of your time for me to argue the strategic difference between maintaining an anti-Communist frontier in Asia and permitting the entire area to fall under Communist domination. Any important anti-Communist frontier in Asia presents continuous and serious problems to the Communist regime in Peking or Moscow so long as it exists. I would like to emphasize that; that we do not have to feel too badly about not having a way to turn because that present frontier is on the south border of China instead of the north border. In case of war, it cuts off the availability of many important strategic material and, on the other hand, would impose the burden of flow from Russian sources of such materials and of arms and of ammunition, instead of providing a source of supply flowing in the other direction. Under the same conditions, of course, products of eastern Asia would be available to the western world and would permit the strategic use of these favorably located land and water areas in the exercise of world-wide military operations. I would like to emphasize that, because I have often looked at the map and if they were to get down and control Indonesia and southeast Asia, it would certainly make communications between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean very questionable, requiring shipping to go to India, for instance, around Australia, or probably around the Cape of Good Hope. If you will look at the map under those conditions you will see that India looks lost. AREAS UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL Let us first consider the areas which I have classified as those presently under the dominating control of Moscow through the various intervening Chinese Communist governments. This discussion may be a little lengthened by my attempt to point out the value of taking the initiative and which Russia in this case has maintained and cleverly exploited for a considerable period of time. To the students of the Far East it has been evident that the strategic value placed by Russia upon North China, including Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang has been very pronounced for many years-150 years. By recent developments the U. S. S. R. has not only obtained control of these vast areas important to herself, but no less authority than the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, has stated that they have been successful in detaching these areas from China and attaching them to the Soviet Union. Personally I do not believe that we can reduce Soviet domination of these areas short of war or of violent and successful revolution against the existing Soviet or Communist governments of Moscow and Peking. I sincerely hope there is some other way. At this point consideration should be given to a few recent historical facts. At Cairo in November 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff were considering the advisability of Russian entrance as a declared belligerent in the war against Japan. Because of the meeting with Mr. Stalin in Tehran, which was to follow the Cairo conference by only a few days, an immediate decision was necessary in order that they might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly. LOGISTICAL WEAKNESS OF SOVIET IN FAR EAST IN 1943 The Allied logistic agencies, with plenty of accurate and conclusive evidence and statistics at their disposal, pronounced the U. S. S. R. as being so weak logistically in the Far East, that even the support |