warfare. He massed his best troops in a solid column, fifty deep, on the left, opposite the Spartan wing in the Peloponnesian army. His other troops were spread out as thin as possible. The solid phalanx was set in motion first; then the thinner center and right wing advanced more slowly, so as to engage the attention of the enemy opposite, but not to come into action until the battle should have been won by the massed column. In short, Epaminondas simply adopted a device whereby he could safely mass a great part of his force against one part of his enemy's line.1 The weight of the Theban charge crushed through and trampled under the ten minutes. Thespiae PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF LEUTRA 371 B.C. Leuctra THE BANS SPARTANS PELOPONNESIANS Spartan force. Four hundred of the seven hundred Spartans, with their king and with a thousand Perioeci, went down in The field was won, and Sparta was a secondrate power. The mere loss was a fatal enough blow, now that Spartan citizenship was so reduced, the number of full citizens after this battle did not exceed fifteen hundred, but the effect upon the military prestige of Sparta was more deadly. None the less, the Spartan character never showed to better advantage. Sparta was always greater in defeat than in victory. Her virtue was that of endurance rather than of action; and she met her fate with heroic courage. The news of the overthrow did not interfere with a festival that was going on, and only the relatives of the survivors of the battle appeared in mourning. 1 The Spartans seem to have been unable to modify their military system so as to cope with the evident peril from these new tactics, which were to win again with almost equal ease at Mantinea (§ 231). After this, Sparta played little part in Greece for a hundred and fifty years, until the time of Cleomenes (§ 266). II. THEBAN SUPREMACY. 231. The Interest in the Brief Supremacy of Thebes centers in two facts—the personality of Epaminondas and the connection with young Philip of Macedon. Epaminondas' marks one of the fair heights to which human nature ascends. With a more lovable and more justly balanced character, he sought to do for Thebes what Pericles had done for Athens; and while he lived, success seemed possible. Sparta was humiliated and Laconia ravaged. Messenia was liberated on one side, with its new capital, Messene, and Arcadia was organized into a federal union on another side "to surround Sparta with a perpetual blockade." In the latter district, Mantinea was restored, and Epaminondas united forty scattered villages into a new city, Megalopolis (the Great City). Except for aid from Athens, Sparta probably would have been totally destroyed. Epaminondas then turned upon Athens, built fleets, swept the Athenian navy from the seas, and made Euboea a Theban possession. Meantime Pelopidas had been active in the north. Both Thessaly and Macedonia were brought under Theban influence, and the young Philip, prince of Macedon, spent some years in Thebes as a hostage, learning lessons in war and in politics that were to result in the conquest of Greece and of Asia. Thus Thebes had replaced Sparta as head of Greece, and a humiliating embassy to the Persian court obtained express recognition of that fact from the Great King. This leadership, however, rested solely on the supreme genius of one statesman, and vanished instantly at his death. In 362 B.C., for the fourth time Epaminondas marched against Sparta, and at Mantinea won another great victory, by tactics like those of Leuctra. This was the greatest land battle ever fought between Hellenes, and nearly all the states of Greece took part on one side or the other. The victory of Thebes ought to have made her suprem 1 Special report upon his character and work. acy lasting; but Epaminondas himself fell on the field, and his city sank at once to a slow and narrow policy. No state was left in Greece to assume leadership. Even within the Peloponnesus, Arcadians and Messenians proved incapable of steady government; and a turbulent anarchy, in place of the stern Spartan rule, seemed the only fruit of the brief glory of the great Theban. III. THE RISE OF MACEDON. 232. Political Demoralization in Hellas: Mutual Stalemate. The failure of the Greek cities to federate or consolidate made it certain that sooner or later they must fall to some outside power. Sparta and Thebes (with Persian aid) had been able to prevent Athenian leadership; Thebes and Athens had overthrown Sparta; Sparta and Athens had still been able to stalemate Thebes. Each state had been discredited and exhausted in turn; and each, in varying degree, had sinned by calling in Persia or by recognizing her as arbiter in Hellenic politics. No one of the three had thought of empire primarily as involving duties to the subjects. The Greeks had not degenerated,' as is sometimes taught; but the imperfections of their political system had become apparent, and it was to be replaced by something stronger. 233. Macedon: its People and King. - The Macedonians were part of the "outer rim of the Greek race." They were still barbaric, and perhaps were mixed somewhat with non-Hellenic elements. They had remained in the tribal stage until just before this time, when a series of able kings had consolidated them into a real nation. The change was so recent that Alexander a little later could say, in his one reproachful speech to army: : his "My father, Philip, found you a roving people, without fixed habitations and without resources, most of you clad in the skins of animals, 1 On the virtue of the Greeks in the third century, see Holm, III. 178 ff. and 194-199, |