history, and that the conduct of the free nations is both unbelievable and incredible. I sit here every day and all day and most willingly in hopes that my curiosity about some of these matters can be cleared up. I thought I had heard everything until I read this morning's New York Times to which I wish to make the briefest sort of a reference in a moment or two. On page 7919 of your testimony you said: I think the time will arrive when we can drive the Chinese out of Korea. do not know how we are ever going to keep the Chinese out of Korea. I * * * Will you tell me as best you can, sir, what you have in mind as to the time and under what circumstances we are going to drive the Red Chinese out of Korea? General BARR. That was a rather general statement. I feel that our strength, our combat efficiency will eventually build up in Korea to where perhaps we would be able to drive the Chinese Communists. out of Korea, but we cannot keep them out of Korea unless we occupy the border, which we certainly do not want to do. That was perhaps too géneral a statement. Maybe I shouldn't have made it. Senator CAIN. General Barr, is it your view that the allied forces can drive the Red Chinese and the North Koreans as aggressors out of Korea with the present total strength the free nations have committed today in Korea? General BARR. I can't answer that question, Senator, because I don't know the relative combat efficiency of the two forces. ADDITIONAL UN FORCES NEEDED IN KOREA Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. Permit me to make reference to the New York Times of today. Ernest A. Gross, deputy_United_States representative, said in a letter to Secretary General Trygve Lie of the United Nations.on yesterday, June 21, this: There is a real need for additional forces from member states in the light of massive Chinese Communist concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression. That observation made by Mr. Gross in an official manner does not indicate, does it, that the free forces think they can repel the aggressor with the troops now available? General BARR. It doesn't indicate that, no. He wouldn't be asking for additional help if it did. Senator CAIN. What startled and actually shocked me about this additional troop need, as written about in the New York Times, was this: Mr. Gross asked Mr. Lie to relay the United States appeal to the members concerned, asking them to "give immediate consideration to making an initial contribution of ground forces of substantial character, consonant with their respective capabilities and other responsibilities." "Further, it is requested that member governments be asked to notify the Secretary General of offers in general terms, detailed arrangements to be made by the respective member governments and the unified command," the letter concluded. United Nations officials said the letter on this most critical of all subjects, a letter which said we want some immediate help from all of our allies in Korea United Nations officals said the letter would be forwarded to Mr. Lie, who is in Copenhagen preparatory to taking a vacation in Norway. Just as one American, my feeling has no resentment in it to you, General Barr, of any kind, but does that paper indicate to us that the management of the United Nations lies not in the unified command, which already has caused or had 170,000 American casualties within it, but lies entirely within the hands of one human being, who any time he leaves New York and goes to Denmark or on a vacation in Norway must be tracked down to wherever he is before we can even get a "yes" or "no" from our allies? It is for that reason, sir, that I said this is an unbelievable war, in which men are dying while other men are taking holidays; and that is why I asked you what you meant when you said, "I think the time will come when we can drive the Red Chinese out of Korea." I pray and share your hopes, sir, that that day will come, but on the basis of our present battle plans and until we can find Mr. Lie to ask him to ask others for more contributions, we can have no assurance of it, sir. I thank you and am grateful for your testimony. APPRECIATION OF GENERAL BARR'S TESTIMONY Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if there are no further questions, this will conclude the examination of General Barr. General, I want to express to you my personal thanks and those of the committee for your appearance here and for your assistance to us in matters which we have under inquiry. I shall not resort to any comparisons, but I do wish to say that I have never seen a witness who answered questions more directly than you have, and I am sure that no one could have listened to your testimony without being impressed by your sincerity and the honesty of the conviction that moved you to the different positions that you have taken. I am glad to say that the way you have stood up under this grilling indicates that I was somewhat in error this morning when I referred to your recent indisposition. You must have had a toothache or something of that nature, but I heard that you were ill. We thank you, sir, for your assistance to the committees and for your long and patriotic service to our country. General BARR. Thank you very much, Senator Russell. I greatly appreciate the consideration of the committees in questioning me. Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join the sentiments of the Chair and I know all the other committee members feel the same way about this gentleman's fine contribution here with such close proximity to the battlefield in Korea and these problems in China. He has helped me wonderfully. General BARR. Thank you, sir. Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning. (Whereupon at 5:40 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Monday, June 25, 1951 at 10: 03 a. m.) MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1951 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committe on Armed Services) presiding. Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Servcies), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, and Flanders. Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk, Verne D. Mudge and Mark H. Galusha, staff members, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order. Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland. ADMIRAL KING'S VIEWS ON RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE WAR Senator KNOWLAND. On June 16, 1951, I addressed a letter to Admiral Ernest J. King, reading as follows: DEAR ADMIRAL: As you know, the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee has been conducting hearings relative to our far eastern policy. Among the policy decisions that were made that appear to have had a farreaching effect in the Far East, was the bringing of the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East. The facts indicate that their troops entered Manchuria 6 days prior to the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945. It would be very much appreciated if you would send me any information available to you relative to your viewpoint and that of the Navy Department regarding the desirability of bringing the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East and such other facts that you might be able to present which would be helpful to the committee in the understanding of the problem. With best personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND. I received today the following answer from Admiral King, dated June 21, 1951, addressed to me, reading as follows: DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: In reply to your letter of June 16 I am pleased to inform you that at the time of the Yalta Conference (February 3-10, 1945) I was agreeable to the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war in the Far East. It was the belief of the Navy that Japan could and should be defeated without an invasion of the home islands. Our contention was that blockade and bombard ment could bring about Japanese capitulation and that in connection with this course of action, engagement of the Japanese armies in Manchuria by the Soviets would hasten that capitulation. When the late President Roosevelt asked me about making concessions to Premier Stalin in order to get him to "play ball." I replied that I would concede him only the southern half of the island of Sakhalin and that as a "sop." My expectation was that the Soviets would enter the conflict in the Far East sooner than they did, but perhaps Stalin and company were getting back at the Allies for not opening up the second front in Europe sooner than they did. I would remind you that as the Navy member of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff my job was advisory in nature. I did not attend any of the meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and consequently I have no first-hand knowledge of decisions reached, policies formulated or agreements made thereat. With kindest personal regards, I am, Sincerely yours, ERNEST J. KING, Fleet Admiral. Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have another procedural matter which I would like to bring before the committees, if this is the proper time. Chairman RUSSELL. You might as well do it now, as any other time, Senator McMahon. POSSIBLE TESTIMONY BY HARRIMAN Senator MCMAHON. Well, now it will be recalled that Averell Harriman was the only witness who was scheduled for a hearing by these committees who has not been heard. The determination to relieve Mr. Harriman of the obligation to testify was made by the subcommittee before we heard from this very unusual character, Patrick J. Hurley. The recommendation was made to the full committee before we had heard from Mr. Hurley. I believe that it would be a mistake to close this record without the testimony of Mr. Harriman who was present at Yalta. I have very much in mind Winston Churchill's admonition that we better not spend so much time on the past that we will lose the present and endanger the future, but at the same time we must remember too that we are making and have made a record here which will undoubtedly affect history. It would seem to be an obligation in view of Mr. Hurley's testimony, particularly his testimony with regard to Yalta, the circumstances that surrounded it, that we have the testimony of a man who above all others that I know of has information in regard to that conference, the circumstances surrounding it, what immediately preceded it and what followed it. I personally would like to see these hearings close. I, like all the other Senators, have much work backed up that we ought to get about. I do not wish to delay, but I bring for the consideration of the committee the problem that I have presented. If perhaps it is decided in the interests of speed that you want to close this hearing, then I would ask unanimous consent to print in the record at the conclusion of General O'Donnell's testimony a sworn affidavit from Mr. Harriman bearing upon the Yalta Conference and what went before it and what went after it, and I make that request. Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland. Senator KNOWLAND. I have no desire to object to the request of the Senator to have Mr. Harriman come before the committee if in the |