The

analysis, but started a new theory of its own. opposition of the two is typified by the contention between Thibaut and Savigny at the beginning of the present century. But in speaking of Savigny as the founder of a historical school, we must remember that his views upon the origin of Law were little more than conjecture, hence it was to be expected that the next Jurist who was capable of independent thought would reject them. This, indeed, Ihering has done; he returns to the old lines, establishes Law on Force, and reconstructs a system equivalent to that of Austin. It is to be noticed, however, that he carries his results a stage further, and includes in his idea of Law the limitation of the Sovereign power.

With all this before us then, it is impossible to be content to rest finally in Austin's conclusions. The view of Law which Savigny and Puchta adopted, and which was sharply repudiated by Ihering, has received unexpected confirmation from the works of Sir Henry Maine, and the analysis of Ihering himself has led him, upon other grounds, to a point which is far in advance of Austin. That I have adequately employed the material thus placed at my disposal, I cannot say; it must be sufficient if I have done something to emphasise the defects of the current system, and to make the way easier for subsequent enquirers. It will be seen that. I lay claim to no originality in the views I maintain. Some of them, indeed, seemed at one time to be my own, but wider reading has shown that they rest on better authority than any that I could give them, and to their proper authors I have gladly referred

them. This will be evident in the course of the work; and there is only one point which I need specially mention here. I have tried to show that there exist sufficient historical reasons for the different views on Law which have prevailed in Germany and in England. This idea I for some time thought to be my own, until, on referring to some notes which I took of Prof. Pollock's introductory lecture last October at University College, London, I found that, however unconsciously I had retained it, it must have been originally suggested by him. I am glad, therefore, to make this acknowledgment to a writer who has shown how happily practical sense and humorous criticism can be combined in the treatment of Law.

In conclusion, I may say that perhaps hardly any idea of Law is likely to be accepted by all students; it is sufficient if each aspect is from time to time brought prominently forward, and so made to influence actual conduct. In the complication of human affairs it is enough for us to give every view proper expression and representation; the blending of them is effected, and the final result worked into the history of the race, by forces which are beyond human control.

Soon after I wrote the above, and when the following pages were already in the publisher's hands, there appeared Professor Clark's work on "Practical Jurisprudence." The view of Law which he has propounded is in some respects so similar to the one adopted here, that I was at first in some little diffi

culty as to the proper course for me to take. Had that work, indeed, been published a few weeks earlier, I should have thought it necessary either to withdraw or at least to make extensive alterations in my own; as it was, I at once communicated with Professor Clark, and I have to thank him for the ready courtesy with which he recognised the independence of our investigations and left me at liberty to act as I thought fit. Perhaps, then, this explanation will be enough to account for any coincidences between the two works that may be observed, and it will be easily seen that if our results are occasionally the same, the methods I have employed are but too clearly my own.