rising ground where the hills of Pentelicus meet the plain, the ten thousand Athenian hoplites faced the Persian host for the first struggle between Greeks and Asiatics on European ground. A swift runner had run the hundred and fifty miles of rugged hill country to implore the promised aid from Sparta, reaching that city on the second day; but the Spartans waited a week, on the ground that an old law forbade them to set out on a military expedition before the full moon.' The Boeotian city of Plataea, however, remembering how Athens had protected it against Thebes, joined the little Greek army with its full strength of a thousand hoplites. Without other help, the Athenians won a marvelous victory over ten times their number of the most famous soldiery in the world. The result was due to the generalship of Miltiades, the Athenian commander, and to the superior equipment of the Greek hoplites. The charge of their dense array, with long, outstretched spears, by its sheer weight broke the light-armed Persian lines, utterly unprepared for conflict on such terms. The darts and light scimeters of the Persians made little impression upon the heavy bronze armor of the Greeks, while linen tunics and wicker shields counted for little against the thrust of the Greek spear. One hundred and sixty-two Athenians fell. The Persians left over sixty-four hundred dead upon the field.2

162. Moral Importance of Marathon. Natural as the result came to seem in later times, it took high courage at that day to stand before the hitherto unconquered Persians, even without such adverse odds. "The Athenians," says Herodotus, were the first of the Greeks to face the Median garments, ... whereas up to this time the very name of Mede had been a terror to the Hellenes." Athens broke the spell, and grew

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1 For the sincerity of the Spartan excuse, see Grote, IV. 463-464, and Holm, II. 26, note 9. Read Browning's poem, Pheidippides.

2 Special reports: plan and story of the battle; discussion as to the Persian numbers.

herself to heroic stature in an hour. The memory of Marathon became the richest inheritance of the Athenians, and inspired them to daring enterprise. The sons of the men who conquered on that field could find no odds too crushing, no prize too dazzling, in the years to come. It was now that the Athenian character first showed itself as Thucydides (i. 70) described it a century later: "The Athenians are the only people who succeed to the full extent of their hope, because they throw themselves without reserve into whatever they resolve to do."

V. ATHENS

FROM MARATHON TO THERMOPYLAE.

163. An Interval of Preparation : Themistocles. Marathon, together with an Egyptian revolt against Persia, gained the Greeks ten years more of respite; but except in Athens little use was made of the interval. In that city the guiding spirit had come to be Themistocles, one of the most energetic and statesman-like leaders in all history. Under his guidance the Athenian democracy grew in unity and power. Two especially important measures are noted in the following sections.

164. Athens crushed Internal Faction by weakening and terrorizing the oligarchs. This involved the ruin of Miltiades, the hero of Marathon. He was an Athenian noble who had formerly made himself tyrant of Chersonese. Not long before the Persian invasion he had incurred the hatred of the Great King and had fled to Athens, where he became at once a prominent supporter of the oligarchic party. The democrats tried to prosecute him for his previous "tyranny," but the attempt failed, and his genius was available at Marathon. Soon after, he failed in a military expedition against Paros, and this time the democrats secured his condemnation.' He died shortly after in prison; and the blow was followed by

1 Special reports: a fuller story of Miltiades; the question of Athenian ingratitude (Abbot, I. 93–97; Grote, IV. 492–512; Cox, Greeks and Persians, 135-139; Holm, II. 23-24; Curtius, II. 255–258).

the ostracism of some oligarchic leader each season for several years, until that party was utterly broken and Athens was freed from danger of internal dissension.

165. Athens a Naval Power. The victorious democrats divided into new parties on questions of policy. Aristeides, "the Just," led the more moderate wing, content with the Cleisthenian constitution and inclined to follow old customs. Themistocles headed the more radical faction, and was bent upon a great departure from all past custom. The two appealed to the ostracism, and fortunately Aristeides was banished.

Some new and rich veins of silver had just been discovered in the mines of Attica, and it had been proposed to divide the large revenue among the citizens. Themistocles now persuaded his countrymen to reject this tempting plan; and instead to build a great fleet. He saw that the real struggle with Persia was yet to come, and that for a country like Hellas, the final issue must be decided by the command of the sea, where, too, the Greeks could not be so infinitely outnumbered. The policy, wise though it was, broke with all tradition. No European Greeks up to this time had used ships in war in any considerable measure; and Attica was utterly insignificant upon the sea. But, thanks to Themistocles, in the next three years Athens became the greatest naval power in Hellas; and the decisive victory of Salamis (§ 171) was to be the result.

VI. THE MAIN ATTACK, 480-479 B.C.

166. Persian Preparation. - Meantime, happily for the world, Darius had died, and the invasion of Greece fell to his vain and feeble son, Xerxes. Marathon had proved that no Persian fleet could transport troops sufficient for the enterprise, so the route through Thessaly was tried again. Another such accident as had wrecked the first expedition was guarded against by the construction of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos - a great engineering work that took

three years. Meantime, supplies were collected at stations along the way; the Hellespont was bridged; and finally, in the spring of 480 B.C., Xerxes in person led a mighty host of many nations into Europe. Ancient reports put the Asiatics at from one and a half to two millions of soldiers, with followers and attendants to raise the total to five millions. Modern critics think Xerxes may have had some half-million effective troops, with numerous followers. A fleet of twelve hundred ships accompanied the army.

167. The Greek Preparation. The danger forced the Greeks into something like common action: into a greater unity, indeed, than they had ever known so far, unless in the legendary war against Asiatic Troy. Sparta and Athens joined in calling an Hellenic congress at the Isthmus, in the spring of 480 B.C. The deputies that appeared bound their cities by oath to mutual aid, and pledged their common efforts to punish any states that should " Medize," or join Persia. Plans of campaign were discussed, and Sparta was recognized formally as leader. Ancient feuds were pacified, and messengers were sent to implore aid from outlying portions of Hellas, though with little result. Crete excused herself on a superstitious scruple; Corcyra promised a fleet, but took care it should not arrive; and Gelon of Syracuse had his hands full at home with the Carthaginian invasion. Indeed, the double attack by Asia and Africa upon the two sections of the Greek race was probably concerted to prevent any joining of Hellenic forces.

The outlook was full of gloom. Argos, out of hatred of Sparta, and Thebes, from jealousy of Athens, refused to attend. the congress, and were ready to join Xerxes. Even the Delphic oracle predicted ruin, advised submission, and warned the Athenians to flee to the ends of the earth.

168. The Lines of Defense: Plan of Campaign. - Against a land attack the Greeks had three lines of defense. The first was at the Vale of Tempe near Mount Olympus, where only a narrow pass opened into Thessaly. The second was at Ther

mopylae, where the mountains shut off northern from central Greece, except for a still narrower road. The third was behind the Isthmus of Corinth.

At the congress, the Peloponnesians had wished selfishly to abandon the first two lines. They urged that all patriotic Greeks should retire at once within the Peloponnesus, the final citadel of Greece, and fortify the Isthmus by an impregnable wall. This plan was as foolish as it was selfish. Greek troops might have held the Isthmus against a land army; but the Peloponnesus was readily open to attack by sea, and the Persian fleet would have found it easier here than at either of the other lines of defense to land troops in the Greek rear without losing touch with its own army. Such a surrender of two thirds of Greece, too, would have meant a tremendous reënforcement of the enemy by excellent Greek soldiery.

169. The Loss of Thessaly. - Sparta had no gift for going to meet an enemy, but must await its attack on its own terms. From fifty thousand to one hundred thousand men should have held the Vale of Tempe. The feeble and insufficient garrison sent there retreated wisely before the Persians appeared. Xerxes entered Greece without a blow, and the Thessalian cities, so deserted by their allies, joined the invaders with their powerful cavalry.

170. Thermopylae. This made it evident, even to Spartan statesmen, that to abandon central Greece would strengthen Xerxes further, and it was decided in a half-hearted way to make a stand at Thermopylae. The pass was only some twenty feet wide between the cliff and the sea, and the only other path was one over the mountain, equally easy to defend. The long island of Euboea approached the mainland just opposite the pass, so that the Greek fleet in the narrow water passage could guard the land army against having troops landed in the rear. The Athenians furnished and manned one hundred and twenty-seven ships of the fleet (out of a total of two hundred and seventy). The land defense had been