Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. General, if we had all-out war in Europe, would it be better to have our ground troops free, too? It would, would

it not?

General O'DONNELL. I didn't understand you, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I say, if you had an all-out war in Europe, following up the line of questions propounded by Senator Saltonstall, we would be better off if we had our ground forces so we could utilize them there in Europe, would we not?

General O'DONNELL. I don't know too much about the ground picture, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Well, you would think so, would you not? General O'DONNELL. I don't know. I have my own opinions. would be

Senator GEORGE. General

It

Chairman RUSSELL. He was prepared to answer it, I think, to some extent, Senator George. He said, "It would be"-and I do not know how much further he wished to go.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I do not think that is a military question. I think if we were out of Korea, with all of our forces, and if we are going to be faced with a war in Europe, we would feel more comfortable if we were out with the air, ground, and what have you, wouldn't you think so, General?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I think we have a pretty rich stake over there in Japan, too.

Senator GEORGE. I think you are right about that.

SOVIET ASPIRATIONS IN FAR EAST

General O'DONNELL. I have a personal opinion that Russia's objective in the Far East is Japan ultimately anyhow. I think they have had their sights on it for centuries and if they ever got into Japan and got that homogeneous nation of 70,000,000 people under their control, and highly industrialized as they are and as hard working as they are, and backing it up with the natural resources of Korea and Manchuria, our old fear of the yellow peril would be multiplied a hundredfold.

Senator GEORGE. Especially since Yalta with Manchuria and north China in the hands of the Red Chinese.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where 70 percent of all industry of the whole of China was located, was it not, even at the outbreak of this wareven at the outbreak of World War II?

General O'DONNELL. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you thoroughly. I don't think the half of Yalta has ever been told, and it will not be told for the next half century, because they not only have the iron and coal but the biggest pool of dependable cheap labor in the world, and they have access to all warm-water ports.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And through it, if the Russians can exploit it they can control Asia, of course.

WHEN MANCHURIAN BOMBING WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE

I was interested, General, in your statement about your first phase. You consider the first phase as having ended about November 1? General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. When the Chinese, the Red Chinese, came in in organized units?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was no question but what they were doing it early in November?

General O'DONNELL. And the myth of the volunteer army was broken, and they recognized them by armies

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

General O'DONNELL (continuing). Actual military commanders. Senator GEORGE. That is right. That, in your opinion, was the time when we should have been free to have struck along the Yalu River and at points just north of it?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. If we had been free to do so, are you of the opinion that we could have inflicted terrific damage, at least?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Might have been decisive?

General O'DONNELL. Might have.

Senator GEORGE. Might have?

General O'DONNELL. In my opinion.

Senator GEORGE. I congratulate you, General, on your Americanism. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

TRAINING AFFORDED ENEMY PILOTS IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General O'Donnell, relative to this plane operation which has been going on now for some time in North Korea, is it your professional opinion that the Communists, whether they be Russian fliers or Russian-trained fliers, are getting a considerable amount of experience in North Korea against our bombers and against our fighters?

General O'DONNELL. Very definitely, sir; they are able to get up there and toy with us, you see. They can run away if they want to, and they can come in if they want to, and as they have been building up their strength, they get more and more courageous, and come further down the line, and they have learned how to attack our bombers and how to fight with our fighters, and by just taking a little bit of time I never will forget during the last war, the first raid over Tokyo, we were told that we would be opposed by a thousand fighters over there.

Well, we went up there and we had nothing; that they were down climbing below us; they didn't know how to fight us, but as we stayed

with them they became more and more accustomed to our method of operation, and later on we did have a little serious opposition from both antiaircraft and the fighters; so this is giving the practice.

Senator KNOWLAND. Practice which they could rotate crews in a

way.

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. And send them in and then send them back to train Communist crews in Russia with the latest techniques of combating our fighter bombers?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; they are very definitely doing that and getting a lot of valuable information, I am afraid.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was over in Korea, General, in November of last year, both the Communist capital and later at Hamhung and Hungnam, and had a chance to talk to some of the men who had flown the Yalu River line, and they were certainly taking a very dim view of being fired on by these antiaircraft batteries that you have mentioned here and being able to see the Communist planes come up and attack them and then run back into sanctuary. General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

LETTER OF CAPT. JOHN THOMAS WELLS, III

Senator KNOWLAND. Because I do not want you to think, General, that it was only the air force that felt somewhat that way about it. A letter came into my hands yesterday and I want to give a little background on it.

On June 1 Capt. John Thomas Wells, III, of Baltimore, Md., a West Point graduate and counterintelligence officer, was killed in Korea. On May 24, 7 days before his death, he wrote his wife a letter, and I have a copy which I would like to read into the record at this time:

KOREA, May 24, 1951.

ANN MY DARLING: I am writing now because I had to relieve the tension beside me and I can only do that with you. If I could only describe for you the true picture over here, then you would know more than millions of other Americans. But even a clear description wouldn't be enough, because you've got to be here to realize how it is.

There is such a hopeless feeling inside me because of the helpless situation we are in. Here we have enough force to prevent defeat, but we haven't enough to win a victory. What is more hopeless than that? Every soldier fights to win: That's what keeps him going.

You remember that extremely patriotic feeling I had in Panama? Well, that's all gone now. Our Nation has flubbed this thing so badly that it hardly seems that we'll ever pull ourselves out. We could, with a strong, ruthless, firm hand at the wheel, which we don't have. We need somebody who will overlook the petty details, look at the big picture, decide what is necessary to end the war, make a plan, give Russia an ultimatum, slap down a few dissenters (which we have a perfect right to do since we're supporting them all), jump into the driver's seat, put the gas to the floor and a hand on the horn, and let her roll so that everyone will see we mean business. Certainly we'll scrape a few fenders, may even lose one or two, but it won't stop us. What gags me is the way we're driving like Caspar Milquetoast, trying to avoid every bump.

We immediately put ourselves on the defensive by knocking ourselves out trying to avoid war with Russia and she's smart enough to take advantage of it. If she wanted war, we'd be in it by now. Why can't we smarten up and take advantage of it by putting her on the defensive? I'm so damn sick and tired of this pussyfooting that I'm getting numb.

And this business of holding on to our allies at all costs is so much flimflam. Damn it, it should be the other way around and we could make it that way if we half tried.

* *

*

I love America because you are a part of it, Darling. You and our children are my America. That's what America means to me and I'm selfish about it. God bless America.

All my love,

RESTRICTIONS ON AIR POWER UTILIZATION IN KOREA

JACK.

General, from the time we got involved in the Korean War, in going through the paraphrases of documents furnished us by the Joint Chiefs I find that there have been various restrictions put on the military operations there including the air operations. For instance, the first one that I found appeared on page 8, paragraph 14, reading as follows:

The instructions furnished CINCFE by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, 1950, provided for the employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korea and units south of the Thirty-eighth parallel only.

Now that was subsequently changed because obviously it would have brought destruction to our ally and would have left the aggressor untouched, but that apparently was the first of the restrictions which was subsequently changed.

Then I find on page 49 of the same document the following:

25. Because of the political implications involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCFE on October 21 that the Department of State wished a special report to the Security Council by CINCUNC to the effect that it was the intent of the unified commander not to interfere with the operations of the Suiho hydroelectric power plant near Sinuiju.

Which I think you have already mentioned. Then I find on November 6 the following:

On November 6, 1950, CINCFE, by Telecon, indicated that he planned to employ 90 B-29 aircraft in attacking the first overwater span of the international bridge at Sinuiju crossing the Yalu River, the approaches to the bridges at Sinuiju, and the communication and supply centers at Sinuiju. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of this proposed air attack and dispatched a message to CINCFE directing him to postpone all bombing of targets within 5 miles of the Manchurian border until further orders.

Senator FLANDERS. What was that date?

Senator KNOWLAND. That was November 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that consideration was being urgently given to the Korean situation at the governmental level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urgently requested CINCFE's estimate of the situation and reasons for bombing the Yalu River bridges.

Then on that same day General MacArthur replied, stating there was a substantial movement across the bridges on the Yalu River and among other things that the only way to stop this movementis the destruction of the bridges by air attack and air destruction of installations in North Korea which would facilitate the movement. The air operations against the bridges at Sinuiju were being mounted and the strike on Sinuiju would be made within the next few hours. Under the gravest protest CINCFE could make, the operation was suspended. CINCFE felt that the operation was within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and the directions which he had received.

CINCFE requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the President since he believed the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well result in a calamity of major proportion, for which he could not acept the responsibility. He further requested immediate reconsideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decision.

And finally in answer to that urgent message he was given permission to bomb the river but again was told that he must not bomb any of the dams or power plants on the Yalu.

Now, the only reason-and there are many other examples other than the one I raised-do you not think, General, from a purely professional military point of view that the strategic air command and for that matter the military, had been operating under restrictions that perhaps had been without parallel in American history in fighting a war?

General O'DONNELL. I do not think there is any question about that, Senator. The United Nations decision to restrict us to areas south of the Yalu definitely put us under wraps and made us work against an inordinate disadvantage.

EFFECT OF LIMITATIONS ON EFFICIENCY OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, then, I want to raise this question, General. Consistently since I have been here I have supported the 70group air program, as I felt the 70-group program should be carried out, and I tried to get some funds in the Senate when they had been reduced in committee.

My feeling has been that one of the difficulties we now face rose out of our not having a sufficient force in being, which the very realistic men in the Kremlin would understand.

But the thing that concerns me is that now as the result of the Korean War you hear upon the floor of the Senate and throughout the country that maybe the Air Force is not all that it is cracked up to be, because they have not been able to knock the enemy out of the Korean operation.

I think that has had a detrimental effect upon our allies or potential allies in Europe and Asia and the Middle East, because they do not understand that our strategic air force was not permitted to operate in the way that that strategic air force was supposed to operate; and therefore it was not necessarily the fault of the Air Force that they have not been able to do the job that we all thought it could do, but because it was operating under restrictions nobody contemplated would be imposed upon it.

General O'DONNELL. That is correct. We were engaged in an unorthodox utilization of our equipment; and of course our equipment was not designed and our units were not designed and our crews were not trained to do that particular type of job. They were trained and designed to do a much more devastating type of job.

Senator KNOWLAND. And in the event aggression should take place elsewhere in the world, let us say from the East German satellites into West Germany, if you were restricted to not moving outside West Germany and into East Germany, you would again be faced with the same limitations?

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. In Germany as in Korea, if you were prohibited from going beyond the Polish border, let us say.

General O'DONNELL. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct, is it not?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all, General.