us, as we sit in this room, I understood you to testify that you were not aware that Racin was being used as a major supply depot by our enemy, Red China, and the North Koreans, is that correct, sir? Admiral BADGER. That is correct. Senator CAIN. You are just not familiar with that? Admiral BADGER. That is correct. Senator CAIN. May I ask you, have you, in pursuit of your naval duties, ever personally visited Racin? Admiral BADGER. NO. [Deleted.] Admiral BADGER. You say northeast Korea. You mean northeast Korea? Do you mean northeast Korea? Senator CAIN. That is what I have been advised, and that is what the map shows its location to be, sir. Now, people have pronounced that word, Admiral, in various ways. The Secretary of State called it Racin, and he may be more correct. Do you know it against that pronunciation? Admiral BADGER. Well, if it is in Korea, if it is within the area of North Korea, and a part of North Korea, then the least I can say is I don't understand. Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Cain, he may know it by another name, Najin. Senator CAIN. Yes. Well, the admiral's last reply is if Racin, called by any other name, is situated in northeast Korea and is being used by our enemy to destroy us, he, Admiral Badger, cannot understand why that is permitted. Admiral BADGER. That is right. I am not cognizant of any particular reason for its elimination from being subject the same as other localities in Korea. Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. HOT PURSUIT Admiral Badger, you have said with reference to the subject of hot pursuit that that is a course you think the United States ought to pursue to destroy enemy aircraft which crossed the Yalu River going south to destroy our forces. Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. Senator CAIN. Thank you. [Deleted.] USE OF NATIONALIST FORCES ON FORMOSA My last question: I have understood you to indicate that you were not very familiar with the status or the capability of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa, and for that reason you think a decision as to whether they should be employed, either in Korea or on the mainland of China-and with reference to the latter generally for guerrilla purposes-ought to be left to a decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Have I understood you correctly in that sense, sir? Admiral BADGER. That is correct, plus the third alternative as to their value for retention as defensive forces on the island. Senator CAIN. Admiral, I have labored long this afternoon, but I set out to do my best to understand exactly what you think about this question, and to my satisfaction, I have gotten the answers. Thank you. Chairman RUSSELL. The examination of Admiral Badger now comes to a close. Admiral, on behalf of the committees, I wish to thank you for your helpfulness to these committees. I enjoyed your opening statement. It was clear, concise, and pertinent to the issues that are under investigation. I think it was one of the most helpful statements that has been made here. The balance of your evidence is very valuable to the committees and grows out of a rich experience of many years in the service of your country. We thank you for your appearance here and for your assistance to the committees. If there is no further business at this time, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (The information referred to at pp. 2755, 2756 of this hearing follows:) CONSULTATIONS WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS During the testimony of General Marshall on May 14 he was asked by Senator Smith whether any of the policy makers in the Department of State or the Department of Defense discussed far-eastern problems with General MacArthur prior to June 1950 (p. 1830). In the course of General Marshall's answer to Senator Smith, he said that further information could be obtained from the Department of State. The information requested follows: The formal channel for communication between General MacArthur and this Government was the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army. As far as the Department of State is concerned, in addition to these formal channels, a high-ranking Department political officer was attached to General MacArthur's staff from the beginning of the occupation of Japan. This position was first filled by Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., who was tragically killed in a crash of a military transport plane in 1947 while returning to Washington for consultations. Since his death this position has been filled by Ambassador William J. Sebald. Both of these men maintained very useful and close relations with General MacArthur. In addition, almost all of the senior officers in the Department of State concerned with the Far East visited General MacArthur in Tokyo at various times and informally discussed with him virtually the whole range of far-eastern problems. Walton Butterworth, formerly Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, visited and conferred with General MacArthur in 1947 before coming to Washington from China to assume his post, and again in February of 1950. In the spring of 1948 Mr. George Kennan, who was the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, was sent to Japan by Secretary of State Marshall, for the specific purpose of fully conferring with General MacArthur concerning Japan and other far-eastern problems. Mr. Kennan spent 3 weeks in Japan for this purpose. Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup visited Japan to confer with General MacArthur in January 1950. Ambassador Dulles visited General MacArthur twice-first in June 1950 and again in January of this year, to discuss the problems connected with the making of a peace treaty with Japan. Almost all of our ambassadors in the Far East have also conferred with General MacArthur. The American Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, has maintained very close touch with General MacArthur before, as well as after, the attack on South Korea. He has visited Tokyo to see General MacArthur on numerous occasions, and he conferred with General MacArthur on the latter's visits to Korea. Most of the other top civilian officials of the Government concerned with problems of the Pacific area visited and conferred with General MacArthur. Thus, between General MacArthur and Washington there was not only the regular exchange by telegram and letter of views on matters of all degrees of importance, but there was the give-and-take of face-to-face discussions on all vital policy questions. Detailed lists of officials who consulted with General MacArthur, showing the dates of each visit to Tokyo are attached. ATTACHMENT A SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHO VISITED TOKYO, March 11-13, 1946: Gen. George C. Marshall, mission to China. April 16-17, 1946: Gen. George C. Marshall, mission to China. May 8, 1946: Paul MsNutt, Ambassador to Philippines. February 25-26, 1947: Paul McNutt, Ambassador to Philippines. June 3-4, 1946: Joseph Ballantine, Assistant to Secretary. May 13-June 13, 1947: James Penfield, Deputy Director, Far Eastern Affairs, May 18-23, 1947: Walton Butterworth, Minister-counselor. February 3-6, 1950; Walton W. Butterworth. Assistant Secretary of State. January 26-February 11, 1951: Ambassador John F. Dulles. June 17-27, 1950, John Allison, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. January 26-February 11, 1951: John Allison, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. NOTE.-Foregoing not necessarily complete. ATTACHMENT B HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT (EXCEPT DEPART- March 10-14, 1946: K. C. Royall, Under Secretary of War. June 19-July 15, 1946: E. W. Pauley, Reparations Commission. July 8, 1946: W. S. Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air. September 3-4, 1946: Howard E. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War. September 18-27, 1947: William Draper, Under Secretary of the Army. December 8-26, 1949: William Draper, Former Under Secretary of the Army. March 20-April 2, 1948: Paul Hoffman, Administrator, ECA. December 17, 1948: Paul Hoffman, Administrator, ECA. June 7, 1948: Roger Lapham, China Aid Mission. May 25-28, 1949: Roger Lapham, China Aid Mission. November 17-20, 1948: Arthur S. Barrows, Under Secretary of the Air Force. February 1-7, 1949: John W. Gibson, Assistant Secretary of Labor. February 1-May 2, 1949: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission. October 30-December 4, 1949: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission. October 7-December 4, 1950: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission. April 2-7, 1949: Robert A. Griffin, Chief of ECA in China Economic Survey Mission. March 1-5, 1950: Robert A. Griffin, Chief of ECA in China Economic Survey Mission. August 29-September 14, 1949: Tracy S. Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army. December 5-9, 1949: Tracy S. Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army. November 17-20, 1949: John J. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury. April 15-28, 1950: Thomas G. Blaisdell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce. June 17-27, 1950: Earl Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army. January 26-February 11, 1951: Earl Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army. August 6-8, 1950: William Harriman, Personal Representative of the President. November 22-28, 1950: F. P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy. NOTE.-Foregoing not necessarily complete. ASSISTANCE TO CHINA DURING AND AFTER THE EMBARGO (JULY 29, 1946 TO MAY 26, 1947) ON MILITARY SUPPLIES Senator Hickenlooper asked (p. 4958, June 4): "After the technical end of the embargo, isn't it a fact that for almost a year after that, for one reason or another, export permits were blocked so that no particular quantity of aid, either economic or otherwise, in fact, went to the Nationalists?" The information requested follows: Aid, other than combat matériel, was provided throughout the period of the embargo. Export licenses were promptly granted on request of the Chinesse Government during the period cited by Senator Hickenlooper. The embargo applied only to combat-type items of military equipment. It did not apply to economic assistance or civilian equipment, such as trucks and road-building equipment of obvious military value. On October 22, 1946, the embargo was modified to permit the Chinese Government to purchase civilian end-use items under 8% group program. The Chinese Government concluded no contracts covering these items until over a year later, on November 6, 1947. On August 30, 1946, 1 month after the embargo on combat matériel, the United States signed an agreement with the Republic of China for the sale of civilian-type war surplus property with an estimated procurement value of $900,000,000. This property consisted in large measures of vehicles of all types, construction equipment and air force supplies and equipment. The remainder comprised a wide variety of communications equipment, tools, shop equipment, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, medical equipment and supplies and chemicals. The UNRRA program for China, which began in November, 1945, continued throughout 1946 and 1947. The United States contributed 72 percent of the cost of this program or $474,000,000. UNRRA's China program consisted chiefly of food and clothing and of a wide variety of capital goods and materials important to the rehabilitation of China's agriculture and industries. In addition, UNRRA provided large numbers of technical and supervisory personnel who assisted the Chinese in the distribution of consumption commodities and the installation of capital goods. The embargo of combat matériel was lifted on May 26, 1946. That same day the Chinese Government was informed that the Department of State would approve the sale to China of 130,000,000 rounds of surplus rifle ammunition; and would approve export licenses for transport planes and for spare parts for all equipment, including combat items, previously transferred under the 8% group program. On June 25, 1947, the Chinese Government signed the contract for the ammunition and it was shipped from the west coast on July 14 and August 11, 1947. The Chinese Government was also informed that it would be granted export licenses on material purchased in the normal commercial arms markets in the United States, but it concluded no major contracts for the purchase of ammunition until December 1947. Before the actual lifting of the embargo in April and May, 1947, the United States Marines began to turn over (abandoned) large quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition rather than evacuate it when they were withdrawn from North China. The Secretary of State testified further on sales and deliveries of military supplies in his testimony on pages 5073-5976 of the June 5 session. . ALLEGED BLOCKING OF SHIPMENT OF GERMAN ARMS TO CHINA * ** * On June 5 Senator Brewster asked Secretary Acheson: "Are you familiar with the fact that a consignment of 20,000 rifles had actually left a German port for China, but was stopped en route by an order signed by Laughlin Currie on White House stationery forbidding any such aid to China? I would be interested to have you see what the records would indicate regarding that. It was following VE-day and the shipment was urgently recommended by General Wedemeyer and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Senator Brewster gave Freda Utley's book China Story as his source. * * * The Department of State has checked with appropriate offices in the Department of Defense and is informed on the basis of a preliminary search that the records checked in the Department of Defense show no recommendation by General Wedemeyer, or approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for any shipment of the kind indicated, nor any record of any such proposed shipment. The Department of State is requesting that the Department of Defense make a thorough investigation to ascertain what basis, if any, might exist for Miss Utley's report. The Department has also checked at the White House and is informed there is no record of any Laughlin Currie letter of memorandum on such a subject. The Department of the Army advises that in a letter dated July 7, 1945, to the London Joint Munitions Board, the combined Joint Chiefs of Staff did approve as a matter of policy the shipment of arms taken from the Germans to allies fighting in the Far East. The Department of the Army advises that there is no record of any shipment to Nationalist China in implementation of such policy. It appears possible to the Department of State that such a policy was rejected by agreement between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists since it was believed desirable at that time that the Nationalists standardize their arms for 30-caliber ammunition. With the German arsenals no longer producing ammunition for German arms, it was generally agreed that German arms would be of little use to the Nationalists since no further ammunition for such arms would be forthcoming. STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MARCH 20, 1947, ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND IN GREECE Tuesday morning, June 5, Senator Brewster (p. 5144) asked whether Secretary Acheson recalled making the following statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 20, 1947: "That is what we are doing in China. The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years." This single paragraph was a part of Secretary Acheson's reply to a question by Representative Judd. Representative Judd's question and Secretary Acheson's full reply follows: "Mr. JUDD. Mr. Secretary, a great many Americans obviously are confused by what seems to be a contradiction in our foreign policy with respect to the governments which become Communist-dominated. "If it is a wise policy for us to urge, for example, the Government of China to unite with organized Communist minorities there, why is it a wise policy to assist the Greek Government to fight against the same sort of armed Communist minorities in Greece? "Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think the problem is not exactly as you have stated it, Mr. Judd. "In China, as you know far better than I because you are an expert on the matter, the area controlled by the Communists is an area which the Communists have controlled for many years, perhaps up to 20 years. It is a large contiguous geographical area. In that area they have a government, for years, which has defied the authority of the Central Government and maintained its own authority. "It has an army which for years has repulsed all attempts to invade it. "Last spring a conference was held after a truce between representatives of the Communist-controlled area and the Government. Out of that conference came a Chinese proposal which was to create a new form of government, the result of which would be to dissolve the Communist government, to dissolve the Communist army and to allow that area of China which is now controlled by Communists to be represented in a central parliament. |